基于三元交互理论框架的信用评级机构道德风险探析

发布时间：2018-08-21 14:59

【摘要】：信用评级机构的道德风险会严重误导投资者,进而对金融市场产生不利影响。经济利益的粘连度、法律风险的缺损度以及外部干预的强度是影响信用评级机构道德风险的三大变量。经济利益驱使信用评级机构的经济行为偏离职业道德路标,法律风险的缺损使得道德风险的暴露率急剧增加,而外部干预的强度进一步使道德风险外溢。在这种三元交互作用下,信用评级机构道德风险难以彻底消除,但在一定程度上降低其发生的概率和程度确实是可行的。要降低信用评级机构道德风险必须从改善制度环境和完善公司治理机制入手。具体措施为:政府要厘清与评级机构的关系,自觉回归监管者的角色;建立健全集体诉讼与大额民事赔偿机制;信用评级机构声誉机制的培养;信用评级机构职业道德的构建。
[Abstract]:The moral hazard of credit rating agencies can seriously mislead investors and adversely affect financial markets. The degree of adhesion of economic benefits, the defect of legal risk and the intensity of external intervention are the three variables that affect the moral hazard of credit rating agencies. Economic benefits drive the economic behavior of credit rating agencies deviate from the professional ethics signpost, the defect of legal risk causes the moral hazard exposure rate to increase sharply, and the intensity of external intervention makes the moral hazard overflow further. Under this kind of ternary interaction, it is difficult to eliminate the moral hazard of credit rating agencies completely, but it is feasible to reduce the probability and degree of its occurrence to a certain extent. In order to reduce the moral hazard of credit rating agencies, it is necessary to improve the institutional environment and the corporate governance mechanism. The specific measures are as follows: the government should clarify the relationship with the rating agencies, consciously return to the role of the regulator; establish and improve the class-action litigation and large-scale civil compensation mechanism; the credit rating agencies reputation mechanism training; the construction of professional ethics of credit rating agencies.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨师范大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“金融衍生工具的风险测评研究”(09BJY108)阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F832.39;B82-053

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