随机产出与随机需求下TPL介入的农产品供应链协调

发布时间：2018-03-14 14:33

本文选题：随机产出　切入点：随机需求　出处：《管理工程学报》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对供应商、TPL服务商和零售商组成的农产品三级供应链,建立了随机产出与随机需求情形下供应商强主导、TPL服务商弱主导的三方序贯非合作博弈模型。结果表明:序贯非合作博弈模式下,零售商的最优订购量与TPL服务商的最优物流服务水平的比值低于集中决策模式下对应的结果,而供应商的计划满足率在两种决策模式下保持不变,系统期望利润出现损失。依次引入批发价格和物流服务价格出清合同,证明了成员的期望利润均为集中决策模式下系统期望利润的映射函数,故供应链实现完美协调,且当合同参数满足特定条件时,系统实现帕累托改善。最后,运用算例对供应商的单位外购成本进行灵敏度分析,发现其计划满足率及成员的期望利润均随外购成本增加而增加。
[Abstract]:For the three-tier supply chain of agricultural products composed of suppliers, TPL service providers and retailers, In this paper, a three-way sequential non-cooperative game model is established under the condition of random output and random demand. The results show that: under the model of sequential non-cooperative game, the TPL service provider is weakly dominated by the supplier. The ratio of the retailer's optimal order quantity to the TPL service provider's optimal logistics service level is lower than the corresponding result under the centralized decision mode, while the supplier's plan satisfaction rate remains the same under the two decision modes. By introducing wholesale price and logistics service price to clear the contract, it is proved that the expected profit of the member is the mapping function of the system expected profit under the centralized decision-making mode, so the supply chain realizes perfect coordination. And when the contract parameters meet the specific conditions, the system achieves Pareto improvement. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the unit outsourcing cost of the supplier is carried out by using an example. It is found that both the plan satisfaction rate and the expected profits of the members increase with the increase of the outsourcing cost.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101147) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20110491477) 江苏省博士后科研基金资助计划(1101111C) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013W12)
【分类号】：F274;F304

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