基于合作博弈的相变储热容量优化配置及利益分配
发布时间:2018-06-24 04:44
本文选题:合作博弈 + 相变储热 ; 参考:《电网技术》2017年09期
【摘要】:在冬季供暖期,中国东北"以热定电"的供热模式造成大量弃风,通过储热消纳弃风是提高风电吸纳率的一种有效手段。所采用的供热模式参与主体包括风电场、弃风供热企业、热电厂和电网公司,提出了基于合作博弈的相变储热容量优化配置模型。其以联盟年总净值收益最大为目标函数,考虑了弃风功率约束、供热约束、相变储热技术约束等。进一步提出基于Shapely值分配模型的二次利润分配方案,构建各方公平合理的利润分配机制。通过对某省4年弃风进行分析,求得最优相变储热容量。分析表明采用Shapely值进行利润分配后,联盟各成员都有可观收益,投资回报期较短。
[Abstract]:During the heating period in winter, the heating mode of "fixing electricity by heat" in Northeast China causes a great deal of abandoned wind, and it is an effective means to increase the absorption rate of wind power through heat storage. The participants of the heating mode include wind farm, abandoned heat supply enterprise, thermal power plant and power grid company. A phase change heat storage capacity optimization model based on cooperative game is proposed. The objective function is the maximum annual gross net income of the Union, and the constraints of abandoned wind power, heat supply and phase change heat storage technology are considered. Furthermore, a secondary profit distribution scheme based on Shapely value distribution model is proposed to construct a fair and reasonable profit distribution mechanism for all parties. The optimum phase change heat storage capacity is obtained by analyzing the 4-year abandoned wind in a province. The analysis shows that each member of the alliance has considerable income and the period of return on investment is shorter after using Shapely value to distribute profits.
【作者单位】: 浙江大学电气工程学院;国网辽宁省电力有限公司;
【基金】:国家科技支撑计划重大项目(2015BAA01B02)~~
【分类号】:TU995
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