投贷联盟中多方准入限制的模型分析
发布时间：2019-06-29 21:16
【摘要】：在Catherine Casemate模型[1]的基础上,利用公司金融理论和委托代理理论,建立合理的数学模型,讨论了投贷联盟的两种模式中企业、风险投资机构和银行的准入条件,以及在引入道德风险和监督成本后准入条件的变化。结果发现,企业参与第二种模式的门槛较低,且风险投资机构在牺牲自身"超额收益"的条件下,可以适当控制企业的道德风险。
[Abstract]:On the basis of Catherine Casemate model [1], this paper establishes a reasonable mathematical model by using corporate finance theory and principal-agent theory, and discusses the admission conditions of enterprises, venture capital institutions and banks in the two modes of investment and loan alliance, as well as the changes of access conditions after the introduction of moral hazard and supervision cost. The results show that the threshold for enterprises to participate in the second model is low, and venture capital institutions can properly control the moral hazard of enterprises at the expense of their own "excess returns".
【作者单位】： 四川大学工商管理学院;四川大学经济学院;
【基金】：四川省哲学社会科学青年基金项目(SC10C027)
【分类号】：F830.59;F224
本文编号：2508120
[Abstract]:On the basis of Catherine Casemate model [1], this paper establishes a reasonable mathematical model by using corporate finance theory and principal-agent theory, and discusses the admission conditions of enterprises, venture capital institutions and banks in the two modes of investment and loan alliance, as well as the changes of access conditions after the introduction of moral hazard and supervision cost. The results show that the threshold for enterprises to participate in the second model is low, and venture capital institutions can properly control the moral hazard of enterprises at the expense of their own "excess returns".
【作者单位】： 四川大学工商管理学院;四川大学经济学院;
【基金】：四川省哲学社会科学青年基金项目(SC10C027)
【分类号】：F830.59;F224
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