管理层激励与企业避税行为研究

发布时间：2018-01-10 04:03

本文关键词：管理层激励与企业避税行为研究　出处：《沈阳工业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：管理层激励机制是现代公司治理结构的重要组成部分,在所有权与经营权分离的情况下,股东们追求企业价值最大化,而自身利益的最大化是管理层所追求的目标,这使得拥有公司经营权的管理者与拥有公司所有权的股东的利益目标不完全相同,而这会在一定程度上阻止股东财富最大化的目标的实现。现有的研究已经证明,由于所有权和经营权相分离的现代企业制度的出现,所有者和经营者的利益冲突影响着企业避税行为。税收规避作为世界范围内的普遍现象,股东为了获取税收规避可得到的利润,可能会为管理层提供更高额度的激励报酬。那么,作为降低企业代理成本,激发管理层努力工作有效手段的管理层激励,能否刺激企业管理者做出避税决策来增加企业税后收益,成为越来越多的学者所关注的问题。本文首先对国内外的已有文献研究进行了回顾总结,继而梳理文章思路与框架。然后对涉及到的概念和基础理论进行列述,进而揭示管理层激励与企业避税活动的理论逻辑关系。随后提出八个有关管理层激励与企业避税行为的研究假设,之后进行变量设计与模型构建。在实证检验与分析过程中,首先对总体样本进行回归检验,分析了在总样本下,管理层激励对企业避税行为的影响。其次,与国外的私有产权相比,我国具有很特殊的现象,即我国存在国有控股上市公司与非国有控股上市公司,并且国有控股上市公司比重较大,并且本文认为,所有权类型的差异会使得公司管理层对于公司避税行为做出不同的决策,因此在模型中加入了衡量所有权类型的虚拟变量,检验分析在不同所有权类型下,管理层激励对企业避税行为的影响是否存在显著差异。研究表明:管理层薪酬激励与企业避税行为存在正相关关系,管理层内部薪酬差距与企业避税行为呈现负相关关系,且均对非国有控股上市公司的避税行为差生更大的影响;管理层在职消费与企业避税行为呈现负相关关系,对国有控股上市公司的避税行为带来的负面影响更大;管理层股权激励与企业避税行为存在正相关关系,但是对非国有控股、国有控股上市公司的避税行为影响差异不大。本文的研究,丰富了我国避税行为方面的实证理论研究,有助于提出完善我国税收征管制度的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The incentive mechanism of management is an important part of modern corporate governance structure. In the case of separation of ownership and management, shareholders pursue the maximization of enterprise value. The maximization of self-interest is the goal pursued by the management, which makes the interests of the managers who have the management right of the company and the shareholders with the ownership of the company are not exactly the same. To some extent, this will prevent the realization of the goal of shareholder wealth maximization. Existing research has proved that the emergence of modern enterprise system due to the separation of ownership and management rights. The conflict of interest between the owner and the operator affects the enterprise tax avoidance behavior. Tax evasion is a common phenomenon in the world, shareholders in order to obtain tax evasion can get profits. It may provide a higher incentive reward for management. Then, as an effective means to reduce agency costs and motivate management to work hard. Whether corporate managers can be stimulated to make tax avoidance decisions to increase after-tax income has become a growing concern of scholars. Firstly, this paper reviews and summarizes the existing literature at home and abroad. Then combing the ideas and framework of the article, and then related to the concept and basic theory are described. Then it reveals the theoretical and logical relationship between management incentives and corporate tax avoidance activities, and then puts forward eight research hypotheses about management incentives and corporate tax avoidance behavior. After variable design and model construction. In the process of empirical test and analysis, first, the overall sample of regression test, analysis of the total sample, management incentives on the impact of corporate tax avoidance behavior. Compared with foreign private property rights, China has a very special phenomenon, that is, there are state-owned holding listed companies and non-state-owned holding listed companies, and the proportion of state-owned holding listed companies is large, and this paper believes that. The difference of ownership type will make managers make different decisions on corporate tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, virtual variables to measure ownership type are added to the model to test and analyze the different types of ownership. Whether there are significant differences in the influence of management incentive on corporate tax avoidance behavior. The study shows that there is a positive correlation between management compensation incentive and corporate tax avoidance behavior. There is a negative correlation between the internal pay gap of management and corporate tax avoidance behavior, and both of them have a greater impact on the poor tax avoidance behavior of non-state-owned holding listed companies. There is a negative correlation between the in-service consumption of management and corporate tax avoidance behavior, which has a greater negative impact on the tax avoidance behavior of state-owned holding listed companies. There is a positive correlation between managerial equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance behavior, but there is little difference in tax avoidance behavior between non-state-owned holding and state-owned holding listed companies. It enriches the empirical theoretical research on tax avoidance behavior in China, and it is helpful to put forward some policy suggestions to perfect the tax collection and management system in China.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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