组内网络外部性对平台定价决策的影响

发布时间：2019-01-05 00:32

【摘要】：互联网的发展进步带动了商业模式由传统模式向电子商务的转变。人们生活的方方面面都可以通过网络实现。购物不再局限于实体店的选购,各种网络购物平台能够允许消费者在拥有网络和通讯设备的条件下选购全世界范围内的商品。与购物网站类似的还有打车软件,团购网站,订餐平台,此外还有银行卡平台,操作系统平台等等。这些平台的共同特征就是将商品或者服务的提供者和需要商品或者服务的消费者集中到一起,让他们能够通过平台的中介作用完成消费的过程,并且平台中一边用户的数量会影响进入平台的另一边用户的数量,这样的平台就是双边市场。双边市场中信息不对称的问题因为平台提供用户点评的功能得到优化,消费者可以将从平台中得到的用户体验发布到平台,让其他消费者能够了解更多更全面的信息帮助他们进行消费行为的决策。这样具有点评功能的平台中就存在消费者的组内网络外部性。双边市场中研究的重点问题就是关于平台的定价决策,之前的研究大多数都是关于存在交叉网络外部性的情况下平台的定价决策问题,但是这篇文章以订餐平台为例,考虑平台中的点评带来的消费者方的组内网络外部性对平台定价的影响。文章首先对双边市场的概念和特征作了介绍,并对已有的关于双边市场平台定价的研究进行了总结。文章的创新之处就在于以具有点评功能的平台为具体研究对象将点评带给消费者的组内网络外部性引入影响平台定价的因素,并且将双边市场分为垄断型和竞争型两类分别建立模型。在垄断型平台中考虑平台方是否给予消费者优惠的两种情况研究双边市场中平台对两边用户的定价问题。此外这篇文章还结合实际将点评分为正面点评和负面点评两类。研究表明当平台中组内网络外部性表现为正时,平台的收益大小会随着组内网络外部性的增加而呈现出先增后减的状态,所以控制平台中点评的数量能够帮助平台获得最佳收益。垄断平台和竞争平台中当平台在市场中形成了品牌效应的情况下平台的组内网络效应呈现的负向影响越大,平台能够获得的关注度越高,吸引的消费者和商户也会越多,从而获取的收益越大。当平台中的点评带来正向组内网络效应时,平台的收益会因为点评数量的过载导致的组内网络效应过大而降低,太多的点评也引起消费者的阅读耐性丧失从而失去参考性。所以通过一些方法控制平台中的点评才能保证平台获取最佳的收益。
[Abstract]:The development and progress of the Internet has driven the transformation of business model from traditional mode to electronic commerce. All aspects of people's lives can be realized through the network. Shopping is no longer confined to physical stores, various online shopping platforms can allow consumers to purchase goods worldwide under the condition of having network and communication equipment. Similar to shopping websites are ride-hailing software, group-buying websites, food booking platforms, bank card platforms, operating system platforms, and so on. The common feature of these platforms is to bring together the providers of goods or services and the consumers who need them, so that they can complete the process of consumption through the intermediary role of the platform. And the number of users on one side of the platform will affect the number of users on the other side of the platform, such a platform is the bilateral market. Information asymmetries in bilateral markets because the platform's ability to provide user reviews is optimized, consumers can publish the user experience gained from the platform to the platform. Let other consumers know more and more comprehensive information to help them make consumer behavior decisions. In this way, there is the network externality of consumers in the platform with comment function. The focus of the research in the bilateral market is on the pricing decision of the platform. Most of the previous studies are about the pricing decision of the platform in the presence of cross-network externalities, but this article takes the ordering platform as an example. Consider the impact of the consumer's intra-group network externalities on the pricing of the platform. This paper first introduces the concept and characteristics of bilateral market, and summarizes the existing research on the pricing of bilateral market platform. The innovation of this paper lies in the fact that the internal network externalities brought to consumers by the platform with comment function are introduced into the factors that affect the pricing of the platform. And the bilateral market is divided into monopolistic and competitive models. Considering whether the platform side gives preferential treatment to the consumer in the monopolistic platform the pricing problem of the platform to the users on both sides in the bilateral market is studied. In addition, this article classifies the reviews into two categories: positive and negative. The results show that when the intra-group network externality is positive, the income of the platform will increase first and then decrease with the increase of the intra-group network externality. So control the number of comments in the platform can help the platform to get the best benefits. In monopolistic platform and competitive platform, when the platform forms brand effect in the market, the greater the negative influence of the intra-group network effect of the platform, the higher the attention the platform can get, and the more consumers and merchants are attracted. The greater the gain. When the comments in the platform bring positive intra-group network effect, the platform's income will be reduced because of the overload of the number of comments, and too many comments will lead to the loss of consumers' reading patience and loss of reference. Therefore, only by controlling the comments in the platform can the platform obtain the best income.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274

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