面向快递末端共同配送的经济博弈研究

发布时间：2018-03-10 04:25

本文选题：末端共同配送　切入点：福利经济学　出处：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着IT技术的发展与网络购物的兴起,我国快递业务量随之呈现爆发式增长。为应对快递业务量暴涨带来的末端配送瓶颈,快递末端环节的共同配送模式应运而生。本文研究了发展快递末端共同配送过程中政府、快递企业、末端共配企业之间的利益关系与博弈行为,分别以政府财政补贴使用、企业利益分配方案为核心,建立了政府与末端共配企业、末端共配企业与快递企业的博弈模型。论文主要做了以下四个方面的工作:(1)梳理了我国快递末端物流的发展现状,包括快递市场总体状况、快递末端物流的开展状况、发展前景等。在此基础上,对快递末端共同配送模式的产生原因、利益相关者、现存问题等进行了研究。(2)以政府、快递企业、末端共配企业为研究对象,研究了发展快递末端共同配送过程中三方的利益关系和博弈行为。从政府角度,分析了政府在发展快递末端共同配送中的地位与作用、政府与末端共配企业的经济利益关系,并运用动态博弈理论,对政府鼓励支持发展快递末端共同配送的财政补贴的有效条件和影响因素进行了分析,提出了提高政府财政补贴有效性的相关建议。(3)从市场角度,分析了快递企业和末端共配企业在合作中的地位和利益关系,针对开展快递末端共同配送过程中各类风险因素造成的利益不确定性,考虑了不同企业对随机性利益的个体效用和风险态度的差异,将期望效用理论引入利益分配的合作博弈模型,形成了随机性利益的利益分配方案。(4)以北京市高校快递市场为对象进行了实证研究。首先介绍了北京市高校快递末端共同配送的发展状况,之后以北京市B大学为研究对象,在市场需求分析和成本收益分析的基础上,探讨了末端共配企业M是否应该在B大学内设置共配网点,并构建了设置网点后末端共配公司与快递企业的利益分配方案。
[Abstract]:With the development of IT technology and the rise of online shopping, express delivery volume in China has been explosive growth. The joint distribution mode of express terminal link emerges as the times require. This paper studies the interest relationship and game behavior between government, express delivery enterprise and terminal co-distribution enterprise in the process of developing express terminal joint distribution, respectively, which is used by government financial subsidy. In this paper, the game model between the government and the terminal joint enterprise, the terminal co-matching enterprise and the express delivery enterprise is established. The thesis mainly does the following four aspects: 1) combing the development status of the express terminal logistics in China. Including the general situation of express delivery market, the development of express terminal logistics, the development prospects, etc. On this basis, the origin of joint distribution mode of express terminal, stakeholders, existing problems and so on are studied by the government. The interest relationship and game behavior of three parties in the development of joint distribution of express terminal are studied. From the angle of government, the position and function of government in the development of joint distribution of express terminal are analyzed. The economic benefit relationship between the government and the terminal joint enterprise is analyzed, and the effective conditions and influencing factors for the government to encourage and support the development of joint distribution of express terminal are analyzed by using the dynamic game theory. This paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the effectiveness of government financial subsidies. (3) from the market point of view, the paper analyzes the position and interest relationship of express delivery enterprises and terminal co-matching enterprises in the cooperation. In view of the uncertainty of interest caused by various risk factors in the joint distribution process of express delivery terminal, the differences of individual utility and risk attitude of different enterprises to random interests are considered. The expected utility theory is introduced into the cooperative game model of benefit distribution. This paper takes the express delivery market of universities in Beijing as the object of empirical research. Firstly, it introduces the development situation of the joint distribution of express delivery terminals in Beijing universities, and then takes B University of Beijing as the research object. On the basis of market demand analysis and cost-benefit analysis, this paper discusses whether the terminal co-matching enterprise M should set up a co-distribution network in B university, and constructs the benefit distribution scheme between the terminal co-distribution company and the express delivery enterprise after the establishment of the net point.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F259.2;F224.32

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