基于博弈模型的工程监理激励与监督问题研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 02:29

本文选题：工程监理 + 委托代理理论　；参考：《华北电力大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：工程监理制度是在上个世纪80年代,针对我国建筑行业项目建设监督不到位、外资企业对质量的高要求等内外实际情况下从国际上引入的新型制度。工程监理是我国工程建筑产业同国际相接轨的重要措施。工程监理制度在中国近40年的应用,取得了丰富的成效,同时也暴露出一些弊端和问题,如工程监理方往往不能尽职尽责,与项目经理合谋等。尽管全国人大常委会、国务院分别在《中华人民共和国招标投标法》、《中华人民共和国招标投标法实施条例》等国家法律法规或文件中针对项目利益相关方工程合谋问题明确做出了禁止性规定,但工程监理与项目经理合谋来侵害发包方利益、降低工程质量的现象还是频频发生。如何有效激励监理方进行监督,降低监管领域的合谋行为,遏制项目经理不当行为的发生是当前急需解决的严峻问题。目前,发包方对于自身利益的保护主要通过建立相应的激励机制与监督机制来规范项目经理和第三方监督者——工程监理的行为。尽管近些年来对项目经理出现了多种报酬形式,但对于监理方而言,我国依然采用2007年《建设工程监理与相关服务收费标准》中的相关公式进行计算,在工程概算额既定的情况下,对于监理方来说,其取得的是依据固定监理费率计算得出的固定报酬。实践证明,现有的激励机制与监督机制没有起到良好的作用,也就是说,现有的激励机制与监督机制存在缺陷。本文针对工程监理中存在的问题,基于委托代理理论,在考虑市场声誉的影响下,建立工程建筑领域中项目经理、监理方、发包方之间的三方博弈模型,通过模型分析了在固定监理费率制度下,项目经理、监理方、发包方的委托代理关系及混合策略均衡解,通过对各方的最优行为选择的分析结果,提出相应的结论和防范合谋建议,并以理论研究为依据提出合理的、具体的工程监理激励、监督意见和改进措施。
[Abstract]:The project supervision system is a new type of system introduced from the international market in the 1980s, in view of the fact that the construction supervision of the construction industry in our country is not in place and the high quality requirements of the foreign-funded enterprises. Engineering supervision is an important measure for China's engineering construction industry to connect with the world. The application of the project supervision system in China in the past 40 years has achieved rich results, but also exposed some disadvantages and problems, such as the engineering supervision side is often unable to fulfill its duties and collude with the project manager and so on. Although the standing Committee of the National people's Congress, The State Council has made specific provisions in the relevant national laws and regulations, such as the Law of the people's Republic of China on bidding and bidding, and the regulations on the implementation of the Law on the implementation of the Law on bidding and bidding of the people's Republic of China, on the issue of collusion of project stakeholders. However, the phenomenon of project supervision and project manager colluding to infringe upon the interests of the contracting party and reduce the quality of the project still occurs frequently. How to effectively encourage supervision, reduce collusion in the field of supervision, and curb the occurrence of improper behavior of project managers is a serious problem that needs to be solved. At present, the proprietors protect their own interests by establishing the corresponding incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism to standardize the behavior of project manager and third party supervisor-project supervision. Although there have been many forms of compensation for project managers in recent years, for the project managers, China still uses the relevant formula of "Construction Project Supervision and related Service charge Standard" in 2007 to calculate. When the estimated amount of the project is fixed, for the engineer, the fixed remuneration is calculated on the basis of the fixed supervision rate. Practice has proved that the existing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism do not play a good role, that is to say, the existing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism have defects. In this paper, based on the principal-agent theory and considering the influence of market reputation, a three-party game model between project manager, supervision party and contracting party in the field of engineering construction is established in view of the problems existing in engineering supervision. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship and mixed strategy equilibrium solution of the project manager, the supervisor and the issuer under the fixed supervision rate system, and analyzes the results of the optimal behavior selection of the parties. The paper puts forward the corresponding conclusions and preventive collusion suggestions, and puts forward reasonable and concrete project supervision incentives, supervision opinions and improvement measures based on theoretical research.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.92;F224.32

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