对退市公司高管和大股东股票交易行为的研究
发布时间：2019-07-02 17:35
【摘要】：就公司内部人的股票交易行为而言,行为财务学传统的争论主要集中于他们是否使用信息优势图利自己,但在研究方法以及相应结论和政策建议上并未取得共识。近期的文献表明,内部人并不像经济模型预期的那样理性:他们不仅没有成功择机买卖股票,甚至错失良机。本文使用内部人持股数量和持股比例的变化来度量内部人的交易行为,使用退市公司这一独特样本来避免方法论上的争议,以检验经济转型阶段我国上市公司的内部人交易行为特征。实证结果显示,我国退市公司的大股东从退市前两年开始便存在超卖现象,而退市公司高管人员则一直到退市当年才出现超卖现象。结论表明,退市公司的大股东有通过信息优势图利自己的倾向;而退市公司高管人员则往往表现出对公司未来过度乐观的倾向。
[Abstract]:As far as the stock trading behavior of company insiders is concerned, the traditional debate of behavioral finance mainly focuses on whether they use information advantage to benefit themselves, but there is no consensus on the research methods, the corresponding conclusions and policy recommendations. Recent literature has shown that insiders are not as rational as economic models expect: not only have they not succeeded in buying and selling stocks, but they have even missed opportunities. This paper uses the change of the number and proportion of insiders to measure the trading behavior of insiders, and uses the unique sample of delisting companies to avoid methodological disputes in order to test the characteristics of insider trading behavior of listed companies in China in the stage of economic transformation. The empirical results show that the major shareholders of delisting companies in China have oversold since two years before delisting, while the executives of delisting companies did not oversell until the year of delisting. The conclusion shows that the major shareholders of delisting companies tend to benefit themselves through information advantages, while the executives of delisting companies tend to be overly optimistic about the future of the company.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.51
[Abstract]:As far as the stock trading behavior of company insiders is concerned, the traditional debate of behavioral finance mainly focuses on whether they use information advantage to benefit themselves, but there is no consensus on the research methods, the corresponding conclusions and policy recommendations. Recent literature has shown that insiders are not as rational as economic models expect: not only have they not succeeded in buying and selling stocks, but they have even missed opportunities. This paper uses the change of the number and proportion of insiders to measure the trading behavior of insiders, and uses the unique sample of delisting companies to avoid methodological disputes in order to test the characteristics of insider trading behavior of listed companies in China in the stage of economic transformation. The empirical results show that the major shareholders of delisting companies in China have oversold since two years before delisting, while the executives of delisting companies did not oversell until the year of delisting. The conclusion shows that the major shareholders of delisting companies tend to benefit themselves through information advantages, while the executives of delisting companies tend to be overly optimistic about the future of the company.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.51
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