博弈均衡视角下物流金融道德风险防范研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 06:07

本文选题：物流金融 + 博弈论　；参考：《浙江理工大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：目前，很多中小企业面临资金链紧张、融资困难等问题。物流金融作为一种创新性的第三方物流服务金融产品，可为金融机构、第三方物流企业以及融资企业之间创造紧密合作的商业机会，尤其可为解决中小企业的融资困难问题提供便利。然而，由于物流金融服务还处在初步发展阶段，因此存在很多不完善之处，特别是这种新型的业务模式给金融机构和物流企业带来不同于以往的风险，其中道德风险尤为明显。因此，如何合理有效地管理道德风险对于物流金融业务的顺利开展非常重要。以往对风险的研究比较注重对融资企业的客观因素进行评估和度量，事实上，相对于客观风险，主观道德风险由于其主观性反而更难控制，这种主观道德风险主要是由于参与主体之间信息不对称而引起的。本文首先对与研究内容相关的物流金融、信息不对称、委托代理、博弈论、博弈均衡以及道德风险等概念和理论进行阐述，并在对物流金融参与主体之间的委托代理关系进行梳理的基础上，对各参与主体的道德风险来源进行分析，从而识别物流金融道德风险如何产生。然后，从博弈论及博弈均衡视角出发，分析传统模式下融资企业与金融机构的收益均衡模型以及物流金融模式下三方参与主体的收益均衡模型，通过模型的选取与求解，探析影响物流金融主体违约风险大小的原因，挖掘对融资企业与第三方物流企业的违约或者合谋概率有抑制作用的因素，从而分析金融机构在作出不同行动情况下对道德风险的影响，总结与风险防范有关的结论，，并提出防范建议。最后，以H银行为背景，将模型与实例相结合，对博弈均衡模型下得出的结论进行验证。本文将定性与定量方法相结合，对物流金融道德风险道德产生根源及防范进行深入研究，具有一定的理论和实践意义。
[Abstract]:At present, many small and medium-sized enterprises are faced with the shortage of capital chain, financing difficulties and other problems. As an innovative third party logistics service financial product, logistics finance can create business opportunities for close cooperation among financial institutions, third party logistics enterprises and financing enterprises. In particular, to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises to provide facilities. However, because the logistics financial service is still in the initial stage of development, there are many imperfections, especially this new business model brings different risks to financial institutions and logistics enterprises, especially the moral hazard. Therefore, how to manage moral hazard reasonably and effectively is very important for the smooth development of logistics financial business. In the past, the research on risk has paid more attention to the evaluation and measurement of the objective factors of the financing enterprises. In fact, compared with the objective risk, the subjective moral hazard is more difficult to control because of its subjectivity. This kind of subjective moral hazard is mainly caused by the asymmetry of information among the participants. In this paper, the concepts and theories of logistics finance, information asymmetry, principal-agent, game theory, game equilibrium and moral hazard are discussed. On the basis of combing the principal-agent relationship among the participants in the logistics finance, this paper analyzes the source of the moral hazard of the participants, so as to identify how to produce the moral hazard of the logistics finance. Then, from the perspective of game theory and game equilibrium, this paper analyzes the income equilibrium model of financing enterprises and financial institutions under the traditional model and the income equilibrium model of the three parties involved in the logistics finance model, through the selection and solution of the model. This paper analyzes the reasons that affect the default risk of logistics financial subjects, and excavates the factors that inhibit the probability of default or collusion between the financing enterprises and the third party logistics enterprises. This paper analyzes the influence of financial institutions on moral hazard in different situations, summarizes the conclusions related to risk prevention, and puts forward some preventive suggestions. Finally, taking H bank as the background, the conclusion under the game equilibrium model is verified by combining the model with an example. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper makes a deep study on the origin and prevention of moral hazard and morality in logistics finance, which has theoretical and practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F253;F832.4;F224.32

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