上市公司大股东侵占行为影响因素实证研究
发布时间：2019-03-15 18:03
【摘要】：大股东的侵占主要是股权过于集中导致的。以LLSV为代表的学者认为，大股东一方面与小股东共享收益，并利用其控制地位而独享私有收益，大、小股东之间的利益冲突产生。中国，由于其制度的不完善性，证券市场上信息的不对称，造成了上市公司和它所下属的上市公司、关联公司之间上演着复杂的关联交易，而上市公司的盈利能力与大股东现金流量的所有权存在着一定的关系，就会使得大股东通过利用控制权从而取得私人收益。中国的上市公司实行着金字塔结构下的大股东利益侵占激励机制，股权集中度相当高，而对中小股东利益实行保护的法律体系又不完备，大股东侵占的行为又多采取不正当的手段来达到其目的，大股东侵占中小股东的利益现象屡见不鲜，影响了中国证券市场的有序进行。所以，要从根本上解决大股东侵占行为的发生就必须从根源上来探索影响大股东侵占行为因素和内在动因机制，具有理论和现实意义。 本文首先对大股东侵占行为影响因素的研究文献做了一个综述，并进行了相关理论的分析。接着讨论了大股东侵占的途径和产生大股东侵占的制度与环境分析。然后选取了2004年和2009年上市公司作为样本，用logistic模型实证分析了大股东侵占行为发生的影响因素，发现股权分置度变量与大股东侵占行为的发生呈重要的负相关关系，公司规模有重要的正相关关系；然后，选取了2004、2005、2009和2010年的上市公司为样本，使用panel data模型实证分析了大股东侵占度的影响因素，发现资产负债率、监事会规模与大股东侵占度呈正相关关系，股权分置度和公司规模与大股东侵占度呈负相关关系。公司规模在抑制大股东侵占行为发生和减轻侵占度的作用正好相反，这是个有趣的结论。
[Abstract]:The occupation of major shareholders is mainly caused by excessive concentration of equity. Scholars, represented by LLSV, believe that on the one hand, the major shareholders share the income with the minority shareholders, and use their control status to enjoy the private income, and the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders arise. In China, due to the imperfection of its system and the asymmetry of information in the securities market, the listed companies and their listed companies, and affiliated companies, are performing complex related transactions. There is a certain relationship between the profitability of listed companies and the ownership of large shareholders' cash flow, which will make the large shareholders obtain private income by using control rights. The listed companies in China implement the incentive mechanism of large shareholders' interests embezzlement under the pyramid structure, the concentration of equity is quite high, and the legal system of protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders is not perfect. The behavior of embezzlement by large shareholders often adopts improper means to achieve its purpose. The phenomenon of large shareholders encroaching on the interests of small and medium shareholders is not uncommon, which affects the orderly progress of China's securities market. Therefore, in order to fundamentally solve the occurrence of large shareholder embezzlement, it is of theoretical and practical significance to explore the factors and internal motivation mechanism that influence the behavior of large shareholder embezzlement from the root. At first, this paper reviews the literature on the influencing factors of the major shareholders' embezzlement, and analyzes the relevant theories. Then it discusses the ways of major shareholders' embezzlement and the system and environment analysis of the major shareholders' embezzlement. Then selected the listed companies in 2004 and 2009 as samples, using the logistic model to analyze the influencing factors of the large shareholder embezzlement, found that the degree of ownership separation variable and the occurrence of the major shareholder embezzlement behavior has an important negative correlation. The size of the company has an important positive correlation; Then, the listed companies in 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2010 are selected as samples, and the panel data model is used to analyze the influencing factors of the invasion degree of large shareholders. It is found that the ratio of assets and liabilities, the size of the board of supervisors and the degree of invasion of large shareholders have a positive correlation. There is a negative correlation between the degree of ownership separation and the size of the company and the degree of occupation of the major shareholders. It is an interesting conclusion that corporate size has the opposite effect on restraining the occurrence of large shareholder embezzlement and reducing the degree of encroachment.
【学位授予单位】：福建农林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
本文编号：2440855
[Abstract]:The occupation of major shareholders is mainly caused by excessive concentration of equity. Scholars, represented by LLSV, believe that on the one hand, the major shareholders share the income with the minority shareholders, and use their control status to enjoy the private income, and the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders arise. In China, due to the imperfection of its system and the asymmetry of information in the securities market, the listed companies and their listed companies, and affiliated companies, are performing complex related transactions. There is a certain relationship between the profitability of listed companies and the ownership of large shareholders' cash flow, which will make the large shareholders obtain private income by using control rights. The listed companies in China implement the incentive mechanism of large shareholders' interests embezzlement under the pyramid structure, the concentration of equity is quite high, and the legal system of protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders is not perfect. The behavior of embezzlement by large shareholders often adopts improper means to achieve its purpose. The phenomenon of large shareholders encroaching on the interests of small and medium shareholders is not uncommon, which affects the orderly progress of China's securities market. Therefore, in order to fundamentally solve the occurrence of large shareholder embezzlement, it is of theoretical and practical significance to explore the factors and internal motivation mechanism that influence the behavior of large shareholder embezzlement from the root. At first, this paper reviews the literature on the influencing factors of the major shareholders' embezzlement, and analyzes the relevant theories. Then it discusses the ways of major shareholders' embezzlement and the system and environment analysis of the major shareholders' embezzlement. Then selected the listed companies in 2004 and 2009 as samples, using the logistic model to analyze the influencing factors of the large shareholder embezzlement, found that the degree of ownership separation variable and the occurrence of the major shareholder embezzlement behavior has an important negative correlation. The size of the company has an important positive correlation; Then, the listed companies in 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2010 are selected as samples, and the panel data model is used to analyze the influencing factors of the invasion degree of large shareholders. It is found that the ratio of assets and liabilities, the size of the board of supervisors and the degree of invasion of large shareholders have a positive correlation. There is a negative correlation between the degree of ownership separation and the size of the company and the degree of occupation of the major shareholders. It is an interesting conclusion that corporate size has the opposite effect on restraining the occurrence of large shareholder embezzlement and reducing the degree of encroachment.
【学位授予单位】：福建农林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
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