互联网金融中的监管问题:基于激励理论的分析框架

发布时间：2018-01-01 15:21

本文关键词：互联网金融中的监管问题:基于激励理论的分析框架　出处：《求索》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：互联网金融监管的设计是为了纠正市场中存在的失灵问题,保护公众投资人的利益。由于互联网金融在覆盖范围、市场信息以及资产担保等方面与传统金融机构有很大的差别,因此其监管应当区别对待。正是基于此认识,通过借助激励理论的分析框架,构建了金融监管部门、公众投资者和互联网金融平台之间的委托-代理模型,对互联网金融监管中的激励问题进行分析。结果表明:金融监管部门的介入能够对互联网金融的风险控制水平和融资规模产生积极影响,同时信息不对称条件下会使得互联网金融的风险控制水平下降,融资规模变化不明确。在此基础上借助激励理论中的声誉模型进行分析,发现附加了声誉激励后互联网金融平台的清算或者"跑路"现象明显减少。因而对互联网金融监管的重点在于采取监管措施促进互联网金融平台内部信息透明化和信用可查化。
[Abstract]:Internet financial regulation is designed to correct market failures and protect the interests of public investors. Market information and asset guarantee are very different from the traditional financial institutions, so their supervision should be treated differently. It is based on this understanding, through the use of incentive theory of the analytical framework. The principal-agent model between financial supervision department, public investors and Internet financial platform is constructed. The results show that the intervention of financial supervision department can have a positive impact on the level of risk control and financing scale of Internet finance. At the same time, under the condition of asymmetric information, the risk control level of Internet finance will decline, and the change of financing scale is not clear. On this basis, the reputation model of incentive theory is used to analyze. Discovery of liquidation or "runaway" of Internet financial platforms with reputational incentives attached. Therefore, the focus of Internet financial supervision is to take regulatory measures to promote the transparency of information and credit traceability in Internet financial platforms.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“城乡金融统筹发展研究”(71673307)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.1
【正文快照】： 一引言 2013年以来互联网金融逐渐在我国兴起,2015年更是得到了极大地发展,无论是总体规模还是产品创新以及业务范围,其影响力越来越大。本文所涉及的互联网金融不包括传统金融机构的互联网化,如网上银行、手机银行等业务(1)(谢平等,2015)。互联网金融弥补了我国以前存在的金

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