非对称信息下大型建设项目合同主体关系协调研究

发布时间：2018-02-14 03:54

本文关键词： 信息不对称合同主体博弈论关系协调　出处：《西安建筑科技大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：大型建设项目作为一个国家经济协调发展的重要保障,是一个多元合同主体的综合体。目前,虽然像EPC、DB等项目管理模式已涌进大型建设项目的市场,但是DBB作为传统的承包模式,在国内建筑市场仍然一直在沿用。并且在合作的过程中各方合同主体都追求自身利益的最大化,以致于常会发生利益冲突。这些冲突从潜在慢慢地走向激化,成为合同管理的问题。此时,合同管理的主要任务是通过对合同主体关系的协调管理来弱化主体之间的矛盾冲突,将他们的关系由对立转化为合作。因此,本文以DBB模式为例,分析如何协调非对称信息下大型建设项目中合同主体间的关系,协调各方主体间的利益需求。首先,文章基于国内外合同主体关系协调的研究基础,从业主角度出发,运用博弈论探讨由于信息的不对称和合同的不完备引起的合同主体关系不协调的问题。其次,通过理论分析和现状调研表明,合同主体关系不协调的根源在于利益目标的不一致。然后,根据不同的假设条件、不同的行动顺序以及不同的信息结构,运用不同的博弈模型,即不完全信息动态博弈、不完全信息静态博弈,分别对合同签订阶段和合同履行阶段的合同主体关系进行博弈研究。通过博弈模型的分析,根据博弈的均衡结果得出结论,建立相应的激励合同机制,在合同内部设置奖惩措施。通过奖惩措施来降低监理方和承包商间寻租行为发生的概率,从而在一定程度上协调了合同主体之间的利益关系,最终使各方实现有效的合作和利益的和谐共赢,对提高合同管理水平以及项目的顺利实施有一定的理论意义和参考价值。
[Abstract]:Large-scale construction projects, as an important guarantee for the coordinated development of the national economy, are a complex of multiple contract subjects. At present, although project management models such as EPC-DB have poured into the market of large-scale construction projects, However, as a traditional contracting mode, DBB is still used in the domestic construction market. As a result, conflicts of interest often occur. These conflicts are gradually becoming more and more serious and become a problem of contract management. At this time, the main task of contract management is to weaken the conflict between subjects through the coordinated management of the relationship between contract subjects. Therefore, this paper takes the DBB model as an example to analyze how to coordinate the relationship between the parties in large construction projects under asymmetric information, and to coordinate the interests and needs of the parties. Based on the research foundation of the coordination of contract subject relationship at home and abroad and from the angle of owner, this paper uses game theory to probe into the problem of uncoordinated relationship between contract subject caused by asymmetric information and incomplete contract. Secondly, Through theoretical analysis and current investigation, it is shown that the root of the incongruity of contract subject relationship lies in the inconsistency of interest objectives. Then, according to different hypothetical conditions, different action sequence and different information structure, different game models are used. That is, dynamic game with incomplete information, static game with incomplete information, game research on the relationship between contract subject in contract signing stage and contract performance stage respectively. Through the analysis of game model, the conclusion is drawn according to the equilibrium result of game. Set up the corresponding incentive contract mechanism, set up the reward and punishment measure inside the contract, through the reward and punishment measure to reduce the probability of the rent-seeking behavior between the supervisor and the contractor, thus to a certain extent coordinate the benefit relation between the contract main body, Finally, it is of theoretical significance and reference value to improve the level of contract management and the smooth implementation of the project.
【学位授予单位】：西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：TU723.1

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