控股股东在定向增发中的认购动机与获利手段的实证研究

发布时间：2018-08-22 12:11

【摘要】：我国学术界一直致力于控股股东行为的研究。对控股股东行为相关研究发现控股股东利用其对上市公司影响力为其输送利益。控股股东直接或间接的参与上市公司决策,在上市公司整个决策过程中控股股东利用其控制权能力注入其主观意愿,使上市公司做出有利于控股股东的决策。所以,出于保护中小股东的利益,对上市公司控股股东行为的研究是必不可缺的。定向增发融资方式深受上市公司欢迎,其被采用次数已经超过配股以及公开增发。定向增发逐渐成为上市公司普遍采用的再融资方式。定向增发中控股股东认购次数较多,认购比例较大,这—现象与控股股东在配股及公开增发中的表现截然不同。定向增发不仅满足上市公司募集项目资金需求,而且使控股股东的其他资产得以上市。从市场表现看,控股股东认购通常带来股价正的效应。控股股东积极参与定向增发,是否预示控股股东在定向增发中将会有新的表现?其利益动机以及用来获取利益的手段是否与公开增发、配股不同?这需要进一步的研究。本文认为,对于控股股东在定向增发中的行为研究还不够充分。控股股东在定向增发中表现出来的行为与以往有着明显不同。在这样的情况下,本文试图挖掘现有文献的不足,深入探讨定向增发这种再融资方式中控股股东行为背后的利益动机与利益获取手段,丰富现有理论的不足,使广大投资者能更清楚的了解定向增发中控股股东的行为。本文以2009年-2011年286家成功完成定向增发的样本以及84家控股股东以非现金资产认购的定向增发样本,试图回答以下问题：控股股东是否出于提高控制权比例、获得股权价值增值等利益而做出认购决策?控股股东在做出认购决策后,是否利用定价手段(增发定价手段以及资产定价手段)获得利益? 本文各章节安排如下：第一章引言本章详细的阐述了本文的研究背景,从而确定了本文研究思路,为后文搭建整个研究框架。本章还阐述了本文研究的理论意义与现实意义,并对研究样本及研究方法进行了说明。第2章文献综述本章对国内外关于定向增发的相关文献进行了梳理,回顾了控股股东在定向增发中的行为表现以及行为导致的结果。本章主要从两个角度总结定向增发相关文献：(1),控股股东认购行为导致的市场反应；(2),控股股东认购与定向增发价格的关系。本章为后文实证分析提供了理论基础。第3章定向增发机制与现状分析本章对定向增发相关制度进行梳理,目的在于阐述定向增发概念以及其重要性。本章不仅描述定向增发制度,而且阐述了定向增发在我过资本市场的现状。本章亦对以募集资金或资产重组为目的的定向增发进行了对比,重点阐述二者定价机制的不同。本文正是围绕定向增发特殊的政策制度展开研究,因此本章是后文研究的前提。第4章定向增发中控股股东行为本章主要对控股股东在定向增发中认购行为背后的利益动机及获利手段进行理论分析。首先总结控股股东三种利益动机,正是基于这三种利益动机才导致了控股股东做出认购决策,从而进一步的阐述控股股东在定向增发中采用定价手段进行获利。本章梳理了控股股东在定向增发中行为背后的利益链条,本章的理论分析是后文实证分析的最直接理论基础。第5章定向增发中控股股东认购利益动机本章以实证研究手段对控股股东两方面的利益动机进行了研究：第一,控股股东是否出于提高控制权比例而认购股份?第二,以资产回报率衡量上市公司业绩、市场回报率衡量股权价值增值程度,分析控股股东认购行为对业绩变化,市场回报率是否有影响?试图以本章的研究佐证控股股东利益动机假说。第6章定向增发中控股股东的获利手段本章以实证研究手段对控股股东在认购股份后是否会利用增发定价、资产定价手段进行获利进行分析。本章以增发折价率衡量定向增发价格,分析控股股东认购行为与增发折价率的关系,以及控股股东认购比例是否会提高控股股东获利的积极性。本章又以资产评估增值率衡量资产价值高低,并引入第三方独立机构,分析控股股东利用资产定价手段获利的决定性因素与其获利渠道。第7章研究结论与研究局限性本章对前文研究结果进行总结,并对本文研究的局限性进行说明。本文的主要结论如下： (1)控股股东在定向增发中出于三种利益动机而做出认购股份的决策。控股股东认购明显导致了其控制权比例的增加。定向增发前控制权比例较低的控股股东认购股份的意愿相对于定向增发前控制权比例较高的控股股东更加强烈,促使控股股东认购更多的规模以提高控制权比例。对于股权价值增值利益动机来说,控股股东认购股份能够提高上市公司业绩,从而进一步提升上市公司股权价值。 (2)控股股东认购股份行为促使其利用控制权影响上市公司定向增发定价决策,从而获得较低的增发价格。控股股东认购股份越多,其利用控制权进行获利的可能性越大,也即控制权比例越大的控股股东在定向增发中利用其控制权影响定价的积极性越高。所以,控股股东认购导致了较高的折价率。 (3)控股股东认购与资产评估增值率呈正的相关关系,也即控股股东认购相对于控股股东不认购导致了更高的资产评估增值率。本文的研究结论揭示了控股股东利用资产定价获利的途径。当控股股东以资产认购股份时,控股股东将会利用其控制权影响上市公司选择资产评估机构决策,进而选择对其有利的资产评估机构。资产评估机构的声誉的好坏与其出具的资产评估报告质量的高低呈显著正相关关系,也即声誉较差资产评估机构出具质量较低的资产评估报告的可能性越高。本文主要贡献如下： (1)本文以控股股东认购行为背后的利益动机为视角分析控股股东在定向增发中认购股份的决定性因素,并将定向增发定价与资产定价看作控股股东在定向增发中的两种获利手段,从而阐述了控股股东在定向增发中决策的利益链条。本文对控股股东在定向增发中认购行为动机以及获利手段的研究,拓宽了对控股股东行为研究的层面,对控股股东行为理论研究具有重大贡献。 (2)学术界很少涉及对控股股东在定向增发中采用资产定价进行获利以及资产定价获利渠道的研究。因此本文的研究丰富了现有文献,为学者研究我国定向增发中控股股东以资产认购股份现象提供了一个新的视角。本文研究存在以下不足： (1)本文缺乏对定向增发中重要的投资者——机构投资者研究。机构投资者在定向增发中所代表的利益是与控股股东一致,还是会对控股股东产生一定制衡。本文对此没有展开研究,因此缺乏这对这一重要投资者的研究,使得本文的研究具有一定局限性。 (2)本文缺乏对定向增发中公司治理作用的研究。本文仅仅以控股股东控制权的主导地位对定向增发决策的影响进行研究。但在实际中,控股股东在资产定价,增发定价过程中应该进行回避表决,独立董事机制作用日益明显,公司治理水平渐渐提高,累计投票制等都对控股股东控制权产生了一定制约。公司治理如何在定向增发中产生作用,甚至对控股股东行为产生一定影响值得进一步研究。 (3)本文研究样本存在一定缺陷。由于数据搜集时间成本,本文仅仅选用了2009年-2011年成功定向增发的样本,没有囊括成功定向增发的所有样本,所以本文研究结论有一定局限性。
[Abstract]:The academic circles of our country have been devoted to the study of the behavior of the controlling shareholders. Subjective will makes listed companies make decisions that are conducive to controlling shareholders. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, it is necessary to study the behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies.
Private placement is popular with listed companies and has been adopted more frequently than allotment and public offering. Private placement has gradually become a common way of refinancing in listed companies. Private placement not only meets the financing needs of listed companies, but also enables the other assets of the controlling shareholders to be listed. From the market performance, the subscription of the controlling shareholders usually brings positive effect of the stock price. This paper argues that the research on the behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement is insufficient. The behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement is obviously different from that in the past. In order to enrich the deficiency of the existing theories and make the investors understand the behavior of the controlling shareholders more clearly, this paper explores the motivation and means of gaining benefits behind the behavior of the controlling shareholders in the redistribution.
Based on 286 successful private placement samples from 2009 to 2011 and 84 private placement samples from non-cash assets, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Is the controlling shareholder making the decision to subscribe for the purpose of increasing the proportion of control rights and gaining the value of equity? Is it profitable to use pricing means (additional pricing and asset pricing)?
The chapters are arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
This chapter elaborates the research background of this paper in detail, and then determines the research ideas of this paper, and builds the whole research framework for the later part.
The second chapter is literature review.
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on directed placement at home and abroad, and reviews the behavior of controlling shareholders in directed placement and the results caused by the behavior. The relationship between prices. This chapter provides a theoretical basis for empirical analysis.
The third chapter is the mechanism and current situation of private placement.
This chapter not only describes the concept of private placement, but also describes the status quo of private placement in China's capital market. This chapter also compares the private placement for the purpose of fund raising or asset reorganization, with emphasis on the two definitions. The price mechanism is different. This paper is just around the special policy system of directional additional issuance, so this chapter is the premise of the later study.
The fourth chapter is the behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement.
This chapter mainly analyzes the interest motivation and profit-making means behind the controlling shareholder's subscription behavior in the directional offering. First, it summarizes the three interest motivations of the controlling shareholder, which lead to the decision-making of the controlling shareholder's subscription. This chapter combs the interest chain behind the behavior of controlling shareholders in the directional offering. The theoretical analysis of this chapter is the most direct theoretical basis of the empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter is about the motives of controlling shareholders to subscribe for interest in private placement.
This chapter studies the interest motivation of controlling shareholders in two aspects: first, does the controlling shareholder subscribe for the purpose of increasing the proportion of control rights? Second, the performance of listed companies is measured by the return on assets, the value-added degree of equity is measured by the return on market, and the change of performance caused by the subscription behavior of controlling shareholders is analyzed. Does the return on the field have any effect? The purpose of this chapter is to prove the motivation hypothesis of controlling shareholders' interests.
The sixth chapter is the profit making method of controlling shareholders in private placement.
This chapter uses empirical research to analyze whether the controlling shareholders will make use of additional issuance pricing and asset pricing to make profit after subscribing for shares. In this chapter, the value of assets is measured by the value-added rate of assets appraisal, and the third-party independent institutions are introduced to analyze the determinants of controlling shareholders'profit by means of asset pricing and their profit channels.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and limitations of the study.
This chapter summarizes the results of previous studies and explains the limitations of this study.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Controlling shareholders make the decision to subscribe for shares because of three kinds of interest motives in the private placement. Controlling shareholders'subscription obviously leads to the increase of their proportion of control rights. In order to increase the proportion of control rights, the controlling shareholders can subscribe more shares, which can improve the performance of listed companies and further enhance the equity value of listed companies.
(2) The behavior of controlling shareholders'subscribing to shares urges them to make use of the control right to influence the pricing decision of the listed company's private placement, so as to obtain a lower additional price. The higher the price is, the higher the discount rate is.
(3) Controlling shareholder's subscription is positively related to the value-added ratio of asset valuation, that is, the higher value-added ratio of asset valuation is caused by the subscription of controlling shareholder compared with the non-subscription of controlling shareholder. The reputation of an asset appraisal institution has a significant positive correlation with the quality of its asset appraisal report, that is, the reputation of a less reputable asset appraisal institution has a lower quality of its asset appraisal report. The higher the possibility.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) This paper analyzes the decisive factors of controlling shareholders'subscription in the process of directed placement from the perspective of interest motivation behind the behavior of controlling shareholders' subscription, and regards the pricing of directed placement and asset pricing as the two profit-making methods of controlling shareholders in the process of directed placement, thus expounding the interest chain of controlling shareholders'decision-making in the process of directed placement. The study on the motive and profit-making means of the controlling shareholder's subscription behavior in the private placement has broadened the research level of the controlling shareholder's behavior and made a great contribution to the study of the controlling shareholder's behavior theory.
(2) Academia seldom involves the study of the profit-making and the profit-making channel of the controlling shareholder's asset pricing in the private placement. Therefore, this study enriches the existing literature and provides a new perspective for scholars to study the phenomenon that the controlling shareholder subscribes for shares with assets in the private placement.
This study has the following shortcomings:
(1) Institutional investors, an important investor in private placement, are lacking in this paper. Whether the interests of institutional investors in private placement are consistent with the controlling shareholders or will they produce a certain balance between the controlling shareholders, this paper does not study this issue, so there is no research on this important investor, which makes this paper study. It has certain limitations.
(2) There is a lack of research on corporate governance in private placement. This paper only studies the influence of controlling shareholder's dominant position on private placement decision. But in practice, the controlling shareholder should avoid voting in the process of asset pricing and additional placement pricing. Independent director mechanism plays an increasingly important role in corporate governance. The gradual improvement of the level and the cumulative voting system have restricted the control rights of the controlling shareholders to a certain extent.
(3) There are some shortcomings in the research sample. Because of the time cost of data collection, this paper only selects the samples of successful directional placement from 2009 to 2011, and does not include all the samples of successful directional placement.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【参考文献】