双边市场竞争策略性行为分析

发布时间：2018-02-05 23:03

本文关键词： 双边市场电子商务平台非对称定价行为产品搭售行为平台兼容行为　出处：《山东财经大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着产业组织经济学理论的不断发展与深入,关于双边市场理论的研究也日趋完善,尤其是双边市场的定价与基本特征方面的理论不断丰富,双边市场理论已逐渐成为产业组织理论研究的重要方向。随着我国“互联网+”行动计划影响的不断深入,电子商务平台作为双边市场中最具代表性的平台企业,针对平台竞争策略性行为进行深入的研究就具有重要的现实意义。但是,目前关于电子商务平台的研究方向主要集中在关于平台厂商的均衡价格的研究,而关于平台厂商竞争策略性行为方向的研究则相对匮乏。双边市场具有与单边市场明显区别的独特特征,如网络外部性特征等,所以,仅仅依靠传统单边市场的产业组织理论试图解释双边市场的产业行为是缺乏合理性的,因此,基于双边市场理论的研究由其是针对电子商务平台的研究就具有重要的理论意义。本文基于双边市场理论,采用经典产业组织模型——Hotelling模型,在其模型基础上进行扩展,通过分析平台厂商的三种主要策略性行为的影响因素以及策略性行为对平台厂商均衡定价的影响,得出的结论主要有:第一,双边市场平台中双边用户完全单归属情况下,两个平台的卖方用户分别提供产品差异化程度不同的差异化产品的非对称定价策略行为,对卖方用户与买方用户收取注册费用,当平台企业的利润最大化时,针对双方用户收取的均衡价格存在唯一解,但是,均衡价格之间存在相互影响,即如果一个平台对买方用户降价,那么另一平台也对买方降价。卖方的直接网络效应强度对买方用户的均衡价格是没有影响的,但是对卖方用户的均衡定价有影响,这种影响的好坏是与平台上卖方用户的用户规模的大小决定的。在卖方用户较多的平台中,卖方提供差异化的产品是有利于卖方用户本身的利益的。第二,在实施搭售策略行为的情况下,平台企业对于向卖方与买方收取注册费用,使平台利润最大化的均衡定价和均衡用户数量的大小关系与额外净效用有关。而且,额外净效应对卖方用户和买方用户的影响是相反的。当额外净效用为正时,表示平台企业通过对双方用户收取的费用的总和大于平台企业由于采取产品搭售策略所产生的固定成本,同时还会获得更高的卖方与买方的用户规模,而没有实施搭售策略的平台企业的均衡价格与用户规模则会低于原两平台企业均没有采取搭售策略时的均衡价格与市场份额。但是,搭售策略并不能一定保证能够在产业竞争中为实施搭售策略的平台企业保驾护航。只有当被搭售产品的额外净效用以及两边用户的两种网络外部性强度满足一定条件时,平台企业才能够对双方用户制定合理的价格以确保自身利润最大化。第三,在一个平台作为新进入厂商选择完全兼容的策略性行为的情况下,均衡时新进入平台针对卖方用户和买方用户制定的价格和两边用户数量都与原在位平台企业针对双边用户制定的价格以及在此基础上形成的用户规模有关。同时,平台二对双方用户制定的均衡价格以及在此基础上形成的用户规模与买方用户与卖方用户的间接网络外部性的差额有关。平台对买方用户与卖方用户的间接网络外部性的差对于买方定价大小的影响是与平台一对于卖方用户收取的价格共同发挥作用的。完全兼容策略下的均衡定价大小均与平台的直接网络外部性成负相关关系。完全兼容并不能保证平台二在竞争中能够获得最大化效应,只有当采取完全兼容所产生的成本满足一定条件,且两边用户的网络外部性强度满足一定条件时,平台二才能对卖方用户与买方用户收取较高的注册费用。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development and deepening of industrial organization economics theory, the research on the theory of two-sided markets is becoming more and more perfect, especially in the aspect of bilateral market pricing and the basic characteristics of the theory constantly enrich the bilateral market theory has gradually become the important industrial organization theory research direction. As China's "Internet plus" action plan of deepening electronic commerce, as a platform for bilateral market in the most representative of the platform enterprise, it has important practical significance to conduct in-depth studies on the platform competition strategy behavior. However, the current research direction of e-commerce platform, mainly concentrated in the equilibrium price on the platform manufacturers, and Research on the competitive strategy of platform vendors the direction is relatively scarce. The bilateral market has the obvious difference with the unique characteristics of the single market, such as network externality, so, Only rely on the traditional market industrial organization theory attempts to explain the behavior of the bilateral market industry is the lack of rationality, therefore, the research of two-sided markets theory which is the research on e-commerce platform has the important theory significance. This paper based on the theory of two-sided markets based on the classical industrial organization model -- Hotelling model, which extended its based on the model, through the three main strategic behavior analysis platform manufacturers influence factors and strategic behavior of platform firm equilibrium pricing, the main conclusions are: first, the bilateral single user completely belonging bilateral market platform, the two platforms provide seller user asymmetric pricing strategy behavior the degree of product differentiation between different products, the seller and the buyer user registration fee for the user, when the profits of the business platform The maximum, the equilibrium price for both users for the existence and uniqueness of solution, however, there is a mutual influence between the equilibrium price, if a platform of buyer's customer price, then another platform also to the buyer price. The equilibrium price strength direct network effect to the buyer the seller user is not affected, but the equilibrium pricing of the user's influence, this influence is the size of the user scale and the user platform decisions. The more users of the platform, the seller to provide differentiated products is conducive to the interests of the seller users themselves. Second, in the implementation of strategy of tying behavior, the platform for enterprise to charge the seller and the buyer registration fee, the size and number of users balanced equilibrium pricing platform to maximize profits associated with additional net utility. Moreover, additional net effect to the user The influence and user is the opposite. When additional net utility is positive, said the platform of enterprise through the sum of fees charged by the user on both sides is greater than the platform of enterprise because of fixed costs take bundling strategies are generated at the same time, the seller and the buyer will get higher user scale, without the implementation of equilibrium price and user the size of the Bundling Strategy Platform of enterprises will be lower than the original two platform companies have not taken the equilibrium price and market share tying strategies. However, tying strategy can not guarantee to take the escort business platform sales strategy for the implementation of competition in the industry. Only when the two kinds of network externality tying product extra the net effect on both sides of the user and satisfy certain conditions, the platform enterprises can develop a reasonable price for both users to ensure that their own profit maximization. In third, a As a platform of strategic behavior of new entrants is completely compatible with the selected case, the equilibrium price and new platform for both sides to enter the number of users users: buyers and sellers are related to the original formulation incumbent for bilateral users to make the price and on the basis of the formation of the scale of users. At the same time, the indirect network externality formation platform two for both users to make the equilibrium price and on the basis of the user scale and the buyer and seller user user's balance. The indirect network externality of the buyer and the seller platform user user difference is a platform for the seller and the price charged to the user to play the role for the buyer. The size is completely compatible with the equilibrium pricing the size of the pricing strategy under the direct network externalities are negatively related with the platform. Fully compatible and can not guarantee the platform two In the competition, the maximum effect can be achieved. Only when the cost that is completely compatible with certain conditions is satisfied, and the strength of the network externalities of both sides satisfy certain conditions, platform two can receive a higher registration fee for the seller and the buyer.

【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F724.6

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