金融干预与商业银行薪酬水平、违约风险的研究
发布时间：2019-04-11 06:57
【摘要】：金融危机之后，不少濒临破产边缘依靠政府救助得以幸存的商业银行仍然支付其高管高额薪酬。民间纷纷指责这一不公平现象，学术界也认为高薪缺乏优秀业绩的支撑，各国政府也都出台了相关政策来规范银行高管薪酬问题。本文正是在这样的背景下来，以中国十六家上市商业银行作为样本，，从风险角度来对商业银行薪酬问题进行研究。以几家有代表性的国际性大银行作为参照对象，本文发现中国银行业总体薪酬水平还有上升空间。目前股份制商业银行的薪酬水平最高。大部分商业银行普遍实施了固定薪酬与变动薪酬相结合的激励措施，但是后者比例较低。基于股权价值的激励和中长期的激励方案，无论在管理层还是普通员工中间均很少实施。 基于面板数据的实证模型研究了高管薪酬水平对银行违约风险的影响，发现高管薪酬水平对银行违约风险的影响呈“倒U形”关系，并且高管薪酬水平对国有大型商业银行违约风险的影响高于对股份制商业银行和城市商业银行的影响。另外，总体薪酬成本作为银行一项重要的人力资本成本，水平越高对银行违约风险的影响也越大。但是这并不意味着总薪酬成本越低越好，银行应提高提高经营效率，从而提高人力资本效率。因此本文在分析了干预手段-间接的资本充足率限制和直接的薪酬干预的基础上，提出建议，金融监管部门应加强对银行薪酬干预的力度，扩大干预范围，尤其应加强对薪酬结构的干预和规范，增加中长期激励和基于股权价值的激励。
[Abstract]:After the financial crisis, many commercial banks, on the brink of bankruptcy, survived by government bailouts, still paying high salaries for their executives. Civil society has criticized this unfair phenomenon, academia also believes that high-paid lack of excellent performance support, governments have issued relevant policies to regulate the issue of bank executive compensation. Under this background, this paper takes 16 listed commercial banks in China as a sample to study the compensation of commercial banks from the point of view of risk. Taking several representative international banks as the reference object, this paper finds that the overall compensation level of Chinese banks still has room to rise. At present, the joint-stock commercial banks pay the highest level. Most commercial banks generally implement a combination of fixed and variable pay incentives, but the latter ratio is low. Equity value-based incentives and medium-and long-term incentives are rarely implemented either among management or ordinary employees. Based on the empirical model of panel data, this paper studies the impact of executive compensation level on bank default risk, and finds that the impact of executive compensation level on bank default risk is "inverted U" relationship. And the effect of executive compensation level on default risk of state-owned large commercial banks is higher than that on joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. In addition, as an important cost of human capital, the higher the level of compensation cost, the greater the impact on the default risk of banks. However, this does not mean that the lower the total compensation costs, the better, banks should improve operational efficiency, thereby improving the efficiency of human capital. Therefore, based on the analysis of the indirect capital adequacy ratio restriction and the direct compensation intervention, this paper puts forward some suggestions that the financial regulatory departments should strengthen the intervention to the bank compensation and expand the scope of the intervention. In particular, we should strengthen the intervention and regulation of salary structure, increase the medium-and long-term incentive and incentive based on equity value.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33
[Abstract]:After the financial crisis, many commercial banks, on the brink of bankruptcy, survived by government bailouts, still paying high salaries for their executives. Civil society has criticized this unfair phenomenon, academia also believes that high-paid lack of excellent performance support, governments have issued relevant policies to regulate the issue of bank executive compensation. Under this background, this paper takes 16 listed commercial banks in China as a sample to study the compensation of commercial banks from the point of view of risk. Taking several representative international banks as the reference object, this paper finds that the overall compensation level of Chinese banks still has room to rise. At present, the joint-stock commercial banks pay the highest level. Most commercial banks generally implement a combination of fixed and variable pay incentives, but the latter ratio is low. Equity value-based incentives and medium-and long-term incentives are rarely implemented either among management or ordinary employees. Based on the empirical model of panel data, this paper studies the impact of executive compensation level on bank default risk, and finds that the impact of executive compensation level on bank default risk is "inverted U" relationship. And the effect of executive compensation level on default risk of state-owned large commercial banks is higher than that on joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. In addition, as an important cost of human capital, the higher the level of compensation cost, the greater the impact on the default risk of banks. However, this does not mean that the lower the total compensation costs, the better, banks should improve operational efficiency, thereby improving the efficiency of human capital. Therefore, based on the analysis of the indirect capital adequacy ratio restriction and the direct compensation intervention, this paper puts forward some suggestions that the financial regulatory departments should strengthen the intervention to the bank compensation and expand the scope of the intervention. In particular, we should strengthen the intervention and regulation of salary structure, increase the medium-and long-term incentive and incentive based on equity value.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33
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