基于博弈论的网络病毒防御模型研究

发布时间：2018-10-08 19:29

【摘要】：目前,网络技术已获得了前所未有的发展,在军事、经济、生活和政治等领域中都得到了广泛运用。然而,由网络病毒的入侵和传播引起的网络安全事件频频出现,网络安全问题日益凸显。网络病毒防御模型可为防御网络病毒提供策略指导,同时对确保网络的可用性、保密性和完整性,以及确保整个网络正常运行不受网络病毒的入侵都起到关键性的作用。本文深入探讨和分析了基于博弈论的网络病毒防御模型,主要研究内容有:网络病毒传播模型的建立,网络服务提供商(ISPs)与网络病毒之间博弈模型的建立,以及ISPs最优投资点模型的建立,并基于以上模型进行了动力学分析,具体内容如下:(1)建立网络病毒传播模型。基于SIR(susceptible-infected-recovered)仓室模型将ISPs分成三类:易感者类S(t);感染者类I(t);恢复者类R(t),并在模型中考虑了ISPs采取安全措施时的相对风险,分析了网络病毒在不同策略下的传播性态。(2)建立ISPs与网络病毒之间的博弈模型。在模型中考虑了ISPs在出口检测和入口检测策略下的不对等性,研究了出口检测的必要性,分析了ISPs策略改变时对病毒传播的影响以及ISPs在不同策略集下对应的收益变化,对ISPs的策略选择提供了指导。(3)建立ISPs最优投资点模型。在模型中考虑了病毒在网络中传播的随机过程,从病毒传播模型和病毒到达规律这两点作出分析,通过微分方程和泊松过程分析了ISPs的最优投资点的存在条件。
[Abstract]:At present, network technology has achieved unprecedented development, and has been widely used in military, economic, life and political fields. However, the network security events caused by the invasion and spread of the network virus appear frequently, and the network security problems become more and more prominent. The network virus defense model can provide policy guidance for the defense of network viruses, and also play a key role in ensuring the availability, confidentiality and integrity of the network, as well as ensuring the normal operation of the entire network from the intrusion of network viruses. This paper deeply discusses and analyzes the network virus defense model based on game theory. The main research contents are as follows: the establishment of the network virus transmission model, the establishment of the game model between the network service provider (ISPs) and the network virus, and the establishment of the game model between the network virus and the network virus. And the ISPs optimal investment point model is established, and based on the above model, the dynamics analysis is carried out. The main contents are as follows: (1) establish the network virus transmission model. Based on the SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) storeroom model, the ISPs was divided into three categories: the susceptible type, the S (t); infected class, the I (t); recovery class, R (t), and the relative risks of ISPs when taking safety measures were considered in the model. The transmission behavior of network virus under different strategies is analyzed. (2) the game model between ISPs and network virus is established. In the model, the inequity of ISPs in export detection and entry detection is considered, the necessity of export detection is studied, the influence of ISPs policy change on virus transmission and the corresponding profit variation of ISPs under different policy sets are analyzed. It provides guidance for the choice of ISPs strategy. (3) the optimal investment point model of ISPs is established. The stochastic process of virus transmission in the network is considered in the model, and the existence conditions of the optimal investment point of ISPs are analyzed by differential equation and Poisson process.
【学位授予单位】：中北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：TP393.08

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