管理层持股的利益趋同效应研究——基于中国A股上市公司盈余持续性的检验
发布时间：2018-09-01 18:35
【摘要】：管理层持股对公司盈余影响有"利益趋同"和"壕沟防御"两种效应。本文采用股权分置改革后中国A股上市公司2007年至2010年样本,基于盈余持续性的视角,研究了管理层持股的利益趋同效应。研究发现管理层持股能显著提高上市公司的盈余持续性,进一步研究还发现董事会和高级管理人员的作用强于监事会。本文不仅丰富了管理层持股对盈余持续性影响的研究,而且获得了管理层持股"利益趋同"作用的支持性验证,说明股权分置改革后"内部人控制"不再是制约管理层持股的制度障碍。本文研究支持上市公司和监管层积极看待管理层持股,并建议上市公司区别制定有效股权激励计划,通过不断完善资本市场和公司治理结构,更好地发挥管理层持股的积极作用。
[Abstract]:The influence of management ownership on earnings has two effects: benefit convergence and trench defense. From 2007 to 2010, this paper studies the benefit convergence effect of management shareholding from 2007 to 2010, from the perspective of earnings persistence. The study found that the management holding can significantly improve the earnings sustainability of listed companies, and further found that the role of the board of directors and senior managers is stronger than that of the board of supervisors. This paper not only enriches the research on the effect of management stock ownership on earnings sustainability, but also obtains the supporting verification of the "interest convergence" function of management stock holding. It shows that "insider control" is no longer a system obstacle restricting management ownership after the reform of split share structure. This paper supports listed companies and regulators to take a positive view of management ownership, and suggests that listed companies should make effective equity incentive plans separately and improve the capital market and corporate governance structure through the continuous improvement of the capital market and corporate governance structure. Better play the positive role of management ownership.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学商学院;
【分类号】：F224;F832.51;F275
[Abstract]:The influence of management ownership on earnings has two effects: benefit convergence and trench defense. From 2007 to 2010, this paper studies the benefit convergence effect of management shareholding from 2007 to 2010, from the perspective of earnings persistence. The study found that the management holding can significantly improve the earnings sustainability of listed companies, and further found that the role of the board of directors and senior managers is stronger than that of the board of supervisors. This paper not only enriches the research on the effect of management stock ownership on earnings sustainability, but also obtains the supporting verification of the "interest convergence" function of management stock holding. It shows that "insider control" is no longer a system obstacle restricting management ownership after the reform of split share structure. This paper supports listed companies and regulators to take a positive view of management ownership, and suggests that listed companies should make effective equity incentive plans separately and improve the capital market and corporate governance structure through the continuous improvement of the capital market and corporate governance structure. Better play the positive role of management ownership.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学商学院;
【分类号】：F224;F832.51;F275
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