公司并购中大股东掏空行为研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 12:07

本文关键词：公司并购中大股东掏空行为研究　出处：《山东财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近几年，在我国资本市场中公司并购的事件越来越多。通过兼并、收购、重组等活动可以使公司的资源得到进一步优化，提升工作效率，提高公司的业绩，但是在我国特殊的制度背景下，市场缺乏有效的监管，公司股权过于集中，使大股东有机会利用并购活动掏空上市公司，侵占中小股东的利益，这种行为对我国资本市场的发展造成很严重的后果。因此，全面研究公司并购中的大股东的掏空行为，深入分析其掏空的动因，并揭示掏空行为对中小股东、公司、市场造成的影响，进而提供相对应的对策建议，，对我国资本市场健康有序的发展有着重要的意义。本文在总结国内外对大股东掏空行为研究的基础上，利用公司治理理论、委托代理理论和公司控制权理论分析大股东在公司并购中掏空上市公司的成因是什么，主要采取何种掏空方式，以及对市场造成什么样的影响。股权分置改革后，大股东的行为发生了变化导致其掏空的方式也随之转变，笔者通过研究近几年揭露的大股东的掏空案例，发现在并购中大股东主要采取资产转让或是置换中不平等对价交易、选择性披露并购信息操纵股价、与管理层合谋获利，这三种方式往往单独或是混合使用。文中分别列举了双鹤药业资产置换事件、三联商社股价操纵事件以及双汇发展的管理层合谋事件，具体分析大股东在并购中采用的掏空方式，这种行为不仅损害了中小股东的利益，而且降低了公司的价值，阻碍了资本市场的健康发展。为了遏制这种行为的发生，文中从公司内部治理机制的调整和外部监管的完善两部分，提出了规范公司并购中大股东掏空行为的对策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, in China's capital market acquisitions, more and more events. Through mergers, acquisitions, restructuring and other activities can make the company's resources to be further optimized, improve work efficiency, improve the performance of the company, but in the context of our special institutional market, lack of effective supervision, the company equity is too centralized so, large shareholders have the opportunity to use mergers and acquisitions emptied listed companies, occupy the interests of minority shareholders, this kind of behavior in China's capital market have very serious consequences. Therefore, a comprehensive study on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in company mergers and acquisitions, in-depth analysis of the tunneling motivation, and reveals the tunneling behavior of small and medium shareholders company. And the resulting effect of the market, and provide the corresponding countermeasures, have important significance to the healthy and orderly development of China's capital market.
In this paper, based on large shareholders' tunneling behavior research at home and abroad, using the corporate governance theory, principal-agent theory and corporate control theory analysis is what causes the tunneling of large shareholders in company mergers and acquisitions, mainly adopt the way of tunneling, and what kind of impact on the market. After the reform of non tradable shares the behavior of large shareholders, leads to the change of the tunneling modes will be changed, the largest shareholder in recent years through research revealed the empty case, found in the merger of large shareholders mainly take the asset transfer or replacement of the unequal price of the transaction, selective disclosure information acquisition and manipulation of stock prices, collusion management profit these three ways are often alone or mixed use. This paper enumerates the double asset replacement event, collusion management triple stock manipulation and Shuanghui development The event, the specific analysis of the major shareholders in the acquisition of the tunneling mode, this kind of behavior not only damage the interests of small shareholders, but also reduces the value of the company, has hindered the healthy development of the capital market. In order to curb this behavior, the perfect corporate governance system, adjust the internal and external supervision two parts. Put forward the countermeasure and suggestion of Large Shareholders Behavior in company mergers and acquisitions.

【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F271;F832.51

【参考文献】