我国商业银行理财产品风险披露研究
发布时间：2018-10-05 13:48
【摘要】：本文界定了理财产品的定义,将其定义为：投资者作为委托方,商业银行作为受托方,按照事前制订以投资计划与管理方式为内容的契约而建立的委托-代理关系的银行经营活动。在此基础上梳理了我国理财产品市场的发展历程,本文认为前后经历了 初步发展期、快速发展、金融危机后的调整期、逐渐成熟期。引入理财风险概念,认为理财产品风险就是商业银行在研发、销售、投资、核算过程中的,由于各种不可有因素的影响,所形成的对于投资者约定收益率的偏差程度,是一种客观存在的无法消灭的不确定性。在此基础上,将理财产品风险归纳为市场风险、信用风险、流动性风险、操作风险、法律风险和声誉风险。 运用信息不对称下委托代理理论作为本文的基础理论,分析了理财产品市场中委托代理关系的表现与理解委托代理成本的重要性,进而得出理论分析结论：理财产品市场需要充分的风险披露。从调查数据与网络资料入手,尝试分析我国理财产品风险披露现状,认为存在如下问题：1、未充分披露产品设计过程中的风险；2、销售阶段客户风险评级流于形式；3、未能建立完整的事前、事中、事后信息披露机制；4、销售环节回避风险；5、刻意夸大收益水平；6、理财产品说明书过于复杂；7、销售人员管理存在漏洞。这些问题既是行业发展中的问题,也引起了社会高度关注。 面对风险披露存在的问题,理财产品放任似的发展不能缓解委托代理冲突,所以需要外部干预来达到风险信息的充分有效披露。引入理财产品监管层——中国银监会2011年通过的《商业银行理财产品销售管理办法》,逐条分析了《商业银行理财产品销售管理办法》涉及理财产品风险披露的条款以及对风险披露活动的影响。本文发现《商业银行理财产品销售管理办法》是理财产品行业发展到一定阶段的问题与解决之道的制度回馈,全面系统的规范了包括风险披露在内的理财产品销售环节的基本原则、制度建设、操作规范与法律责任,从理论上讲,既具有宏观指导意义,又不失微观可操作性,是一部“良法”。值得我们关注理解并切实施行。在大量理论分析与归纳结论之上,引入了一个现实案例,从投资者、商业银行和法院三个角度进行分析,重点结合风险披露现状和监管现状进行分析,拓展了现实问题的深度以及理论研究的方向。最后对相关问题,做出了政策性建议,以期完善我国理财产品风险披露市场建设。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the definition of financial products is defined as: investors as clients, commercial banks as trustees, The operation of a bank with a principal-agent relationship established in accordance with a prior contract based on investment planning and management. On this basis, the paper combs the development course of the financial products market in China. The author thinks that the financial products market has experienced the initial development period, the rapid development, the adjustment period after the financial crisis, and the gradually mature period before and after the financial crisis. By introducing the concept of financial risk, we think that the risk of financial products is the degree of deviation of the agreed rate of return for investors in the process of R & D, sales, investment and accounting of commercial banks, due to the influence of various factors. Is an objective and inexorable uncertainty. On this basis, the risks of financial products are classified as market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputation risk. Using the principal-agent theory under asymmetric information as the basic theory of this paper, this paper analyzes the performance of principal-agent relationship in the market of financial products and the importance of understanding the principal-agent cost. The conclusion of theoretical analysis is that the market of financial products needs adequate risk disclosure. Based on the investigation data and network data, this paper tries to analyze the present situation of financial product risk disclosure in our country, and thinks that there is the following problem: 1, the risk in product design is not fully disclosed, and the customer risk rating in sales stage is just a formality; 3, failure to establish a complete prior, in the matter, after the information disclosure mechanism, sales links avoid risk 5, deliberately exaggerate the level of income 6, financial product specifications are too complex, sales personnel management loopholes. These problems are not only the problems in the development of the industry, but also the high concern of the society. Faced with the problems of risk disclosure, the development of financial products as laissez-faire can not alleviate the principal-agent conflict, so external intervention is needed to achieve the full and effective disclosure of risk information. This paper introduces the supervision layer of financial management products (CBRC), which was adopted by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2011, and analyzes the articles on the risk disclosure of financial management products involved in the measures for the Management of Financial products of Commercial Banks one by one. And the impact on risk disclosure activities. This paper finds that the Management method of Financial products sales in Commercial Banks is the system feedback for the development of the financial products industry to a certain stage and the way to solve it. It comprehensively and systematically standardizes the basic principles, system construction, operational norms and legal responsibilities of financial management product sales links, including risk disclosure. Theoretically, it has both macroscopic guiding significance and microcosmic maneuverability. It's a good law. We should pay attention to understanding and practical implementation. Based on a large number of theoretical analysis and conclusion, this paper introduces a practical case, from the investors, commercial banks and the court to analyze the current situation of risk disclosure and supervision. Expand the depth of practical problems and the direction of theoretical research. Finally, some policy suggestions are made in order to perfect the market construction of risk disclosure of financial products in China.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.2
本文编号：2253633
[Abstract]:In this paper, the definition of financial products is defined as: investors as clients, commercial banks as trustees, The operation of a bank with a principal-agent relationship established in accordance with a prior contract based on investment planning and management. On this basis, the paper combs the development course of the financial products market in China. The author thinks that the financial products market has experienced the initial development period, the rapid development, the adjustment period after the financial crisis, and the gradually mature period before and after the financial crisis. By introducing the concept of financial risk, we think that the risk of financial products is the degree of deviation of the agreed rate of return for investors in the process of R & D, sales, investment and accounting of commercial banks, due to the influence of various factors. Is an objective and inexorable uncertainty. On this basis, the risks of financial products are classified as market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputation risk. Using the principal-agent theory under asymmetric information as the basic theory of this paper, this paper analyzes the performance of principal-agent relationship in the market of financial products and the importance of understanding the principal-agent cost. The conclusion of theoretical analysis is that the market of financial products needs adequate risk disclosure. Based on the investigation data and network data, this paper tries to analyze the present situation of financial product risk disclosure in our country, and thinks that there is the following problem: 1, the risk in product design is not fully disclosed, and the customer risk rating in sales stage is just a formality; 3, failure to establish a complete prior, in the matter, after the information disclosure mechanism, sales links avoid risk 5, deliberately exaggerate the level of income 6, financial product specifications are too complex, sales personnel management loopholes. These problems are not only the problems in the development of the industry, but also the high concern of the society. Faced with the problems of risk disclosure, the development of financial products as laissez-faire can not alleviate the principal-agent conflict, so external intervention is needed to achieve the full and effective disclosure of risk information. This paper introduces the supervision layer of financial management products (CBRC), which was adopted by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2011, and analyzes the articles on the risk disclosure of financial management products involved in the measures for the Management of Financial products of Commercial Banks one by one. And the impact on risk disclosure activities. This paper finds that the Management method of Financial products sales in Commercial Banks is the system feedback for the development of the financial products industry to a certain stage and the way to solve it. It comprehensively and systematically standardizes the basic principles, system construction, operational norms and legal responsibilities of financial management product sales links, including risk disclosure. Theoretically, it has both macroscopic guiding significance and microcosmic maneuverability. It's a good law. We should pay attention to understanding and practical implementation. Based on a large number of theoretical analysis and conclusion, this paper introduces a practical case, from the investors, commercial banks and the court to analyze the current situation of risk disclosure and supervision. Expand the depth of practical problems and the direction of theoretical research. Finally, some policy suggestions are made in order to perfect the market construction of risk disclosure of financial products in China.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.2
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