国有企业高管参政议政、政治激励与过度投资

发布时间：2018-10-18 15:35

【摘要】：本文以2004-2009年间A股国有上市公司为研究样本,考察了高管参政议政对公司过度投资水平的影响。结果表明,高管参政议政能够显著降低自由现金流的过度投资,而在制度环境越差的地区,高管参政议政与自由现金流过度投资之间的负向关系越强。上述结论说明,国有企业高管参政议政体现了政治激励的作用。本文的研究意义在于:与已有文献多关注薪酬激励不同,本文以高管参政议政这一普遍现象为切入点,考察了政治激励对国有上市公司治理机制的作用;与此同时,中国的国有企业改革一直备受关注,本文的结论表明,高管政治激励能够有效地改善国有上市公司的治理机制,这一发现为提高国有企业投资效率、规范国有企业投资体制提供了有益的政策参考。
[Abstract]:In this paper, A-share state-owned listed companies from 2004 to 2009 as a sample to investigate the impact of executive participation in politics on the level of overinvestment. The results show that executive participation in politics can significantly reduce the over-investment of free cash flow, and the negative relationship between executive participation in politics and free cash flow overinvestment is stronger in the areas where the institutional environment is worse. The above conclusion shows that state-owned enterprise executives participate in politics and discuss politics. The research significance of this paper lies in: different from the existing literature, this paper studies the role of political incentives on the governance mechanism of state-owned listed companies by taking the common phenomenon of executive participation in politics and discussion of politics as the starting point. The reform of state-owned enterprises in China has been paid much attention to. The conclusion of this paper shows that the political incentive of senior executives can effectively improve the governance mechanism of state-owned listed companies. This finding is aimed at improving the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Standardizing the investment system of state-owned enterprises provides a useful policy reference.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学经济与管理研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“不完全样本下的统计推断问题及其应用研究”(项目编号:11001224) 西南财经大学校管课题项目“我国股票市场涨跌幅限制的效果分析及其幅度设定”(项目编号:2010XG087)资助
【分类号】：F276.1;F832.51;F224

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