积极的惰性——基层政府产业结构调整的运作机制分析

发布时间：2018-03-21 07:15

  本文选题：农业结构调整　切入点：基层政府行为　出处：《社会学研究》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为什么一些地区的农业结构调整陷入了新产业-低效运作-新产业的重复低效的怪圈之中?本文将这种重复低效现象称为"积极的惰性"。本研究以南方A县的农业结构调整历程为例,发现对于经济条件较差地区的基层政府而言,频繁更换产业是在强激励与弱惩罚的激励结构下的理性行为。内容竞争、时间压力等强激励驱动基层政府上马新产业,并"大干"、"快干";而归因困难、非正式关系介入等弱惩罚则让基层政府面临软风险约束,从而降低了更换成本。
[Abstract]:Why is the adjustment of agricultural structure in some areas trapped in the cycle of duplication and inefficiency of new industries-inefficient operation-new industries? This paper calls this phenomenon "positive inertia". Taking the agricultural structure adjustment course of A County in the South as an example, it is found that for the grass-roots governments in areas with poor economic conditions, The frequent change of industry is rational behavior under the incentive structure of strong incentive and weak punishment. The content competition, time pressure and other strong incentives drive the grass-roots government to start new industries, and "big work", "quick work", but the attribution is difficult. Weak penalties, such as informal involvement, put grass-roots governments under soft risk constraints, thus reducing replacement costs.
【作者单位】： 中山大学中国公共管理研究中心政治与公共事务管理学院;中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院;山东大学政治学与公共管理学院;
【基金】：2016年度教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“社会政策创新与共享发展”(16JJD630011)的研究成果
【分类号】：D630
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本文编号：1642814