政府干预、管理层权力与现金持有价值

发布时间：2018-01-03 19:01

本文关键词：政府干预、管理层权力与现金持有价值　出处：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现金是企业赖以生存的根本。在我国,不论是德隆、巨人等大型集团的轰塌还是江浙地区中小企业老板路跑,都是因为企业资金链发生断裂。由此可见保持公司资产的流动性至关重要。然而由于代理问题的存在,我国大部分上市公司都存在着诸多低效的现金配置问题,诸如大股东侵占资金、管理层在职消费以及非效率投资等。由于市场环境不完善,投资者保护体系不健全,内部治理机制不成熟,股东与管理层之间的代理问题不能得到有效抑制,因此我国上市公司管理层滥用企业资金的现象屡见不鲜,这些行为极大地降低了现金持有价值。因此,本文将从代理理论出发研究管理层权力影响上市公司现金持有价值的机理。目前,我国尚处于经济转轨阶段,各地政府仍存在干预地方经济的行为。政府在承受财政压力的情况下,会对上市公司的经营行为进行干预,然而这种干预行为是否会对企业的现金持有价值产生影响值得思考。本文将从产权性质以及干预能力两方面研究政府干预对现金持有价值的影响。综上,本文将从外部制度环境和内部治理机制两个层面研究现金持有的价值效应,并进一步研究管理层权力与政府干预对企业现金持有价值的交互作用。本文运用2011-2015年我国A股上市公司数据,实证研究了管理层权力、政府干预与现金持有价值之间的关系。研究发现,管理层权力与现金持有价值负相关,并且投资效率对二者的关系发挥了中介效用,管理层的非效率投资行为影响了现金持有价值。另一方面,政府干预同样降低了企业现金持有价值,并且在国有企业中,二者负相关关系更强烈,而在政府干预能力方面,国有企业的金字塔结构削弱了政府的干预能力,抑制了政府干预对现金持有价值的负面影响。最后,虽然政府干预和管理层自利均能降低企业现金价值,但是政府与管理层之间存在相互博弈与制约的关系,在双方的制衡下二者对现金价值的负面影响受到抑制。
[Abstract]:Cash is the basis of survival of enterprises. In our country, whether it is Dulong, Giants and other large groups of the collapse or Jiangsu and Zhejiang region owners of small and medium-sized enterprises run. It can be seen that it is very important to maintain the liquidity of the company's assets. However, due to the existence of agency problems, most listed companies in China have many inefficient cash allocation problems. Such as large shareholders encroach on funds, management on the job consumption and inefficient investment. Due to imperfect market environment, investor protection system is not perfect, internal governance mechanism is not mature. The agency problem between shareholders and management can not be effectively suppressed, so the abuse of corporate funds by the management of listed companies in our country is common. These behaviors greatly reduce the value of cash holdings. This paper will study the mechanism of the influence of management power on the cash holding value of listed companies from the perspective of agency theory. At present, China is still in the stage of economic transition. Local governments still intervene in the local economy. Under the condition of financial pressure, the government will intervene in the management behavior of listed companies. However, whether this intervention will have an impact on the value of cash holdings of enterprises is worth considering. This paper will study the impact of government intervention on the value of cash holdings from the two aspects of the nature of property rights and the ability to intervene. This paper will study the value effect of cash holding from two aspects: external institutional environment and internal governance mechanism. And further study the interaction between management power and government intervention on the value of cash holdings. This paper empirically studies the power of management by using the data of China A-share listed companies from 2011-2015. The relationship between government intervention and cash holding value. The study found that management power and cash holding value are negatively correlated, and investment efficiency plays an intermediary role in the relationship between them. On the other hand, government intervention also reduces the value of cash holdings of enterprises, and in state-owned enterprises, the negative correlation between the two is stronger. In terms of the ability of government intervention, the pyramid structure of state-owned enterprises weakens the ability of government intervention and restrains the negative impact of government intervention on the value of cash holdings. Although both government intervention and management self-interest can reduce the cash value of enterprises, there is a game and restriction relationship between the government and the management, and their negative influence on the cash value is restrained under the checks and balances of both sides.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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