基础设施产业特许经营合约再谈判机制

发布时间：2018-04-21 14:49

本文选题：基础设施产业 + 不完全合约　；参考：《江西财经大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：基础设施产业是经济事业发展的基础,为了减轻政府的财政负担、促进有效竞争、提高服务的效率,特许经营逐渐成为主流模式,随之越来越多的地方政府选择特许经营合约代替原来的管理模式。但不完全合约理论告诉我们,因为人的有限理性、外在情况的复杂性及不确定性等因素的存在,合约天然是不完全的。结合基础设施产业的特性,特许经营合约同样是不完全的,当事后的一些问题和争端发生时,再谈判则是不可避免的。再谈判的现象在拉美地区早已盛行,在我国也频频出现。依据已有的案例事实可以说明,再谈判是存在正面影响的,可以不断调整合约中出现的各种问题,实现帕累托改进。但是再谈判的负面影响更为突出,机会主义的再谈判严重损害了消费者利益,主要形式分为两种:一是运营商对政府敲竹杠,以涉及面较大的项目为主,运营商出现机会主义行为向政府发起再谈判,要求政府把初始合约修改为对自己更有利的合约,提高收费标准或延长收费年限,为了保证供给的可持续性,再谈判的结果是政府对运营商妥协,损害公众利益;二是政府对运营商敲竹杠,以涉及面较小的项目为主,政府会利用自身强大的行事权力对运营商敲竹杠,出于自身的利益或迫于消费者的压力提前修改合约,表现为政府承诺缺失,导致投资激励下降,消费者不能获得基础设施的充分供给,利益受损。针对再谈判的结果都是以牺牲消费者的利益为代价,各方利益失去平衡,合约不能顺利履行,基础设施产业的发展受到限制,所以对再谈判机制的设计成为必要。再谈判的结果是损害消费者的利益,对此进行机制设计,使得再谈判能够兼顾各方的利益,达到共赢。一是运营商对政府敲竹杠机制设计模型,由于发起再谈判的情况有要求提价、延长收费年限或提高收益分配等多种情况,本文主要是针对于运营商要求提价发起再谈判的机会主义行为,对此政府主要通过参与约束和激励相容约束设计一个再谈判机制激励运营商报告自己真实的信息,保证再谈判的结果是运营商实现利润最大化的同时也不损害消费者的利益,达到一个共赢。而政府对运营商敲竹杠的机制设计模型,本文主要给以政府一个惩罚机制,来有效约束政府的承诺行为,保证再谈判的结果能达到政府履约,企业投资的均衡,同时,也满足了消费者的需求。通过上述的案例和模型得出,应该从提高公众参与、引入第三方、保证信息公开透明、完善制度禀赋等方面优化再谈判程序,使再谈判过程更加公平公正,最好能兼顾到消费者的利益,实现三方共赢,促进基础设施健康持续地发展。
[Abstract]:Infrastructure industry is the foundation of economic development. In order to lighten the financial burden of the government, promote effective competition and improve the efficiency of service, franchise has gradually become the mainstream mode. More and more local governments choose franchise contracts instead of the original management model. However, the incomplete contract theory tells us that the contract is naturally incomplete because of the limited rationality of human beings, the complexity of external conditions and the existence of uncertainty. Combined with the characteristics of the infrastructure industry, franchise contracts are also incomplete, and when problems and disputes arise afterwards, renegotiation is inevitable. The phenomenon of re-negotiation has already prevailed in Latin America and has frequently appeared in China. According to the existing case facts, the renegotiation has a positive effect, and can constantly adjust the various problems in the contract to achieve Pareto improvement. However, the negative impact of renegotiation is more prominent. The opportunistic renegotiation has seriously damaged the interests of consumers. The main forms can be divided into two forms: first, the operators are ripping off the government, mainly involving a larger number of projects. Operators, acting as opportunists, renegotiate with the government, asking the government to change the initial contract to a contract that is more beneficial to them, to raise fees or to extend fees for a longer period of time, in order to ensure the sustainability of the supply. The result of the renegotiation is that the government compromises to the operators and harms the public interests; the second is that the government takes advantage of the operators, mainly involving smaller projects, and the government will use its powerful power to abuse the operators. For their own benefit or under the pressure of consumers to amend the contract in advance, the lack of government commitment, resulting in reduced investment incentives, consumers can not get adequate supply of infrastructure, the interests of the damage. The results of renegotiation are at the expense of consumers, the interests of all parties are out of balance, the contracts can not be carried out smoothly, and the development of infrastructure industry is restricted, so it is necessary to design the renegotiation mechanism. The result of renegotiation is to harm the interests of consumers, so that the mechanism can be designed so that the interests of all parties can be taken into account to achieve a win-win situation. The first is that operators design models for the mechanism of government racketeering. As a result of the launching of the renegotiation, they require price increases, extend the number of years of charge or increase the distribution of income, and so on. This paper is mainly aimed at the opportunistic behavior of operators asking for higher prices to initiate renegotiation. The government mainly designs a renegotiation mechanism to encourage operators to report their true information through participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints. The result of renegotiation is that the operator maximizes profits and does not harm the interests of consumers to achieve a win-win situation. And the mechanism design model of the government to the operators, this article mainly gives the government a punishment mechanism to restrain the government's commitment behavior effectively, guarantees the renegotiation result can achieve the government performance, the enterprise investment equilibrium, at the same time, It also meets the needs of consumers. Through the above cases and models, we should improve the public participation, introduce third parties, ensure the transparency of information, perfect the system endowment and optimize the renegotiation procedure, so that the renegotiation process can be more fair and just. It is best to take into account the interests of consumers, achieve a tripartite win-win, and promote the healthy and sustainable development of infrastructure.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F282

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