考虑企业公平关切和消费者网购体验滞后的营销策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 06:03

本文选题：公平关切 + 体验滞后　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着互联网技术与电子商务的蓬勃发展,越来越多的消费者在体验到了网络购物方便快捷后,转向了网络购物。电子商务环境下,企业产品的推广、销售等营销环境又有新的特点。如:在电子商务产品推广环境下,企业不仅关注自身利润的大小,而且关注利润分配方式的不同;同时,新的产品销售环境下,消费者对于产品价值的估计不可避免的产生偏差。因此,对于企业决策者而言,将面临着两大难题:第一,当企业和对手之间对于额外利润的分配有了公平关切因素考虑时,企业如何做出最有利于自身的决策?第二,当企业面对由于电商环境不可避免的网购体验滞后的特点所造成消费者对产品价值偏好不确定时,企业又该如何解决这个问题,以达到自身利益的最大化。这两大问题即是本文研究的重点内容。为了研究企业和企业之间考虑公平关切时的最优营销策略问题,我们构建了一个Stackelberg博弈,其中以电商导购平台为主导,导入流量企业为跟随者。在本文中我们打破了决策者是经济人完全理性的假设,引入了决策者对公平关切的考虑,通过构建决策者的目标效用函数,分析了企业的最优决策行为。研究发现:当电商导购平台的成本分担决策属于中等大小时,导入流量企业的最优决策则不受公平关切的影响,同时,两者的利润之和与效用之和相等,达到协调。此时,公平关切的考虑,会使电商导购平台承担更多的成本,也会使流量导入企业做出更多的销售努力。在解决了企业和企业之间的最优营销策略决策问题后,本文对企业与消费者之间的营销策略问题进行了研究。本文通过构建Hotelling模型,对消费者策略购买行为进行刻画,探究了企业在新情境下的最优定价策略。分析得出:当消费者的退货成本增加时,企业最优定价也随之增加;当消费者对产品的先验效用差异化越小时,企业的最优定价则越低。同时发现,若某种产品无消费者单独购买,企业的最优定价会随消费者偏好的增加而增加;而当两种产品均有消费者单独购买且消费者退货成本较大时,企业的最优定价不但不会随消费者偏好的增加而提高,反而会随消费者偏好增加而减少。此外,本文给出了消费者策略性退货行为存在的临界条件,当消费者的退货成本高于这一临界条件时,消费者的策略退货行为将消失。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology and electronic commerce, more and more consumers turn to online shopping after experiencing the convenience of online shopping. E-commerce environment, the promotion of enterprise products, sales and other marketing environment has new characteristics. For example, in the E-commerce product promotion environment, enterprises not only pay attention to the size of their own profits, but also pay attention to the different ways of profit distribution; at the same time, under the new product sales environment, Consumer estimates of the value of the product are inevitably biased. Therefore, for corporate decision makers, there will be two major difficulties: first, when there are fair concerns about the distribution of extra profits between enterprises and competitors, how can enterprises make decisions that are most beneficial to them? Second, how to solve this problem in order to maximize the interests of enterprises when faced with the uncertainty of consumers' preference for product value caused by the unavoidably delayed online shopping experience in e-commerce environment. These two problems are the key contents of this paper. In order to study the optimal marketing strategy between enterprises and enterprises when considering equity concerns, we construct a Stackelberg game, in which the leading e-commerce platform is the dominant one, and the leading traffic enterprise is the follower. In this paper, we break the assumption that the decision-maker is completely rational, and introduce the consideration of the decision-maker 's concern for fairness. By constructing the objective utility function of the decision-maker, we analyze the optimal decision-making behavior of the enterprise. It is found that when the cost sharing decision of the e-commerce platform is of medium size, the optimal decision of the lead-in flow enterprise is not affected by the concern of fairness, and the sum of the profit and utility of the two is equal, and the coordination is achieved. At this point, the consideration of fairness concerns will make the e-commerce shopping platform bear more costs, but also make more sales efforts. After solving the problem of optimal marketing strategy decision between enterprise and enterprise, this paper studies the problem of marketing strategy between enterprise and consumer. By constructing Hotelling model, this paper describes the purchasing behavior of consumer strategy and explores the optimal pricing strategy of enterprise in the new situation. The analysis shows that when the cost of return increases, the optimal pricing increases, and the smaller the prior utility difference is, the lower the optimal pricing is. At the same time, it is found that if a product is purchased by consumers alone, the optimal pricing will increase with the increase of consumer preference, and when both products are purchased separately by consumers and the cost of returning goods by consumers is higher, The optimal pricing of enterprises will not increase with the increase of consumer preference, but will decrease with the increase of consumer preference. In addition, the critical condition for the existence of strategic return behavior of consumers is given. When the cost of return is higher than this critical condition, the strategic return behavior of consumers will disappear.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F724.6

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