电子商务隐私保护机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 09:51

本文选题：隐私保护　切入点：机制设计　出处：《广东工业大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：目前电子商务信息隐私的研究,要么集中在基于质性研究方法对用户感知隐私保护有效性的研究,要么集中在基于信息技术角度的隐私保护的研究。同时,各种安全保护算法设计仅仅从理论上考虑安全性,但在组织选择决策层面并没有达到预期的效益。此外,传统的组织对隐私信息保护的决策分析研究都是基于决策者为诚实人的假设,然而,在现实情景下,往往极少存在完全诚实的决策者,因此很多研究分析结论并不能有效地与组织存在的隐私信息保护决策问题接轨。因此,研究目标是结合用户个性化服务、隐私保护策略、横向组织间信息共享机制三个研究热点领域,提出电子商务跨平台个性化服务的隐私保护策略和安全信息共享机制,满足跨平台的推荐服务的需要。首先,文章采用信息边界理论、信息敏感度测度论,分析网络信息隐私的边界以及隐私在不同学科不同领域的定义,然后把信息隐私按照0到1的等级划分用户敏感度；其次,采用博弈论、定价模型、效用模型构建两企业之间的静态博弈。观察在自由竞争市场,企业是否实行隐私保护、是否进行个性化服务会对企业受益的影响；再次,采用经济学理论,考虑用户收益、企业利润等,在垄断市场环境下构建两个企业之间的博弈。该博弈模型计算消费者收益函数,平衡企业之间的收益。从中观察企业是否实施隐私保护会吸引何种消费者,同时收益情况如何；最后,采用博弈论、机制设计理论,假设参与者都是理性且不一定诚实,构建效用函数,引入勾结成本的方法,防止参与者之间相互勾结。该机制会降低那些背叛机制的参与者的效益,迫使其改变行为从而获取更高的收益。也就是说当参与者诚实参与机制的时候收益最大,当他们欺骗或者勾结行为的时候,收益反而会下降。最后,在用户敏感度调查中发现用户对于个人身份信息最为敏感,达到0.77；在自由竞争市场中,如果企业实行非对称隐私保护,则可以最大程度的减少价格竞争；在垄断市场中,如果在位者实行隐私保护,而与此同时进入者进入市场,那么两个企业的利润都可以达到均衡。同时消费者的效用也可达到最大化；在两个企业信息共享的机制设计中,引入惩罚机制以后,不诚实的企业则会获得比诚实时候更少的利益。
[Abstract]:At present, the research of information privacy in electronic commerce is either focused on the effectiveness of the qualitative approach to user perceived privacy protection, or on the research of privacy protection based on information technology.At the same time, the design of various security protection algorithms only considers the security in theory, but does not achieve the expected benefit at the level of organization choice decision.In addition, the traditional research of decision analysis of privacy information protection is based on the assumption that the decision-maker is honest. However, in the real situation, there are very few completely honest decision-makers.Therefore, many conclusions of research and analysis can not be effectively linked to the privacy information protection decision-making problems existing in organizations.Therefore, the research goal is to put forward the privacy protection strategy and security information sharing mechanism of the cross-platform personalized service of e-commerce, combining the three hot areas of user personalized service, privacy protection strategy and horizontal inter-organizational information sharing mechanism.Meet the needs of cross-platform referral services.Firstly, the paper uses information boundary theory and information sensitivity measure theory to analyze the boundary of network information privacy and the definition of privacy in different disciplines and different fields, and then classifies information privacy into user sensitivity according to grade 0 to 1.Game theory, pricing model and utility model are used to construct the static game between the two enterprises.In the free competition market, whether the enterprise implements privacy protection, whether carries on the individualized service to the enterprise benefit influence; again, uses the economic theory, considers the user income, the enterprise profit and so on,Constructing the game between two enterprises in the monopoly market environment.The game model calculates the consumer income function and balances the profit between enterprises.Finally, using game theory, mechanism design theory, assume that the participants are rational and not necessarily honest, construct utility function.The introduction of collusion costs to prevent collusion among participants.The mechanism will reduce the benefit of those who betray the mechanism, forcing them to change their behavior to achieve higher returns.That is to say, when participants participate in the mechanism honestly, the benefits are highest, but when they cheat or collude, the benefits will decline.Finally, in the user sensitivity survey, we found that the user is the most sensitive to personal identity information, reaching 0.77; in the free competition market, if enterprises implement asymmetric privacy protection, the price competition can be minimized; in the monopoly market,If the incumbent carries out privacy protection while the entrant enters the market, the profits of both companies can be balanced.At the same time, the utility of consumers can be maximized. In the mechanism design of information sharing between the two enterprises, the dishonest enterprises will gain less benefits than the honest enterprises after the introduction of punishment mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：广东工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：TP309;F724.6

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