最终控制权对过度投资影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 16:01

本文关键词：最终控制权对过度投资影响的实证研究　出处：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资作为拉动经济增长的“三驾马车”之一,对经济增长的促进作用毋庸置疑,但投资是把双刃剑,过热的投资也引发了一系列问题。企业是市场经济的重要参与者,企业层面“过度投资”的行为是造成宏观层面“投资过热”的重要原因。从微观层面看,我国上市公司中普遍存在过度投资行为,过度投资已经成为阻碍上市公司价值提升的主要原因之一。大量过度投资行为的出现,会使越来越多的社会资本扭曲配置,制约着我国经济的发展。因此,科学合理的投资决策无论在微观层面还是在宏观层面都具有重要意义。随着公司治理问题的深入研究,最终控制人与中小股东的代理冲突引起了学术界的广泛关注。最终控制权与现金流权的分离降低了最终控制人的侵占成本,过度投资就是其攫取控制权私人收益的具体表现之一。本文在梳理了相关文献与理论成果之上,基于委托代理理论构建了最终控制人投资决策契约模型,用数学逻辑演绎了“两权分离”导致企业过度投资的过程。在实证研究设计部分,本文对过度投资度量(判别)模型进行评述与选择,考虑行业特征,选取2007-2009年沪深两市制造业上市公司为研究样本,借鉴Richardson(2006)的残差度量模型量化企业的非效率投资,接着选取残差为正的样本数据进行多元线性回归,重点考察了最终控制权、现金流权以及两权分离度对企业过度投资的影响以及过度投资的制约机制。实证结果显示：(1)样本公司普遍存在正的自由现金流；(2)自由现金流与过度投资显著正相关；(3)现金流权与过度投资负相关,两权分离度与过度投资正相关,最终控制权对过度投资的影响因最终控制人性质的不同而不同；(4)派发现金股利、独立董事和股权制衡对过度投资具有抑制作用。最后,基于我国具体国情和研究结果,本文从法律法规建设、公司治理等角度提出改善过度投资现状的相关建议。本文研究的贡献：(1)将最终控制权与企业过度投资相结合进行研究：(2)构建了最终控制人投资决策契约模型,用数学逻辑演绎了两权分离后企业必然存在过度投资这一过程;(3)将控股股东的掏空行为纳入过度投资研究的视角。本文研究的不足：(1)没有将样本按照两权分离度的大小进行细分,因为已有学者证明两权分离度对自由现金流过度投资的影响呈现倒U型的关系,不是单纯的正相关或是负相关关系；(2)出于行业特征考虑,选取了制造业作为研究样本,并剔除了发行B股和H股的公司,这样对样本的广泛代表性略有影响；(3)本文选用了Richardson预测投资模型估计预期投资和非预期投资,根据以往研究经验,直接默认了上市公司整体投资处于正常水平且不存在系统性误差,缺乏理论证明过程。
[Abstract]:As one of the "troika" to stimulate economic growth, investment is undoubtedly promoting economic growth, but investment is a double-edged sword. Overheated investment also leads to a series of problems. Enterprises are important participants in the market economy, and the behavior of "overinvestment" at the enterprise level is an important cause of "overinvestment" at the macro level. Overinvestment has become one of the main reasons to hinder the promotion of listed companies' value. A large number of over-investment behavior appears. It will make more and more social capital distorted allocation and restrict the economic development of our country. Therefore, scientific and reasonable investment decision is of great significance both at the micro level and at the macro level. With the in-depth study of corporate governance, the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders has aroused widespread concern in the academic community. The separation of the final control and cash flow rights reduces the cost of the ultimate controller's encroachment. Overinvestment is one of the concrete manifestations of its acquisition of private gains from control. On the basis of combing the relevant literature and theoretical results, this paper constructs a contract model of the final controller's investment decision based on the principal-agent theory. This paper deduces the process of overinvestment caused by "separation of two rights" by mathematical logic. In the part of empirical research and design, this paper reviews and selects the model of overinvestment measurement (discrimination), considering the characteristics of the industry. From 2007 to 2009, the listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were selected as the research samples, and the residual measurement model of Richardson's 2006 was used to quantify the inefficient investment of enterprises. Then select the sample data with positive residuals to carry out multivariate linear regression, and focus on the final control. The influence of cash flow right and the degree of separation of two rights on overinvestment and the restriction mechanism of overinvestment. The empirical results show that the sample companies generally have positive free cash flow. (2) Free cash flow is positively correlated with overinvestment; (3) the cash flow right is negatively correlated with overinvestment, the separation degree of two rights is positively related to overinvestment, and the influence of final control right on overinvestment is different from the nature of ultimate controller. 4) the distribution of cash dividends, independent directors and equity checks and balances have a restraining effect on overinvestment. Finally, based on the specific conditions and research results of our country, this paper builds from the laws and regulations. Corporate governance and other angles to improve the status of overinvestment related recommendations. The contribution of this paper is: 1) the final control right is combined with the overinvestment of the firm. (2) the contract model of the final controller investment decision is constructed. The paper deduces the process of over-investment after the separation of two rights by mathematical logic. 3) integrating the hollowing behavior of controlling shareholders into the perspective of excessive investment research. The lack of this paper does not subdivide the samples according to the size of the two weights separation degree, because some scholars have proved that the influence of the two rights separation degree on the free cash flow overinvestment is inversely U-shaped. Not only positive correlation or negative correlation; (2) considering the characteristics of the industry, the manufacturing industry is selected as the research sample, and the companies that issue B shares and H shares are excluded, which has a slight influence on the wide representation of the samples; 3) this paper selects the Richardson forecast investment model to estimate the expected investment and the unexpected investment, according to the previous research experience. By default, the whole investment of listed companies is in the normal level and there is no systematic error.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F425;F832.51;F224

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