信息优势、择时行为与大股东内幕交易
发布时间：2018-11-06 14:46
【摘要】：股权分置改革后,解禁股份减持中的内幕交易,成为全流通环境下大股东利益输送的新途径。本文以上市公司业绩预告前后的减持事件为研究对象,考察大股东利用信息优势的内幕交易问题。首先,在交易时点上,大股东倾向于在业绩预告披露"坏消息"之前、"好消息"之后出售股份;其次,在交易规模上,在业绩预告之前(后)出售股份时,业绩预告的利空(利好)程度越高,交易的规模也越大;最后,在业绩预告前减持时,正式业绩相对预告业绩的利空程度要大于在业绩预告后减持的情况,这在业绩预告为"好消息"的情况下尤为突出。这进一步证明了股东的信息优势,即股东的择时行为不仅基于业绩预告这一重大信息,还充分考虑了公司的业绩前景
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, lifting the prohibition of insider trading in the reduction of shares has become a new way to convey the interests of major shareholders in the full circulation environment. In this paper, the listed companies before and after the performance of the event of reduction as the research object, to investigate the information advantage of the major shareholders of insider trading. First, at the time of the deal, the majority shareholders tend to sell shares before the announcement of "bad news" and after the "good news"; Secondly, in the trading scale, when the shares are sold before or after the performance forecast, the higher the negative (positive) degree of the performance forecast, the larger the scale of the transaction; Finally, when the performance forecast is reduced, the negative degree of the formal performance relative to the forecast performance is greater than that after the performance forecast, which is especially prominent when the performance forecast is "good news". This further proves the information advantage of shareholders, that is, the timing behavior of shareholders is not only based on the important information of performance forecast, but also takes full account of the company's performance prospects.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71002044)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F832.51
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, lifting the prohibition of insider trading in the reduction of shares has become a new way to convey the interests of major shareholders in the full circulation environment. In this paper, the listed companies before and after the performance of the event of reduction as the research object, to investigate the information advantage of the major shareholders of insider trading. First, at the time of the deal, the majority shareholders tend to sell shares before the announcement of "bad news" and after the "good news"; Secondly, in the trading scale, when the shares are sold before or after the performance forecast, the higher the negative (positive) degree of the performance forecast, the larger the scale of the transaction; Finally, when the performance forecast is reduced, the negative degree of the formal performance relative to the forecast performance is greater than that after the performance forecast, which is especially prominent when the performance forecast is "good news". This further proves the information advantage of shareholders, that is, the timing behavior of shareholders is not only based on the important information of performance forecast, but also takes full account of the company's performance prospects.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71002044)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F832.51
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