终极控股股东、负债融资与农业上市公司过度投资研究

发布时间：2018-01-05 15:30

本文关键词：终极控股股东、负债融资与农业上市公司过度投资研究　出处：《沈阳农业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：伴随着投资而产生的过度投资一直是学术界所密切关注的问题。过度投资往往造成产能过剩、重复建设、投资效率低下等后果,严重损害国家经济发展和企业股东利益,因此如何有效降低企业过度投资水平的研究具有重要意义。自由现金流理论认为,企业负债融资能够有效抑制过度投资,但是该结论的前提条件是企业股权分散,我国企业则表现出明显的股权集中,大部分企业存在终极控股股东。根据委托代理理论,在股权集中情况下,大股东和中小股东间的委托代理成本成为企业主要的委托代理问题。因此,在股权结构集中情况下,企业负债融资和终极控股股东,两者与过度投资分别是怎样的关系,以及在终极控股股东影响下负债融资与过度投资关系会产生怎样的变化有待于验证和研究。选取我国A股农业上市公司为研究样本,数据来源于CSMAR数据库和巨潮网,数据窗口期为2009-2015年。根据研究内容,应用国内学者普遍使用的Richardson残差度量模型测度样本企业过度投资水平,之后根据相关理论分析构建负债融资与过度投资关系面板数据模型、终极控股股东与过度投资关系面板数据模型和终极控股股东影响下负债融资与过度投资关系变化面板数据模型。研究发现:在股权结构集中情况下,我国企业负债融资对过度投资水平具有显著的抑制作用,企业的国有终极控股性质并不会显著加重其过度投资状况,但是国有终极控股性质能够削弱企业负债融资对过度投资水平的抑制作用,且企业地方政府终极控股性质的削弱作用强于中央政府终极控股性质。随着国有产权企业融资便利性的逐渐消失,由国有终极控股股东性质造成的这种削弱作用也正在不断消退。研究内容主要从两个方面为相关研究做出了贡献:一方面是以股权集中为前提条件,重点从终极控股股东产权性质角度分析了对过度投资的影响。这有别于已有文献对两权分离度与过度投资关系的过度侧重,符合我国企业的现实特征,也是对过度投资相关研究内容的丰富;另一方面是在企业负债和过度投资关系的研究基础上,考察了终极控股股东产权性质下企业负债与过度投资关系的变化。这弥补了大部分文献对企业负债与过度投资关系研究仅限于两者之间的不足,纳入了对两者关系会产生较大影响的终极控股股东产权性质因素,提高了相关研究结论的完整性和稳定性。
[Abstract]:Over investment with investment which has been the focus of the close academic problem. Excessive investment often cause duplication of excess capacity, low investment efficiency and other consequences, serious damage to national economic development and the interests of shareholders, so it is important to study how to reduce the investment level of enterprise free cash flow theory. That debt financing can effectively curb excessive investment, but the premise of this conclusion is the enterprise dispersed ownership, enterprises of our country showed a clear ownership concentration, most of the enterprises are the ultimate controlling shareholders. According to the principal-agent theory, the equity concentration, the agency cost between large shareholders and small shareholders has become the enterprise agency the main problem. Therefore, in the case of a concentrated ownership structure, corporate debt financing and the ultimate controlling shareholders, and over investment are both What kind of relationship, and the influence on the ultimate controlling shareholder of debt financing and over investment will produce what changes need to be verified and studied. Selection of China's A shares of agricultural listed companies as the research sample, the data from the CSMAR database and cninfo net data window period of 2009-2015. According to the research content, the widespread use of Richardson residuals the application of domestic scholars measurement model to measure the sample enterprise over investment level, according to the construction of debt financing and over investment relationship panel data model analysis theory, the ultimate controlling shareholder and excessive investment between the panel data model and the ultimate controlling shareholders under the influence of debt financing and over investment relationship between the changes of the panel data model. The study found: in the concentrated ownership structure under the condition of China's corporate debt financing has a significant inhibitory effect on the over investment level, the ultimate control of state-owned enterprises Shares of nature does not significantly aggravate the situation of excessive investment, but state-owned ultimate controlling nature of corporate debt financing can weaken the inhibition of excessive level of investment, enterprises and local government weakened the nature of the ultimate controlling is stronger than the central government. With the nature of the ultimate controlling gradually disappear in property rights of enterprises financing convenience, this caused by the state-owned property the ultimate controlling shareholder weaken unceasingly is also dissipated. The main research contents from two aspects for the relevant research contributions: one is to focus on equity as the prerequisite, focus on the analysis of the effect on over investment from the ultimate controlling shareholder property. It is different from the existing literature on the separation of two rights and the relationship between excessive excessive investment, in line with the reality of the characteristics of Chinese enterprises, but also on the over investment related research content; on the other hand is in the enterprise Based on the relationship between debt and excessive investment, investigated the property of ultimate controlling shareholder nature relation between corporate debt and excessive investment. This makes up most of the literature on debt and over investment relations between the lack of research is limited to the nature of property rights, the ultimate controlling shareholders included factors will have a greater impact on the relationship between the two. Improve the integrity and stability of the relevant conclusions.

【学位授予单位】：沈阳农业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F324;F832.51;F302.6

【相似文献】