基于综合价值分析的公共建筑能耗监测激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-17 09:33

本文选题：公共建筑　切入点：能耗监测　出处：《西安建筑科技大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：推行公共建筑能耗监测系统对实现建筑节能减排起着至关重要的作用,但由于项目投资额大、收益低、不确定性高、外部性显著等特点,造成能耗监测市场失灵,限制了项目的推进。基于上述背景,本文围绕公共建筑能耗监测项目的综合价值、激励机制、激励政策三方面进行系统的研究。运用实物期权理论、外部价值理论对项目的综合价值进行分析。本文对公共建筑能耗监测系统进行了详细的介绍,并依据公共建筑能耗监测项目特性将综合价值分解成项目常规价值、项目潜在价值、外部价值;分别基于净现值、实物期权理论、外部性理论构建了三种价值的测算模型,进而完成综合价值模型的构建;通过实证分析,证明了公共建筑能耗监测具有重要的价值,同时为激励机制研究提供了价值基础。本文通过激励对象确定、激励机理分析、激励机制设计三方面对激励机制进行系统研究。以综合价值与激励机制的互动关系为基础,通过综合价值的最佳视角分析及多方主体的动态博弈,得出:政府作为激励主体,应该同时对节能服务公司、公共建筑业主、投融资机构进行激励;运用委托代理理论构建最优激励模型,得出:在信息对称情况下,最优激励为“固定激励”,信息不对称情况下,最优激励为“固定激励+变动激励”,最优激励模型同时受到成本努力系数b、风险规避度ρ、外部不确定性2?、综合价值转化系数i等因素的影响;指出激励强度的确定应以项目常规价值与外部价值为依据;根据激励机制的影响因素,提出了不同对象的激励手段,并依据激励目标完成了激励机制的综合设计。根据激励机制的研究,结合我国激励政策现状,提出了财政政策建议、投融资政策建议、产业政策建议。本文的研究成果,为政府制定科学合理的公共建筑能耗监测激励机制与政策提供了重要的依据。
[Abstract]:The implementation of energy consumption monitoring system for public buildings plays an important role in building energy conservation and emission reduction. However, due to the characteristics of large investment, low income, high uncertainty and significant externalities, the energy consumption monitoring market is out of order. Based on the above background, this paper makes a systematic study on the comprehensive value, incentive mechanism and incentive policy of the energy consumption monitoring project of public buildings. This paper introduces the energy consumption monitoring system of public buildings in detail, and decomposes the comprehensive value into the conventional value of the project according to the characteristics of the energy consumption monitoring project of public buildings. Project potential value, external value; based on net present value, real option theory, externality theory to build three value measurement models, and then complete the construction of comprehensive value model; through empirical analysis, It is proved that the monitoring of energy consumption of public buildings has important value and provides a value basis for the study of incentive mechanism. On the basis of the interactive relationship between the comprehensive value and the incentive mechanism, through the analysis of the best angle of view of the comprehensive value and the dynamic game of the multi-subject, it is concluded that the government is the incentive subject. At the same time, we should encourage energy-saving service companies, owners of public buildings, investment and financing institutions, and use the principal-agent theory to construct the optimal incentive model, and get the following conclusions: in the case of information symmetry, The optimal incentive is "fixed incentive", and the optimal incentive is "fixed incentive change incentive" in the case of asymmetric information. The optimal incentive model is also subject to cost effort coefficient b, risk aversion 蟻, external uncertainty 2? It is pointed out that the determination of incentive intensity should be based on the conventional value and external value of the project, and according to the influencing factors of incentive mechanism, the incentive means of different objects are put forward. According to the research of incentive mechanism and the current situation of incentive policy in China, the paper puts forward some suggestions on fiscal policy, investment and financing policy, industry policy. It provides an important basis for the government to formulate scientific and reasonable incentive mechanism and policy for energy consumption monitoring of public buildings.
【学位授予单位】：西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.92

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