所有制、行业垄断与高管薪酬差距——来自中国上市公司2010年的证据

发布时间：2018-07-05 19:37

本文选题：所有制 + 行业垄断　；参考：《经济问题探索》2012年09期

【摘要】：本文以中国上市公司2010年的高管薪酬数据为样本,检验所有制性质和行业垄断对上市公司高管薪酬差距的影响。研究发现,国有上市公司的高管薪酬水平显著高于非国有上市公司。但是,由于不同所有制企业高管薪酬的决定机制不同,行业垄断程度对高管薪酬的影响不同,对国有上市公司而言,所处行业的垄断程度越高,高管薪酬水平越高;而对非国有上市公司而言,所处行业的垄断程度越高,其高管薪酬反而越低。原因在于,不同所有制上市公司垄断优势的来源不同,国有上市公司的垄断地位来自政府赋予的对自然资源和其他资源的垄断优势,而非国有上市公司则主要是通过扩大企业规模来获取垄断地位。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of executive compensation of Chinese listed companies in 2010, this paper examines the effects of ownership and industry monopoly on the executive compensation gap of listed companies. It is found that the executive compensation of state-owned listed companies is significantly higher than that of non-state-owned listed companies. However, because of the different decision mechanism of executive compensation in different ownership enterprises, the monopoly degree of industry has different influence on executive compensation. For state-owned listed companies, the higher the monopoly degree of the industry is, the higher the executive compensation level is. For non-state listed companies, the higher the monopoly, the lower the executive pay. The reason is that the sources of monopoly advantages of listed companies under different ownership are different, and the monopoly position of state-owned listed companies comes from the monopoly advantages given by the government to natural resources and other resources. And non-state-owned listed companies mainly by expanding the size of enterprises to gain monopoly position.
【作者单位】：云南民族大学;北京师范大学;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目“实施扩大就业的发展战略研究”(项目编号:07&ZD044) “实施人才强国战略重大问题跟踪研究”(项目编号:10&ZD046) 国家自然科学基金重点项目“城乡劳动力市场整合机理与实现机制研究”(NSF项目编号:70933001)
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F224

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