基于不对称信息的供应商侵入问题及协调机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-07 06:11

本文选题：供应链 + 供应商侵入　；参考：《西南交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：电子商务以及第三方物流快速发展,越来越多的供应商正在通过直销渠道侵入零售市场,同时新渠道的引入可能引起渠道冲突的发生。本文的研究是基于供应商和传统零售商组成的基础模型,从供应商侵入问题和双渠道协调机制两个方面开展研究。关于供应商侵入问题,本文从以下两方面探讨。首先,考虑零售商的损失规避,研究了态度信息不对称时的供应商侵入问题。研究表明:供应商侵入总使零售商的效用恶化;供应商的效用发生好转还是恶化,将取决于直销成本、损失规避系数的取值;可能会出现供应商与零售商"赢-亏"、"亏-亏"的情形。其次,考虑伯川德竞争,研究基于需求信息不对称的供应商侵入问题。研究表明:供应商侵入使供应商、零售商的收益情况好转还是恶化,将取决于直销成本和产品替代系数的取值;在一定范围内,信息共享可以使供应商和零售商获取比相应不对称信息下更多的收益。最后,本文采用了信息共享和引入契约两种方式对双渠道供应链的协调机制进行探讨。研究表明:在考虑零售商的损失规避且态度信息不对称的双渠道供应链中,当供应商的直销成本和传统零售渠道的市场占有率较低时,仅针对一定取值范围的损失规避系数,信息共享可以实现双渠道供应链协调;双方收入共享契约的引入可以有效解决双渠道的不协调问题。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of e-commerce and third party logistics, more and more suppliers are invading the retail market through direct marketing channels, and the introduction of new channels may lead to channel conflicts. The research of this paper is based on the basic model of supplier and traditional retailer, from two aspects of supplier intrusion and dual channel coordination mechanism. This paper discusses the problem of supplier intrusion from the following two aspects. Firstly, considering the loss aversion of retailers, the problem of supplier intrusion when attitude information is asymmetric is studied. The research shows that the supplier invading always makes the retailer's utility worse, and whether the supplier's utility will get better or worse will depend on the direct selling cost and the value of loss evading coefficient. Suppliers and retailers may "win-lose" and "lose-loss" situation. Secondly, considering Bertrand competition, the problem of supplier intrusion based on asymmetric demand information is studied. The research shows that the profit of suppliers, retailers and retailers will depend on the value of direct selling cost and product substitution coefficient. Information sharing enables suppliers and retailers to obtain more revenue than the corresponding asymmetric information. Finally, this paper discusses the coordination mechanism of double channel supply chain by information sharing and contract. The results show that when the direct selling cost of suppliers and the market share of traditional retail channels are low in the dual-channel supply chain which takes into account the loss aversion of retailers and asymmetric attitude information, the loss circumvention coefficient of a certain value range is only targeted at the direct selling cost of suppliers and the market share of traditional retail channels. Information sharing can realize the coordination of supply chain with two channels, and the introduction of revenue sharing contract between two parties can effectively solve the problem of disharmony between two channels.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】