基于激励相容的银行业监管有效性研究
发布时间：2019-01-22 14:16
【摘要】：银行系统的稳定与效率对于一个国家的经济增长和社会福利具有巨大的影响。2008年因美国次贷问题引发的全球金融危机,造成了全球范围的金融动荡,给世界各国的经济带来严重冲击,银行正是其中关键的一环。危机的巨大危害性凸显了提高银行体系的安全和保持银行体系的稳定的极端重要性,也引发了各国对银行监管体系、银行业监管有效性的反思。20世纪70年代末80年代初以来,激励理论被吸收到西方监管经济学当中,形成了激励监管理论。激励监管理论把监管问题置于信息不对称条件下的委托—代理分析的框架内,研究如何通过机制和制度设计去实现最优监管为目的。而后激励性规制理论被引入银行监管领域后,强调监管机构应参照银行的经营目标,将银行的内部管理和市场约束纳入监管的范围,引导这两种力量来支持监管目标的实现。激励相容银行监管日益得到各国监管部门的吸纳。尤其在金融危机背景下,新一轮监管改革的举措也大多体现了激励相容的要求。通过对激励相容银行监管理论的研究和监管实践有效性的评估,一方面在一定程度上丰富银行监管理论,另一方面为推进我国银行业监管改革、提升银行监管有效性提供有益的参考。本文在规制经济学、管理经济学、信息经济学、金融监管和博弈论等多学科的基础上,以有效银行监管为主线,结合我国银行业监管实际,首先对国内外银行监管和激励相容的相关理论研究进行综述,再分析激励相容与银行监管的结合点和交叉点,然后运用成本收益分析法和实证分析法,一方面从资本要求、市场约束的层面来具体测度和评估我国银行监管的有效性,另一方面从成本收益的角度对我国近些年来激励相容银行监管的有效性进行整体衡量,最后结合金融危机背景下国际银行业监管面临的新问题及挑战,提出完善激励相容监管体制机制,提升银行监管有效性的路径、方法和措施。本文对资本监管实证分析表明,我国资本监管提高了商业银行资本充足率,降低了商业银行风险。但是,随着时间的推移,大多数的银行的资本充足率已经超过8%,并且自从2010年后资本充足率都超过了10%,资本监管所产生的管制效应以及风险减低的效应都在逐渐地减弱。本文市场约束实证分析表明,我国存款人在选择存款银行时并不从商业银行的财务数据信号进行选择,往往只选择规模大的。甚至在不良贷款率越高、利润率越低、资本充足率越低的情况下,规模大的商业银行的存款增长还更多。这种存款市场不成熟现象很可能是出于公众“大而不倒”的预期。这说明我国的存款市场还不成熟,在信息的传播上并非是有效的,商业银行存款人的市场约束相对薄弱。本文从成本收益分析法进行验证后表明,我国银行监管收益大于银行监管成本。但是对比“减少金融犯罪案件”这一目标,金融犯罪案件呈现次数和数额的“双增长”,可以看出这一块的社会福利损失是很大的,这也与前面的实证分析的匹配,说明我国在资本充足和市场约束激励相容监管的实践下,虽然在一定程度上实现了银行业有效监管(这其中监督检查、行业组织的力量和银行内部控制同样起到作用),但激励相容监管有效性需进一步提高。对此,要改进现行银行监管体制,切实厘清适度监管的定位、加强差别化监管、融合银行内部管理、强化市场约束监管,构建新形势下适合我国银行业监管实践的激励相容监管体系。
[Abstract]:The stability and efficiency of the banking system have a great impact on the economic growth and social welfare of a country. The global financial crisis, which was triggered by the American subprime problem in 2008, has caused a global financial turmoil and a severe impact on the economies of the world, The bank is one of the key rings. The great harm of the crisis has highlighted the extreme importance of improving the security of the banking system and maintaining the stability of the banking system, and also raised the reflection of the supervision and effectiveness of the banks in the banking supervision system and the banking supervision. Since the early 1980s, The theory of incentive is absorbed into the western supervision and economics, and the theory of incentive regulation is formed. The incentive regulation theory puts the supervision problem in the framework of the agency analysis of the entrusted agency under the condition of information asymmetry, and studies how to achieve the best supervision through the mechanism and the system design. Then, after the incentive regulation theory is introduced into the bank supervision field, it is emphasized that the regulator should refer to the operation target of the bank, and incorporate the internal management and market constraints of the bank into the scope of supervision, and guide these two forces to support the realization of the regulatory target. The supervision of incentive-compatible banks is increasingly being absorbed by various regulatory authorities. In the context of the financial crisis, especially in the context of the financial crisis, the new round of regulatory reform has also reflected the requirements of incentive compatibility. Through the research on the supervision theory of the incentive-compatible bank and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the supervision and practice, on the one hand, the bank supervision theory is enriched to a certain extent, and on the other hand, it is helpful to promote the reform of the banking supervision of our country and to improve the effectiveness of the supervision of the bank. This paper, on the basis of regulation economics, management economics, information economics, financial supervision and game theory, based on effective banking supervision as the main line, in combination with the practice of China's banking supervision, firstly reviews the relevant theoretical research of domestic and foreign bank supervision and incentive compatibility, Then, the binding point and the intersection point of the incentive compatibility and the bank supervision are analyzed, then the cost-benefit analysis method and the empirical analysis method are used, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the bank supervision in China is measured and evaluated on the one hand from the capital requirement and the market constraint level, On the other hand, from the point of view of the cost benefit, the effectiveness of the supervision of the incentive-compatible bank in recent years is measured, and the new problems and challenges facing the international banking supervision in the context of the financial crisis are put forward. The path, method and measure to improve the effectiveness of the bank's supervision. The empirical analysis of capital supervision shows that the capital management of China has raised the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks and reduced the risk of commercial banks. However, over time, most banks have a capital adequacy ratio of more than 8%, and the effects of regulatory effects and risk reduction have been gradually weakened since the capital adequacy ratio of more than 10% since 2010. The empirical analysis of the market constraints in this paper shows that the depositors of our country do not choose the financial data signal from the commercial bank when the deposit bank is selected. Even in the case of the higher the non-performing loan rate, the lower the profit margin, the lower the capital adequacy ratio, the larger the deposit growth of the large-scale commercial banks. The unripe phenomenon of such a deposit market is likely to be a public 鈥渂ig-and-no-fall鈥，
本文编号：2413291
[Abstract]:The stability and efficiency of the banking system have a great impact on the economic growth and social welfare of a country. The global financial crisis, which was triggered by the American subprime problem in 2008, has caused a global financial turmoil and a severe impact on the economies of the world, The bank is one of the key rings. The great harm of the crisis has highlighted the extreme importance of improving the security of the banking system and maintaining the stability of the banking system, and also raised the reflection of the supervision and effectiveness of the banks in the banking supervision system and the banking supervision. Since the early 1980s, The theory of incentive is absorbed into the western supervision and economics, and the theory of incentive regulation is formed. The incentive regulation theory puts the supervision problem in the framework of the agency analysis of the entrusted agency under the condition of information asymmetry, and studies how to achieve the best supervision through the mechanism and the system design. Then, after the incentive regulation theory is introduced into the bank supervision field, it is emphasized that the regulator should refer to the operation target of the bank, and incorporate the internal management and market constraints of the bank into the scope of supervision, and guide these two forces to support the realization of the regulatory target. The supervision of incentive-compatible banks is increasingly being absorbed by various regulatory authorities. In the context of the financial crisis, especially in the context of the financial crisis, the new round of regulatory reform has also reflected the requirements of incentive compatibility. Through the research on the supervision theory of the incentive-compatible bank and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the supervision and practice, on the one hand, the bank supervision theory is enriched to a certain extent, and on the other hand, it is helpful to promote the reform of the banking supervision of our country and to improve the effectiveness of the supervision of the bank. This paper, on the basis of regulation economics, management economics, information economics, financial supervision and game theory, based on effective banking supervision as the main line, in combination with the practice of China's banking supervision, firstly reviews the relevant theoretical research of domestic and foreign bank supervision and incentive compatibility, Then, the binding point and the intersection point of the incentive compatibility and the bank supervision are analyzed, then the cost-benefit analysis method and the empirical analysis method are used, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the bank supervision in China is measured and evaluated on the one hand from the capital requirement and the market constraint level, On the other hand, from the point of view of the cost benefit, the effectiveness of the supervision of the incentive-compatible bank in recent years is measured, and the new problems and challenges facing the international banking supervision in the context of the financial crisis are put forward. The path, method and measure to improve the effectiveness of the bank's supervision. The empirical analysis of capital supervision shows that the capital management of China has raised the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks and reduced the risk of commercial banks. However, over time, most banks have a capital adequacy ratio of more than 8%, and the effects of regulatory effects and risk reduction have been gradually weakened since the capital adequacy ratio of more than 10% since 2010. The empirical analysis of the market constraints in this paper shows that the depositors of our country do not choose the financial data signal from the commercial bank when the deposit bank is selected. Even in the case of the higher the non-performing loan rate, the lower the profit margin, the lower the capital adequacy ratio, the larger the deposit growth of the large-scale commercial banks. The unripe phenomenon of such a deposit market is likely to be a public 鈥渂ig-and-no-fall鈥，
本文编号：2413291
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