中国创业板上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩关系研究

发布时间：2017-12-30 22:44

本文关键词：中国创业板上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩关系研究　出处：《财政部财政科学研究所》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：创业板上市公司2009年上市以来,短短三年时间内已在中国资本市场占据了重要地位,具有高成长、高风险、高波动特点的创业板对于我国还是一个新兴的板块,与主板上市公司区别较大,而目前我国研究多针对于主板市场,对创业板的相关研究较少,研究深度及广度不够,对其研究的重要性日益凸显,因此需要加强对创业板的研究。近些年,我国上市公司的高管薪酬逐年增长,但公司的业绩却有盈有亏,高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的关系并不明显,似乎有脱钩迹象。本文通过研究创业板上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩的关系,提供一些有助于创业板上市公司提高经营业绩的建议。本文采用理论分析和实证分析相结合的方法,以委托代理理论、激励理论、人力资本理论分析为基础,具体研究了影响高管薪酬的几大因素,采用创业板上市公司2011年数据,以高管薪酬为因变量,业绩指标为自变量,构建高管薪酬与企业绩效相关性的基本模型,设置公司经营特征、股权特征、治理特征等控制变量,通过分析创业板上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩的关系,寻求解决创业板上市公司委托代理问题的办法,优化创业板上市公司机制。通过实证分析本文得出以下结论：第一,从公司的业绩特征来看,高管薪酬与企业业绩具有显著的正相关关系；第二,从公司经营特征来看,高管薪酬与企业规模具有较强的相关性,高管薪酬与公司风险仅存在微弱的负相关关系；第三,从公司股权特征来看,高管薪酬与公司股权集中度存在显著的负相关关系,高管薪酬与公司股权制衡度呈现不显著正相关性；第四,从公司治理特征来看,高管薪酬与两职合一具有不显著的负相关性,高管薪酬与独立董事比例具有微弱的正相关关系,高管薪酬与监事会规模成不显著的负相关关系。基于实证研究结论,建议创业板上市公司完善薪酬激励机制,注重激励效果以及长短期激励方式的结合；进一步完善公司治理与监督机制,发挥独立董事、监事会等应有的监督管理职能；在合理的范围内适当增加高管人员的薪酬差距,带动高管群内部的创优争先；最终强调要提高信息披露的透明度,从根本上消除所有者与经营者之间的信息不对称。
[Abstract]:Since 2009, gem listed companies have occupied an important position in Chinese capital market in a short period of three years, with high growth and high risk. The gem with high volatility is still a new plate in our country, which is different from the listed companies in the main board. But at present, most of the research in our country is aimed at the main board market, but there is little research on the gem. The depth and breadth of the research is not enough, the importance of its research is becoming increasingly prominent, so we need to strengthen the research on the gem. In recent years, the executive compensation of listed companies in China has increased year by year, but the performance of the company has earnings and losses. The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is not obvious and seems to be decoupled. This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in gem listed companies. To provide some help gem listed companies to improve business performance recommendations. Based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory and human capital theory, this paper studies several factors that affect executive compensation. With the 2011 data of gem listed companies, taking executive compensation as dependent variable and performance index as independent variable, this paper constructs the basic model of the correlation between executive compensation and enterprise performance, and sets up the characteristics of company management and equity. By analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise performance of gem listed companies, we seek to solve the problem of entrustment and agency of gem listed companies, and optimize the mechanism of gem listed companies. Through the empirical analysis of the following conclusions: first, from the company's performance characteristics, executive compensation and corporate performance has a significant positive correlation; Second, according to the characteristics of company management, executive compensation has a strong correlation with the scale of the enterprise, and there is only a weak negative correlation between executive compensation and corporate risk. Thirdly, there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and equity concentration, and there is no significant positive correlation between executive compensation and equity balance. 4th, from the corporate governance characteristics, executive compensation and the integration of two positions have no significant negative correlation, executive compensation and the proportion of independent directors have a weak positive correlation. There is no significant negative correlation between executive compensation and the scale of supervisory board. Based on the conclusion of empirical research, it is suggested that the listed companies of gem should improve the compensation incentive mechanism, pay attention to the combination of incentive effect and short-term and long-term incentives; Further improve the corporate governance and supervision mechanism, give play to the independent director, board of supervisors and other due supervision and management functions; In a reasonable range, appropriately increase the pay gap of senior executives, driving the internal top management group to create excellence; Finally, the transparency of information disclosure should be improved, and the information asymmetry between owner and operator should be eliminated fundamentally.
【学位授予单位】：财政部财政科学研究所
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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