从“e租宝”事件看中国P2P金融监管体系

发布时间：2018-01-03 18:38

本文关键词：从“e租宝”事件看中国P2P金融监管体系　出处：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

更多相关文章： e租宝 案例分析 P2P网贷 监管体系

【摘要】：由于满足了中小企业主的融资需求和中小投资者投资需求,近年来,随着互联网交易的普及和互联网技术的成熟,P2P网贷在国内快速发展。与此同时,各类问题平台事件频发,"e租宝"就是其中的典型。"e租宝"由安徽钰诚集团主导,自2014年7月上线,2015年12月事发。在一年半的时间里,通过虚假项目、虚假担保、虚假宣传等方式非法集资500多亿,累计交易额700多亿,涉及相关投资人90余万,范围广、数额大、影响恶劣。值得注意的是,在该事件涉嫌非法集资内幕被曝光前,新华网、中央电视台、中国政府网等多家权威媒体曾对其进行正面宣传,使"e租宝"事件存在不同于其他问题平台的特殊性,更具典型性。现有研究的关注点多集中于"e租宝"非法集资案件性质的认定上,从不同角度回答了 "e租宝"是一个什么样的骗局。本文从"e租宝"作为一个骗局,为什么在事发前能得到如此多的正面宣传切入,对该事件的特点及特点成因进行讨论,对"e租宝"这一典型案例进行分析。通过分析,本文认为,之所以"e租宝"在事发前能获得各方认同,以积极形象示人,最根本的原因是监管机构主体不明导致监管真空,致使"e租宝"有机会违规运营,风险未被及时规避;在此基础上,"e租宝"事件编造者利用投资者信息获取被动性特征制造信息不对称,利用"蹭热度"的方式获得权威媒体关注,利用一般P2P行业风险建构错误逻辑认知,使其风险能短时间内被大范围传播。在以"e租宝"为代表的P2P网贷问题平台不断爆发的同时,以《网络借贷信息中介机构业务活动管理暂行办法》为代表的中国P2P网贷监管政策相继出台。本文基于对"e租宝"事件的反思,从降低监管成本、控制风险的角度对我国现行监管体系内容进行简要介绍,对体系可能存在的不足进行了讨论。本文认为当前国内P2P监管体系不断完善,对规范P2P行业发展有重要的积极作用。同时,现行监管体系中仍然存在立规进程迟缓,制定成本高;缺少对问题平台处理的详细规章,导致执行成本增加;缺少全国统一的信息发布渠道和评级标准,投资者信息获取成本高;缺少对监管实施者监管主动性的监督约束机制,易引发监管低效等进一步有待改进的问题。并以此提出完善国内P2P金融监管体系,应推进机构监管向功能监管转型,降低监管政策制定成本;明确问题平台处置机制,降低监管制度执行成本;开通全国性P2P网贷机构信息查询平台,降低投资者信息获取成本;完善监管者监管主动性约束制度建设,控制监管行为负外部性等政策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the popularity of Internet transactions and the maturity of Internet technology, P2P network loans have been developing rapidly in China because of meeting the financing needs of SME owners and the investment needs of small and medium-sized investors. Various kinds of problem platform events occur frequently, "e Zun Bao" is one of the typical. "e Zanbao" led by Anhui Yucheng Group, launched on July 2014, December 2015 incident. In a year and a half time. Through false projects, false guarantees, false propaganda and other ways to illegally raise more than 50 billion, the cumulative turnover of more than 70 billion, involving relevant investors more than 90 million, a wide range, large amount. It is worth noting that before the incident was exposed, several authoritative media outlets, such as Xinhua, China Central Television, and the Chinese government network, had carried out positive publicity on the incident. Make the "e Zanbao" event different from other problem platform particularity, more typical. The existing research focus on the "e Zanbao" illegal fund-raising cases on the nature of the identification. From different angles to answer the "e Zanbao" is a fraud. This article from "e Zanbao" as a scam, why can get so many positive publicity before the incident cut into. This paper discusses the characteristics and causes of the event, and analyzes the typical case of "e Zanbao". Through the analysis, the author thinks that the reason why "e Zanbao" can be accepted by all parties before the incident. The most fundamental reason for showing people in a positive image is that the unclear subject of the regulatory body leads to the regulatory vacuum, which leads to the opportunity for "e-rent treasure" to operate illegally, and the risk is not avoided in time; On this basis, the fabricator of the "e Zanbao" event uses investor information to obtain passive features and creates information asymmetry, and obtains authoritative media attention by means of "erasing heat degree". Making use of the common P2P industry risk to construct false logic cognition, the risk can be spread in a short time. While the P2P network loan problem platform represented by "e Zanbao" is constantly breaking out. China's P2P network loan supervision policy has been issued one after another, which is represented by "interim measures on the Management of Business activities of Network Lending Information intermediaries". This article based on the reflection of "e Rent Treasure" event, from the cost of regulation. From the perspective of risk control, this paper briefly introduces the content of the current regulatory system in China, and discusses the possible shortcomings of the system. This paper considers that the current domestic P2P regulatory system is constantly improving. At the same time, in the current regulatory system, there is still a slow process of regulation, the development of high costs; The lack of detailed regulations to deal with the issue platform has resulted in increased implementation costs; Lack of national uniform information release channels and rating standards, investors' information acquisition costs are high; The lack of supervision and restraint mechanism of the supervision initiative of the regulatory implementers is likely to lead to inefficient supervision and other problems to be further improved, and to improve the domestic P2P financial regulatory system. We should promote the transformation from institutional supervision to functional supervision and reduce the cost of regulatory policy formulation. Make clear the problem platform disposal mechanism and reduce the execution cost of the supervision system; Opening a nationwide P2P network lending institutions information query platform to reduce the cost of obtaining investor information; To perfect the supervision system construction and control the negative externalities of supervision and other policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.1

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