工程风险管理行为演化博弈分析
发布时间：2018-11-10 17:51
【摘要】：在重大基础设施工程系统复杂性与不确定情况下,风险管理主体的策略选择行为与稳定状态往往受到其角色、利益、风险偏好和感知差异的影响。为了更好地刻画重大基础设施工程风险管理过程中公共部门和私人部门的行为决策动态演变过程,在演化博弈分析中引入前景理论和风险感知因素,通过前景价值和权重函数对传统支付矩阵参数进行修正,分析双方风险管理策略选择过程和演化结果的稳定条件,从风险感知角度诠释双方的行为倾向原因和稳定策略,仿真分析不同参数对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明,双方风险管理行为演化博弈存在5个均衡点,但是由于工程复杂性和主体有限理性产生的认知偏差、乐观偏见和反射及损失效应,使得系统在现实中不易收敛于稳定点并达到最佳风险管理状态,风险管理成本、处罚、风险损失及分担比例等参数对双方行为演化结果产生不同程度的影响,当参数调整通过临界值时能够影响风险管理策略的选择倾向和稳定性。
[Abstract]:In the case of complexity and uncertainty of major infrastructure engineering systems, the behavior and stability of risk management agents are often affected by their roles, interests, risk preferences and perceived differences. In order to better depict the dynamic evolution process of behavior decision in public and private sectors in the process of risk management of major infrastructure projects, foreground theory and risk perception factors are introduced into evolutionary game analysis. By modifying the parameters of the traditional payment matrix through the foreground value and weight function, the paper analyzes the stability conditions of the selection process and evolution result of the risk management strategy, and interprets the cause of behavior tendency and the stability strategy of both sides from the perspective of risk perception. The influence of different parameters on the evolution results is analyzed by simulation. The results show that there are five equilibrium points in the evolutionary game of risk management behavior, but due to the cognitive bias, optimistic bias, reflection and loss effect, due to the complexity of engineering and the limited rationality of the main body. In reality, the system is not easy to converge to the stable point and reach the best risk management state, risk management cost, penalty, risk loss and the proportion of risk loss have different degrees of influence on the evolution of behavior of both parties. The selection tendency and stability of the risk management strategy can be affected when the parameter is adjusted through the critical value.
【作者单位】： 哈尔滨工业大学管理学院;哈尔滨工业大学土木工程学院;哈尔滨工业大学交通科学与工程学院;
【分类号】：TU71
本文编号：2323169
[Abstract]:In the case of complexity and uncertainty of major infrastructure engineering systems, the behavior and stability of risk management agents are often affected by their roles, interests, risk preferences and perceived differences. In order to better depict the dynamic evolution process of behavior decision in public and private sectors in the process of risk management of major infrastructure projects, foreground theory and risk perception factors are introduced into evolutionary game analysis. By modifying the parameters of the traditional payment matrix through the foreground value and weight function, the paper analyzes the stability conditions of the selection process and evolution result of the risk management strategy, and interprets the cause of behavior tendency and the stability strategy of both sides from the perspective of risk perception. The influence of different parameters on the evolution results is analyzed by simulation. The results show that there are five equilibrium points in the evolutionary game of risk management behavior, but due to the cognitive bias, optimistic bias, reflection and loss effect, due to the complexity of engineering and the limited rationality of the main body. In reality, the system is not easy to converge to the stable point and reach the best risk management state, risk management cost, penalty, risk loss and the proportion of risk loss have different degrees of influence on the evolution of behavior of both parties. The selection tendency and stability of the risk management strategy can be affected when the parameter is adjusted through the critical value.
【作者单位】： 哈尔滨工业大学管理学院;哈尔滨工业大学土木工程学院;哈尔滨工业大学交通科学与工程学院;
【分类号】：TU71
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