广场协议后日本中央银行金融政策
发布时间:2019-04-01 16:10
【摘要】:1985年广场协议以来,日本经济在内外环境的影响下,经历了由泡沫膨胀到崩溃、再通过改革寻求恢复的过程。在此过程中,金融制度改革以及中央银行即日本银行的政策操作对实体经济产生了什么作用和影响?其经验教训如何?是本文要探讨的基本问题。 本文采用实证考察的方法,运用货币银行学、国际协调论、群体行为心理学、社会行动论等相关理论分析工具,系统阐述了1985年至2006年日本中央银行的金融政策及其制度改革。 根据这一时期日本经济及金融政策的变化,正文的四章重点考察了中央银行促生泡沫经济的低利率政策、导致泡沫经济破溃的高利率政策、救市护企的“最后贷款人”作用、制度变革期的零利率及量化宽松政策。 通过对广场协议后日本银行金融政策的详尽剖析,可以得出结论性看法是:其一,泡沫经济的膨胀与崩溃,皆与金融政策直接相关,中央银行在利率调控的时机和力度把握上明显存在问题。其二,以国家权力为背景,中央银行在整顿金融秩序、解决不良贷款问题上发挥了“最后贷款人”作用。其三,与同一时期财政政策相对照,面对经济发展长期低迷的状况,中央银行选择了通货稳定的政策目标,从而保证了金融秩序的稳定,恢复了面临危机的金融信用。其四,以“金融大爆炸”改革为分界线,改革终结了战后以来“护送船队”式金融管理体制,中央银行的独立性增强。此外,通过我们的考察,国内外学者、政府与执政党经常提出基于各种目的的政策建议,,有些是日本银行难以接受的,为此常常产生各种争论。一般而言,这种争论是必不可缺的,也有益于经济理论的发展。但通过媒体的推波助澜,肆意渲染以及带有偏见的报道,则往往形成对日本银行的舆论压力。那么中央银行应该恪守的底线是什么?或者说是那些建议是可以接受的,那些建议是绝对不能接受的。通过本文的实证研究得出的答案是,人为地引起通货膨胀及近邻贫困化政策是绝对不能接受的。 由于个别史料的不完备,对民间经济人及学界对经济形势判断,可能会出现以偏概全现象。由于笔者的学识不足,对问题的深度及广度上的把握上深感力不从心。有待于在今后的研究中加以解决。
[Abstract]:Since 1985, under the influence of internal and external environment, Japan's economy has experienced the process of expanding from bubble to collapse, and then seeking recovery through reform. In this process, the reform of the financial system and the policy operation of the Central Bank of Japan (the Bank of Japan) have what effect and impact on the real economy? What are the lessons learned? It is the basic problem to be discussed in this paper. This paper systematically expounds the financial policy and system reform of the Central Bank of Japan from 1985 to 2006 by using the methods of empirical investigation, such as monetary and banking studies, international coordination theory, group behavior psychology, social action theory and other relevant theoretical analysis tools. According to the changes of Japan's economic and financial policies during this period, the four chapters of the text focus on the low interest rate policy of the central bank to promote the bubble economy, the high interest rate policy that led to the collapse of the bubble economy, and the role of the "lender of last resort" in rescuing the market protection enterprises. Zero interest rate and quantitative easing policy in the period of institutional change. Through a detailed analysis of the financial policy of the Bank of Japan after the Plaza Agreement, we can draw a conclusion: first, the expansion and collapse of the bubble economy are all directly related to the financial policy. The central bank has obvious problems in the timing and strength of interest rate control. Secondly, under the background of state power, the central bank plays the role of lender of last resort in rectifying the financial order and solving the problem of non-performing loans. Third, compared with the fiscal policy of the same period, in the face of the long-term economic development downturn, the central bank has chosen the policy objective of currency stability, thus ensuring the stability of the financial order and restoring the financial credit facing the crisis. Fourth, the "Financial Big Bang" reform as the demarcation line, the reform ended the post-war "escort fleet"-style financial management system, the independence of the central bank strengthened. In addition, through our investigation, scholars at home and abroad, the government and the ruling party often put forward policy recommendations based on various purposes, some of which are difficult to accept by the Japanese banks, which often lead to various disputes. In general, such arguments are indispensable and beneficial to the development of economic theory. But media-fuelled, wanton rendering and biased reporting tend to create public opinion pressure on the Bank of Japan. So what is the bottom line that the central bank should adhere to? Or those suggestions are acceptable, and those proposals are absolutely unacceptable. The answer to this empirical study is that it is absolutely unacceptable to artificially cause inflation and poverty in neighboring countries. Due to the imperfection of individual historical materials, it is possible to judge the economic situation of the folk economic man and the academic circles in a partial way. Due to the author's lack of knowledge, the depth and breadth of the problem can not be grasped. It needs to be solved in the future research.
【学位授予单位】:南开大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F833.13
本文编号:2451688
[Abstract]:Since 1985, under the influence of internal and external environment, Japan's economy has experienced the process of expanding from bubble to collapse, and then seeking recovery through reform. In this process, the reform of the financial system and the policy operation of the Central Bank of Japan (the Bank of Japan) have what effect and impact on the real economy? What are the lessons learned? It is the basic problem to be discussed in this paper. This paper systematically expounds the financial policy and system reform of the Central Bank of Japan from 1985 to 2006 by using the methods of empirical investigation, such as monetary and banking studies, international coordination theory, group behavior psychology, social action theory and other relevant theoretical analysis tools. According to the changes of Japan's economic and financial policies during this period, the four chapters of the text focus on the low interest rate policy of the central bank to promote the bubble economy, the high interest rate policy that led to the collapse of the bubble economy, and the role of the "lender of last resort" in rescuing the market protection enterprises. Zero interest rate and quantitative easing policy in the period of institutional change. Through a detailed analysis of the financial policy of the Bank of Japan after the Plaza Agreement, we can draw a conclusion: first, the expansion and collapse of the bubble economy are all directly related to the financial policy. The central bank has obvious problems in the timing and strength of interest rate control. Secondly, under the background of state power, the central bank plays the role of lender of last resort in rectifying the financial order and solving the problem of non-performing loans. Third, compared with the fiscal policy of the same period, in the face of the long-term economic development downturn, the central bank has chosen the policy objective of currency stability, thus ensuring the stability of the financial order and restoring the financial credit facing the crisis. Fourth, the "Financial Big Bang" reform as the demarcation line, the reform ended the post-war "escort fleet"-style financial management system, the independence of the central bank strengthened. In addition, through our investigation, scholars at home and abroad, the government and the ruling party often put forward policy recommendations based on various purposes, some of which are difficult to accept by the Japanese banks, which often lead to various disputes. In general, such arguments are indispensable and beneficial to the development of economic theory. But media-fuelled, wanton rendering and biased reporting tend to create public opinion pressure on the Bank of Japan. So what is the bottom line that the central bank should adhere to? Or those suggestions are acceptable, and those proposals are absolutely unacceptable. The answer to this empirical study is that it is absolutely unacceptable to artificially cause inflation and poverty in neighboring countries. Due to the imperfection of individual historical materials, it is possible to judge the economic situation of the folk economic man and the academic circles in a partial way. Due to the author's lack of knowledge, the depth and breadth of the problem can not be grasped. It needs to be solved in the future research.
【学位授予单位】:南开大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F833.13
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