股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为研究

发布时间：2019-04-04 18:04

【摘要】：本文以2007—2009年被大股东减持的深交所上市公司为样本,研究股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为。研究发现:被减持上市公司在减持前30个交易日有显著的正累计超常收益,而在减持后30个交易日则出现显著的负累计超常收益;被减持上市公司倾向于在减持前披露好消息,或将坏消息推迟至减持后披露;减持规模越大,大股东操控上市公司信息披露的概率就越高;相比其他大股东,控股股东对上市公司信息操控更严重,获得的减持收益也更高。本文的研究证实了大股东,特别是控股股东,通过操控上市公司的重大信息披露来掏空中小股东利益的事实,为监管机构加强大股东行为的监督,提高中小投资者保护水平提供了依据。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange which were reduced by the major shareholders from 2007 to 2009 as a sample to study the hollowing behavior of the major shareholders in the process of stock reduction. It is found that the reduced listed companies have significant positive cumulative extraordinary returns in the 30 trading days before the reduction, while in the 30 trading days after the reduction, there are significant negative cumulative extraordinary returns; The reduced listed companies tend to disclose the good news before the reduction, or postpone the bad news to the post-reduction disclosure, and the larger the scale of the reduction, the higher the probability of controlling the information disclosure of the listed company by the major shareholders; Compared with other major shareholders, the controlling shareholders control the information of listed companies more seriously, and obtain higher return on the reduction of holdings. The research in this paper confirms the fact that the major shareholders, especially the controlling shareholders, empty out the interests of the minority shareholders by manipulating the important information disclosure of the listed companies, and strengthen the supervision of the behavior of the major shareholders for the regulatory agencies. Improve the level of protection of small and medium-sized investors to provide the basis.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“公司财务管理若干基础问题研究”(批准号70632001)
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

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