信贷腐败影响下的企业经营与金融资源配置

发布时间：2019-05-15 12:20

【摘要】： 金融业的特殊性质使得上至银行行长,下至银行普通职员,都可以接触巨额资金,都有产生腐败的可能。文献回顾发现：在“纯”腐败及金融腐败的研究中,腐败的分类没有得到足够的重视,并由此导致腐败的资源配置效应也存在争议,并强调腐败是金融机构自身的行为选择,金融腐败必然导致企业破产概率的提高,企业家比例的下降,并降低金融资源的配置效率。那么这个判断是否准确? 本文以银行业信贷腐败为研究对象,对上述观点提出了挑战。将信贷腐败划分为无盗窃腐败与有盗窃腐败,分别考察不同类型的信贷腐败对企业破产概率与企业家比例的影响,并分析相应的资源配置效应。分析过程借鉴了Blackburn Sarmah(2006)的思路,但放弃腐败是金融机构自身行为决策的假设,将信贷腐败视为银行从业人员与申请贷款企业私下的交易,隐瞒于金融机构,且腐败收入由腐败人员个人获得。得出的主要结论如下： (1)信贷腐败一方面增加了企业的融资需求,导致资金的稀缺性增加,另一方面扭曲了企业的投资条件。 (2)无盗窃腐败的发生使得企业破产概率提高,社会中能够进行创新型投资的企业家比例下降。并且随着贿赂金额的增加,企业家人口比例进一步减少；有盗窃腐败对企业破产概率及企业家人口比例的影响存在不确定性。 (3)不论是无盗窃腐败还是有盗窃腐败的信贷市场,优质企业都被迫付出较高的贿赂以获得贷款,从而促进了金融资源向高效使用者手中的转移与配置；而在无腐败信贷市场中,由于缺乏激励,放贷人员的随机放贷行为可能产生无效率的贷款使用。如果仅仅从经济效率的角度考虑,容忍一定程度的金融腐败将有助于金融资源的高效率使用,是对金融资源严重垄断形势下所导致低效率状态的一种改进。
[Abstract]:The special nature of the financial industry makes it possible for bank governors, as well as ordinary bank employees, to have access to huge amounts of money and the possibility of corruption. It is found that in the study of "pure" corruption and financial corruption, the classification of corruption has not been paid enough attention, and the resource allocation effect of corruption is also controversial, and it is emphasized that corruption is the behavior choice of financial institutions themselves. Financial corruption will inevitably lead to the improvement of enterprise bankruptcy probability, the decrease of entrepreneur proportion, and the reduction of the allocation efficiency of financial resources. So is this judgment accurate? This paper takes the banking credit corruption as the research object and challenges the above point of view. Credit corruption is divided into non-theft corruption and theft corruption. the effects of different types of credit corruption on the probability of enterprise bankruptcy and the proportion of entrepreneurs are investigated respectively, and the corresponding resource allocation effects are analyzed. The analysis process draws lessons from the idea of Blackburn Sarmah (2006), but abandons the assumption that corruption is the behavior decision of financial institutions themselves, regards credit corruption as a private transaction between bank practitioners and loan applicants, and conceals it from financial institutions. And the income from corruption is obtained by the corrupt individual. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) on the one hand, credit corruption increases the financing demand of enterprises, which leads to the increase of capital scarcity, on the other hand, it distorts the investment conditions of enterprises. (2) the occurrence of corruption without theft increases the probability of enterprise bankruptcy, and the proportion of entrepreneurs who can make innovative investment in society decreases. With the increase of bribe amount, the proportion of entrepreneur population decreases further, and there is uncertainty about the influence of theft and corruption on the probability of enterprise bankruptcy and the proportion of entrepreneur population. (3) whether there is theft or corruption in the credit market, high-quality enterprises are forced to pay higher bribes to obtain loans, thus promoting the transfer and allocation of financial resources to efficient users; In the non-corrupt credit market, due to the lack of incentives, random lending by borrowers may lead to inefficient loan use. If we only consider from the point of view of economic efficiency, tolerating a certain degree of financial corruption will contribute to the efficient use of financial resources, and it is an improvement to the inefficient state caused by the serious monopoly of financial resources.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F272;F832.3

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