澄清公告异象、治理失灵与信任危机
发布时间：2018-07-15 08:31
【摘要】：自1996年中国证监会开始要求公司发布“澄清公告”以来,中国股市就频频出现“澄而不清”的质疑。随着证监会和证券交易所多次修改披露规定,对公司澄清的格式、内容甚至措辞都加以规范。然而,澄清公告并不能完全消除传闻的影响,而且投资者的决策受到了澄清方式的影响。本文从保护投资者的角度,选取2005到2012年间发生的澄清公告事件,以资产重组相关事件为研究对象,从不同的视角探讨了澄清公告异象的深层次原因。 资产重组的传闻占到了市场传闻的一半,尽管监管部门已经屡次修改澄清公告的披露指引,甚至在公告中需要特别表述,要求公司承诺“三个月不重组”,都不能有效减少市场中“澄而不清”的现象。本文采用案例分析、档案式数据分析和实验研究相结合,拟对澄清公告的以下问题进行深入地研究：对于同一事件,公司如何进行澄清,采用的方法是否相同?不同澄清方式是否会造成不同的异常收益率?澄清公告是否会导致投资者困惑?管理层是否采用战略性披露迷惑投资者?公司的治理水平与澄清方式之间的相关性?投资者是否在澄清公告事件中存在决策偏差?投资者对公司所进行的披露是否信任?投资者的最终决策依据是什么? 本文对2005年以来的澄清公告进行分析整理,对澄清公告披露的现状和“澄而不清”现象的广泛性进行探讨；采用文本分析法对澄清公告进行分类,检验澄清公告的市场反应,考察不同的澄清方式如何影响资本市场；通过对异常交易量的检验,洞悉信息在不同投资者之间的信念异质的影响。本文从管理层和投资者两个角度,对澄清公告市场异象产生的原因进行剖析,研究发现公司治理的失灵和投资者对管理层的信任缺失是澄清公告异象的两个重要原因。 具体而言,本文的研究从以下几个方面开展： 1.澄清公告与“澄而不清”异象。本文从三个方面来检验市场上存在的“澄而不清”市场异象。首先,系统性地梳理澄清公告规定的演变过程,全面总结2005年-2012年的传闻性质、传闻来源和传闻公司特征,采用案例分析方法重现中国市场上广泛存在的“澄而不清”异象。其次,本文通过文本分析法,对资产重组相关事件的澄清公告进行分类整理,将公告措辞按照“完全澄清”和“部分澄清”进行分类。按照证券交易所的规定,将公告分为有承诺“三个月不重组”和无承诺两个类型进行分析,以考察不同澄清方式是否能够影响投资者的投资决策。最后,本文采用异常交易量作为投资者信念异质的替代变量,分析考察澄清公告是否让投资者感到困惑。 2.澄清公告与“治理失灵”。本文从两个方面讨论公司治理对于澄清公告披露的影响。首先,对否认重组传闻的公司,在公告后发生的重组情况进行检查,考察其否认公告后的三个月、六个月、九个月和一年之间公司是否有成功重组活动；并且检验不同的澄清方式对未来重组活动是否具有预测能力。通过该检验能够明确公司管理层在披露澄清公告时,是否发布了真实信息。由于重组是一个复杂的沟通过程,如果公司在澄清的短期内进行了重组,则说明在发布澄清公告当时,公司已经开始策划或者进行重组活动了。另一方面,本文检验公司治理对于澄清公告的影响,重点考察董事会、监事会、独立董事、大股东和审计委员会在澄清公告中发挥的治理作用。 3.澄清公告与“信任危机”。本文从投资者心理的角度来解读“澄而不清”现象,采用实验研究的方法来探讨投资者的决策过程。在实验一中,投资者阅读不同措辞方式的澄清公告,并且根据公司的基本信息做出投资决策。实验中的措辞方式与实证研究的完全相符,包括了完全澄清和部分澄清,有承诺和无承诺的不同方式。投资者依据这些披露对事件概率、股价等变量做出评估,并且做出相应的投资决策。实验目的在于解释异常股票收益率和异常股票交易量。在实验二中,投资者阅读不同格式的公告,并且根据公告对于管理层的信任度进行评分,最后做出投资决策。实验的目的是考察投资者对管理层是否信任,对管理层的信任是否能够影响到投资者的决策。 正文分为八章： 第一章,绪论部分对本文的选题背景、研究意义、研究思路和研究方法进行了介绍。 第二章,文献回顾和理论基础。本文采用会计行为研究方法结合档案式研究寻求“澄而不清”的原因。认知心理学和社会心理学是会计行为学的理论基础,本文对广泛应用在会计领域的认知心理学和社会心理学进行了简要的回顾,并且对近二十年来会计行为学中应用心理学理论进行总结。在心理学研究成果的基础上,提出研究信息披露与投资者保护机制的研究框架,在该框架中,结合档案研究与实验研究,从市场、公司治理、投资者心理等多方面探讨信息披露效率和投资者保护机制。 第三章,澄清公告规定与“澄而不清现象”。本章主要论述澄清公告规定的历史变革,并且对2005-2012年的澄清公告进行整理,展现传闻类型、传闻媒体、公司特征等各方面的描述性统计,采用案例分析展现近年来“澄而不清”现象的普遍性。 第四章,澄清公告的市场反应。本章主要考察传闻及澄清公告造成的市场反应,将公司澄清方式分为“完全澄清”和部分澄清,有承诺和无承诺。通过对传闻和澄清公告在澄清之前和澄清之后进行对比检验,以分析不同的澄清方式是否在股票市场上造成了显著的异常反应。然后,采用异常交易量作为投资者信念异质的替代变量,分析不同的澄清方式是否会导致投资者困惑。 第五章,澄清公告与治理失灵。本部分从两个方面来讨论公司治理对于澄清公告披露的影响。首先,对于否认重组传闻的公告后公司真实重组情况进行检验,分别检验在否认之后三个月、六个月、九个月和一年之间公司是否有成功进行重组活动。并且检验不同的澄清方式对未来发生重组活动的预测能力。通过该检验能够明确公司管理层在披露澄清公告时,是否发布了真实信息。由于重组是一个复杂的沟通过程,如果公司在澄清的短期内进行了重组,则说明在发布澄清公告当时,公司已经开始策划或者进行重组活动。另一方面,检验公司治理对于澄清公告的影响,重点考察董事会、监事会、独立董事、大股东和审计委员会在澄清公告中发挥的治理作用。 第六章,澄而不清与投资者决策过程。本章采用实验方法来研究投资者决策过程,投资者阅读不同措辞方式的澄清公告,并且根据公司的基本信息做出投资决策。实验中的措辞方式与实证研究的完全相符,包括了完全澄清和部分澄清,有承诺和无承诺的不同方式。投资者依据这些披露对事件概率、股价等变量做出评估,并且做出投资决策。通过了解投资者的决策路径,可以对市场上出现的股票价格异象和交易量异象进行解释。 第七章,澄而不清与信用危机。本章采用实验的方法来考察投资者对管理层的信任。实验中,不同分组的投资者阅读了资产重组相关事件和日常经营事件的澄清公告,根据公司的不同披露格式,投资者对管理层的诚信水平、事件未来发展趋势进行评价,并且做出投资决策。通过实验来评估管理层诚信水平对于投资者的影响。 第八章,全文总结及政策建议。该部分对全文的主要研究结论,政策启示和研究局限性进行系统性地总结,并对未来的研究进行展望。 本文的主要研究结论如下： 1.与前人的研究结果一致,无论是市场传闻还是澄清公告,都能够引起显著的异常收益率,并且传闻与澄清之后的异常收益率方向相反。本文进一步对前人的研究进行了扩展,经实证检验证明,公司的澄清方式能够显著影响股票的异常收益率。以资产重组相关事件传闻为例,公司否定传闻的语气越强烈,公司股票的异常收益率就越低。也就是说,市场的异常收益率与管理层澄清公告的语气相关。管理层的披露方式可以影响到投资者的决策。 2.澄清公告在短期内吸引投资者眼球,引起了较大的市场交易量,并且公司澄清的强烈程度影响投资者的投资决策,造成了投资者的“信念异质”。本文采用市场异常交易量作为投资者信念异质的替代变量,进一步检验公司的澄清方式是否使得投资者感到困惑。在澄清的当日内,澄清公告造成了投资者之间的信念异质,描述不清的事件让投资者感到困惑。 3.对公司澄清后重组活动进行检验,整体上看,有70%的公司在一年内有重组活动。澄清的方式对以后的重组活动有一定的预测力。公司发布混淆的公告,一方面是由于重组事件的不确定性造成的,另一方面存在公司为了维持股价,采用战略性披露策略影响投资者的判断。 4.通过对澄清方式与公司治理的检验,可以看出公司治理是“澄而不清”的一个重要原因。在澄清公告的披露中,监事会、审计委员会、第一大股东持股都在一定程度上遏制公告的模糊性。然而董事会,包括独立董事,并没有发挥应有的作用进行明确的澄清。总而言之,公司治理与澄清公告的披露密切相关,澄清公告“澄而不清”在很大程度上是公司的战略性披露。 5.澄清格式通过影响重组概率判断,最终影响到投资者的投资决策。投资者在面临资产重组事件时,很大程度上会忽略自身对事件性质的判断而进行投资。也就是说,即使投资者认为特定资产重组事项对于公司长远发展未必是好事,但考虑到重组会在短期内拉升股价,也会对公司进行投资。强制承诺“三个月”没有起到应有的作用,投资者仍认为公司会进行重组。 5.在日常经营事件中,投资者将澄清公告的披露方式归因于管理层的诚信度,而在做出最终的投资决策时,一方面要考虑公司的经营状况,另一方面会考虑公司管理层的诚信程度。概括而言,公司的披露方式影响到投资者对公司管理人员的评价,对管理人员的评价最终影响到个人投资者的投资决策。 6.在资产重组事件中,投资者完全不考虑管理层的诚信,也就是说,投资者认为管理层处于失信状态。在资产重组相关的事件中,投资者仅仅考虑事件的发展趋势,而不考虑管理层是否诚信可靠。可见占到半数以上的“资产重组”传闻已经让投资者麻痹,进行投资决策时毫不关心公司管理层的诚信程度,采用投机的方式,只关心股票价格。 本文的创新主要体现在以下几方面： 1.提出了一个研究信息披露与投资者保护的行为学研究方案。基于认知心理学和社会心理学的研究,本文总结了近年来在财务会计和资本市场领域,会计行为研究对于心理学理论的应用情况,进一步提出了一个研究信息披露与投资者保护的行为学研究方案。从管理层披露动机,投资者决策偏差的各方面来为监管层提出保护投资者利益的监管建议。 2.多视角检验和证明“澄而不清”现象。本文对澄清公告异象进行了深入探讨,从公司治理和投资者信任两方面来解释“澄而不清”的市场异象。采用事后检验和事前检验相结合,可以看出公司治理失灵是澄清公告市场异象的主要原因。实验研究可以清楚的探讨投资者的决策路径。 3.采用心理学理论来解释“澄而不清”现象。已有研究证实了“澄而不清”的现象,但是对于该现象产生的原因,并没有形成一个系统性地解释。本文首先对市场异象进行检验,证实澄而不清现象的存在,然后基于档案式研究的结果,通过实验研究探讨了“澄而不清”的心理学原因。在研究中,应用了归因理论、有限注意力和羊群理论来解释投资者的决策偏差,再次证明了已有的研究结论,并且发现投资者在决策中受到了认知局限的影响和社会坏境的影响,最终产生决策偏误,即出现资本市场异象。对于投资者决策过程的理解,可以帮助监管部门加强旨在提高投资者决策质量的披露制度建设。
[Abstract]:Since the CSRC began to publish a "clarification announcement" in 1996, China's stock market has frequently appeared to be "clear and unclear". As the securities and securities exchange and the securities exchange have repeatedly revised the disclosure regulations, the format, content and even wording of the company's clarification are standardized. And the investor's decision is influenced by the way of clarification. From the point of view of protecting the investor, this paper selects the clarification announcements from 2005 to 2012, and discusses the underlying causes of the clarification of the announcement from different perspectives.
The rumor of asset restructuring accounts for half of the market rumours. Although the regulatory authorities have repeatedly revised the disclosure guidelines for clarification announcements, even in the announcement, it is necessary to make a special statement, requiring the company to promise "no reorganization for three months", which can not effectively reduce the "clear and unclear" phenomenon in the market. An in-depth study of the following questions of clarification Announcements: how does the company clarify the same event, how does the company adopt the same method, and do different clarification methods cause different abnormal returns? Will clarification announcements lead to confusion for investors, and whether management uses strategic disclosure fans or not? Investors? The correlation between the corporate governance level and the way of clarification? Does the investor have a decision bias in the clarification announcement? Do investors trust in the disclosure of the company? What is the basis for the final decision of the investor?
This paper analyzes and collate the clarification announcements since 2005, and discusses the status of clarification announcements and the universality of the "clear and unclear" phenomenon, classifies the clarification bulletin by text analysis, examines the market reaction of clarification announcements, and examines how different clarification formulas affect the capital market; through abnormal transactions From the two perspectives of management and investors, this paper analyzes the causes of the emergence of the public announcement market anomalies. The study finds that the failure of corporate governance and the lack of trust in management by investors are the two important reasons for clarifying the anomalies of the announcement.
Specifically, the research in this paper is carried out in the following aspects:
1. clarification announcements and "clear and unclear" anomalies. This article examines the "clear and unclear" market anomalies in the market from three aspects. First, systematically comb the evolution process of the clarification announcements, summarize the hearsay nature of the 2005 -2012, the rumor source and the rumor feature, and use the case analysis method to reproduce the Chinese market. Secondly, through the text analysis, this paper classifies the clarification announcements of assets reorganization related events and classifies the announcement wording according to "complete clarification" and "partial clarification". According to the regulations of the stock exchange, the announcement is divided into a promise of "three months not reorganizing" and "no" Two types are promised to examine whether different ways of clarification can affect investors' investment decisions. Finally, this paper uses abnormal trading volume as an alternative variable of investor belief heterogeneity, and analyzes whether the Clarification Announcement makes investors feel confused.
2. clarification announcements and "governance failure". This article discusses the impact of corporate governance on clarification of announcement disclosure from two aspects. First, check the reorganization of companies that deny the rumor of restructuring after the announcement, and examine whether the company has a successful reorganization activity between three months, six months, nine months and one year after the announcement. And check whether different clarification methods have the ability to predict future reorganization activities. Through this test, it can make clear whether the company's management releases real information when disclosing clarification announcements. Because reorganization is a complex process of communication, if the company has made a reorganization in the short term, the clarification bulletin is issued. At that time, the company had started planning or reorganizing activities. On the other hand, this article examined the impact of corporate governance on clarification of the announcement, focusing on the governing role of the board, the board of supervisors, the independent directors, the large shareholders and the audit committee in clarifying the bulletin.
3. clarification announcements and "trust crisis". This article interprets the "clear and unclear" phenomenon from the perspective of investor psychology and uses experimental methods to explore the decision-making process of investors. In experiment one, investors read clarification announcements in different wording ways and make investment decisions based on the basic information of the company. The wording in the experiment The method is fully consistent with the empirical study, including complete clarification and partial clarification. There are different ways of commitment and non commitment. Investors make evaluation on the probability of events, stock prices and other variables based on these disclosures, and make corresponding investment decisions. The experimental purpose is to explain the abnormal stock returns and abnormal stock transactions. In experiment two In addition, investors read different forms of bulletin, and grade the trust of management according to the announcement, and finally make investment decisions. The purpose of the experiment is to examine whether investors trust in management and whether trust in management can affect the decision of investors.
The text is divided into eight chapters.
The first chapter introduces the background, significance, ideas and methods of the study.
The second chapter, the literature review and the theoretical basis. This article uses the accounting behavior research method and the archival research to find the "clear and unclear" reason. Cognitive psychology and social psychology are the theoretical basis of accounting behavior. This paper briefly reviews the cognitive psychology and social psychology which are widely used in the field of accounting. The theory of Applied Psychology in accounting behavior in the last twenty years is summarized. On the basis of the research results of psychology, the research framework of information disclosure and investor protection mechanism is put forward. In this framework, the efficiency of information disclosure is discussed in many aspects, including the market, corporate governance and investor psychology in the combination of archival research and experimental research. Investor protection mechanism.
The third chapter clarifies the stipulation of the announcement and the "clear and unclear phenomenon". This chapter mainly discusses the historical changes stipulated in the clarification bulletin, and collates the clarification announcements for 2005-2012 years, displays the descriptive statistics of the hearsay type, the hearsay media, the company characteristics and so on, and uses the case analysis to show the general phenomenon of "clear and unclear" in recent years. Sex.
The fourth chapter clarifies the market response of the announcement. This chapter mainly examines the market reaction caused by hearsay and clarification, and divides the company's clarification methods into "complete clarification" and partial clarification. It has a commitment and no commitment. Through the prior clarification and clarification of the anecdotal and clarification bulletin, a comparative test is carried out to analyze the different clarification methods. There is a significant abnormal reaction in the stock market. Then, the abnormal trading volume is used as an alternative variable for the investor's belief heterogeneity, and the analysis of whether different clarification methods can lead to investors' confusion.
The fifth chapter clarifies the announcement and governance failure. This part discusses the impact of corporate governance on the clarification of announcement disclosure from two aspects. First, check the real restructuring of the company after the announcement of the restructure of the rumor, and examine whether the company has succeeded in the three months, six months, nine months and one year after the denial. Group activities. And test the prediction ability of different clarification methods for future reorganization activities. Through this test, it can make clear whether the company's management releases real information when disclosing clarification announcements. Because reorganization is a complex communication process, if the company is reorganizing in the short term of clarification, it is clarified in the release of clarification. At the time of the announcement, the company had started planning or reorganizing activities. On the other hand, it inspected the impact of corporate governance on clarification of the announcement, focusing on the governing role of the board, the board of supervisors, the independent directors, the large shareholders and the audit committee in clarifying the announcement.
The sixth chapter is clarified and unclear and the process of investor decision-making. This chapter uses experimental methods to study the process of investor decision-making. Investors read clarification announcements in different wording ways and make investment decisions based on the basic information of the company. The wording in the experiment is consistent with the complete empirical study, including complete clarification and partial clarification. In different ways of commitment and non commitment, investors make evaluation on the probability of events, stock prices and other variables based on these disclosures, and make investment decisions. By understanding the decision path of the investors, we can explain the stock price anomalies and the trading volume anomalies that appear on the market.
The seventh chapter, clarification and credit crisis. This chapter uses the experimental method to investigate the trust of the investor to management. In the experiment, the investors of different groups read the clarification announcements of the assets reorganization related events and the daily business events, according to the different disclosure formats of the company, the investors' credit level to the management level and the future development of the events. The trend is evaluated and investment decisions are made. The influence of management integrity level on investors is evaluated through experiments.
The eighth chapter, the full text of the summary and policy recommendations. This part of the main conclusions of the full text, policy implications and research limitations are systematically summarized, and the future research prospects.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
1. it is consistent with the previous research results. Both market rumors and clarification announcements can cause significant abnormal returns, and the rumor has the opposite direction after the clarification. This paper further expands the previous studies. The empirical test proves that the clarification method of the company can significantly affect the abnormal income of the stock. As an example, the stronger the tone of the company denies the rumor, the lower the abnormal return of the company's stock. That is to say, the abnormal return of the market is related to the tone of the management clarification bulletin. The disclosure of management can affect the decision of the investor.
2. clarification announcements attract investors' eyeballs in the short term, causing large market trading volume, and the strong degree of company clarification affects investors' investment decision making, resulting in the "belief heterogeneity" of investors. This paper uses market abnormal volume as an alternative variable of investor belief heterogeneity, and further tests the company's clarification method Investors are puzzled. In the day of clarification, clarification announcements have resulted in a heterogeneous belief among investors, and the unclear description of the events is perplexing investors.
3. of the company's clarified reorganization activities were tested. On the whole, 70% of the companies had reorganized activities in one year. The way of clarification had a certain predictability for the future reorganization. The company issued a confusing announcement, on the one hand, caused by the uncertainty of the reorganization event, and on the other hand, the company adopted war to maintain the stock price. A strategic disclosure strategy affects the investor's judgment.
4. through the examination of the ways of clarification and corporate governance, we can see that corporate governance is an important reason for "clarity and unclear". In the disclosure of clarification announcements, the board of supervisors, the audit committee, and the first large shareholders hold the ambiguity of the announcement to a certain extent. However, the board of directors, including independent directors, has not played its proper role. Make clear clarifications. In a word, corporate governance is closely related to the disclosure of clarification announcements, and the clarification of the "clear and unclear" announcement is largely the strategic disclosure of the company.
5. the form of clarification will affect the investment decision of investors by influencing the probability of restructuring. Investors will ignore their own judgement on the nature of the event to a large extent when facing the event of asset reorganization. Considering that restructuring will increase stock prices in the short term,
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F830.42
本文编号：2123473
[Abstract]:Since the CSRC began to publish a "clarification announcement" in 1996, China's stock market has frequently appeared to be "clear and unclear". As the securities and securities exchange and the securities exchange have repeatedly revised the disclosure regulations, the format, content and even wording of the company's clarification are standardized. And the investor's decision is influenced by the way of clarification. From the point of view of protecting the investor, this paper selects the clarification announcements from 2005 to 2012, and discusses the underlying causes of the clarification of the announcement from different perspectives.
The rumor of asset restructuring accounts for half of the market rumours. Although the regulatory authorities have repeatedly revised the disclosure guidelines for clarification announcements, even in the announcement, it is necessary to make a special statement, requiring the company to promise "no reorganization for three months", which can not effectively reduce the "clear and unclear" phenomenon in the market. An in-depth study of the following questions of clarification Announcements: how does the company clarify the same event, how does the company adopt the same method, and do different clarification methods cause different abnormal returns? Will clarification announcements lead to confusion for investors, and whether management uses strategic disclosure fans or not? Investors? The correlation between the corporate governance level and the way of clarification? Does the investor have a decision bias in the clarification announcement? Do investors trust in the disclosure of the company? What is the basis for the final decision of the investor?
This paper analyzes and collate the clarification announcements since 2005, and discusses the status of clarification announcements and the universality of the "clear and unclear" phenomenon, classifies the clarification bulletin by text analysis, examines the market reaction of clarification announcements, and examines how different clarification formulas affect the capital market; through abnormal transactions From the two perspectives of management and investors, this paper analyzes the causes of the emergence of the public announcement market anomalies. The study finds that the failure of corporate governance and the lack of trust in management by investors are the two important reasons for clarifying the anomalies of the announcement.
Specifically, the research in this paper is carried out in the following aspects:
1. clarification announcements and "clear and unclear" anomalies. This article examines the "clear and unclear" market anomalies in the market from three aspects. First, systematically comb the evolution process of the clarification announcements, summarize the hearsay nature of the 2005 -2012, the rumor source and the rumor feature, and use the case analysis method to reproduce the Chinese market. Secondly, through the text analysis, this paper classifies the clarification announcements of assets reorganization related events and classifies the announcement wording according to "complete clarification" and "partial clarification". According to the regulations of the stock exchange, the announcement is divided into a promise of "three months not reorganizing" and "no" Two types are promised to examine whether different ways of clarification can affect investors' investment decisions. Finally, this paper uses abnormal trading volume as an alternative variable of investor belief heterogeneity, and analyzes whether the Clarification Announcement makes investors feel confused.
2. clarification announcements and "governance failure". This article discusses the impact of corporate governance on clarification of announcement disclosure from two aspects. First, check the reorganization of companies that deny the rumor of restructuring after the announcement, and examine whether the company has a successful reorganization activity between three months, six months, nine months and one year after the announcement. And check whether different clarification methods have the ability to predict future reorganization activities. Through this test, it can make clear whether the company's management releases real information when disclosing clarification announcements. Because reorganization is a complex process of communication, if the company has made a reorganization in the short term, the clarification bulletin is issued. At that time, the company had started planning or reorganizing activities. On the other hand, this article examined the impact of corporate governance on clarification of the announcement, focusing on the governing role of the board, the board of supervisors, the independent directors, the large shareholders and the audit committee in clarifying the bulletin.
3. clarification announcements and "trust crisis". This article interprets the "clear and unclear" phenomenon from the perspective of investor psychology and uses experimental methods to explore the decision-making process of investors. In experiment one, investors read clarification announcements in different wording ways and make investment decisions based on the basic information of the company. The wording in the experiment The method is fully consistent with the empirical study, including complete clarification and partial clarification. There are different ways of commitment and non commitment. Investors make evaluation on the probability of events, stock prices and other variables based on these disclosures, and make corresponding investment decisions. The experimental purpose is to explain the abnormal stock returns and abnormal stock transactions. In experiment two In addition, investors read different forms of bulletin, and grade the trust of management according to the announcement, and finally make investment decisions. The purpose of the experiment is to examine whether investors trust in management and whether trust in management can affect the decision of investors.
The text is divided into eight chapters.
The first chapter introduces the background, significance, ideas and methods of the study.
The second chapter, the literature review and the theoretical basis. This article uses the accounting behavior research method and the archival research to find the "clear and unclear" reason. Cognitive psychology and social psychology are the theoretical basis of accounting behavior. This paper briefly reviews the cognitive psychology and social psychology which are widely used in the field of accounting. The theory of Applied Psychology in accounting behavior in the last twenty years is summarized. On the basis of the research results of psychology, the research framework of information disclosure and investor protection mechanism is put forward. In this framework, the efficiency of information disclosure is discussed in many aspects, including the market, corporate governance and investor psychology in the combination of archival research and experimental research. Investor protection mechanism.
The third chapter clarifies the stipulation of the announcement and the "clear and unclear phenomenon". This chapter mainly discusses the historical changes stipulated in the clarification bulletin, and collates the clarification announcements for 2005-2012 years, displays the descriptive statistics of the hearsay type, the hearsay media, the company characteristics and so on, and uses the case analysis to show the general phenomenon of "clear and unclear" in recent years. Sex.
The fourth chapter clarifies the market response of the announcement. This chapter mainly examines the market reaction caused by hearsay and clarification, and divides the company's clarification methods into "complete clarification" and partial clarification. It has a commitment and no commitment. Through the prior clarification and clarification of the anecdotal and clarification bulletin, a comparative test is carried out to analyze the different clarification methods. There is a significant abnormal reaction in the stock market. Then, the abnormal trading volume is used as an alternative variable for the investor's belief heterogeneity, and the analysis of whether different clarification methods can lead to investors' confusion.
The fifth chapter clarifies the announcement and governance failure. This part discusses the impact of corporate governance on the clarification of announcement disclosure from two aspects. First, check the real restructuring of the company after the announcement of the restructure of the rumor, and examine whether the company has succeeded in the three months, six months, nine months and one year after the denial. Group activities. And test the prediction ability of different clarification methods for future reorganization activities. Through this test, it can make clear whether the company's management releases real information when disclosing clarification announcements. Because reorganization is a complex communication process, if the company is reorganizing in the short term of clarification, it is clarified in the release of clarification. At the time of the announcement, the company had started planning or reorganizing activities. On the other hand, it inspected the impact of corporate governance on clarification of the announcement, focusing on the governing role of the board, the board of supervisors, the independent directors, the large shareholders and the audit committee in clarifying the announcement.
The sixth chapter is clarified and unclear and the process of investor decision-making. This chapter uses experimental methods to study the process of investor decision-making. Investors read clarification announcements in different wording ways and make investment decisions based on the basic information of the company. The wording in the experiment is consistent with the complete empirical study, including complete clarification and partial clarification. In different ways of commitment and non commitment, investors make evaluation on the probability of events, stock prices and other variables based on these disclosures, and make investment decisions. By understanding the decision path of the investors, we can explain the stock price anomalies and the trading volume anomalies that appear on the market.
The seventh chapter, clarification and credit crisis. This chapter uses the experimental method to investigate the trust of the investor to management. In the experiment, the investors of different groups read the clarification announcements of the assets reorganization related events and the daily business events, according to the different disclosure formats of the company, the investors' credit level to the management level and the future development of the events. The trend is evaluated and investment decisions are made. The influence of management integrity level on investors is evaluated through experiments.
The eighth chapter, the full text of the summary and policy recommendations. This part of the main conclusions of the full text, policy implications and research limitations are systematically summarized, and the future research prospects.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
1. it is consistent with the previous research results. Both market rumors and clarification announcements can cause significant abnormal returns, and the rumor has the opposite direction after the clarification. This paper further expands the previous studies. The empirical test proves that the clarification method of the company can significantly affect the abnormal income of the stock. As an example, the stronger the tone of the company denies the rumor, the lower the abnormal return of the company's stock. That is to say, the abnormal return of the market is related to the tone of the management clarification bulletin. The disclosure of management can affect the decision of the investor.
2. clarification announcements attract investors' eyeballs in the short term, causing large market trading volume, and the strong degree of company clarification affects investors' investment decision making, resulting in the "belief heterogeneity" of investors. This paper uses market abnormal volume as an alternative variable of investor belief heterogeneity, and further tests the company's clarification method Investors are puzzled. In the day of clarification, clarification announcements have resulted in a heterogeneous belief among investors, and the unclear description of the events is perplexing investors.
3. of the company's clarified reorganization activities were tested. On the whole, 70% of the companies had reorganized activities in one year. The way of clarification had a certain predictability for the future reorganization. The company issued a confusing announcement, on the one hand, caused by the uncertainty of the reorganization event, and on the other hand, the company adopted war to maintain the stock price. A strategic disclosure strategy affects the investor's judgment.
4. through the examination of the ways of clarification and corporate governance, we can see that corporate governance is an important reason for "clarity and unclear". In the disclosure of clarification announcements, the board of supervisors, the audit committee, and the first large shareholders hold the ambiguity of the announcement to a certain extent. However, the board of directors, including independent directors, has not played its proper role. Make clear clarifications. In a word, corporate governance is closely related to the disclosure of clarification announcements, and the clarification of the "clear and unclear" announcement is largely the strategic disclosure of the company.
5. the form of clarification will affect the investment decision of investors by influencing the probability of restructuring. Investors will ignore their own judgement on the nature of the event to a large extent when facing the event of asset reorganization. Considering that restructuring will increase stock prices in the short term,
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F830.42
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