董事多重职位与企业并购绩效研究

发布时间：2018-01-12 09:17

本文关键词：董事多重职位与企业并购绩效研究　出处：《广东外语外贸大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在全球经济不景气,国内经济结构急需调整的大背景下,我国经济处于产业升级与转型的关键时期。大多行业处于优化资源配置阶段,越来越多产业到了需要通过并购实现大规模整合的时候。2014年我国企业并购交易金额将近7 000亿元,2015年并购交易金额则突破了10 000亿元,2016年的并购交易规模再创新高,达到13 000亿元。新型产业,如互联网等,已经开始通过并购的方式进行行业整合,如优酷和土豆,滴滴出行和Uber等;传统行业在近年来的供给侧改革下,也带来了一些并购整合机会,我国正处于重组并购和产业整合的新阶段和黄金时期。并购活动作为实现优化资源配置的一种方式,无论是对宏观经济层面还是公司个体层面,都具有重要意义,其中并购绩效尤其受到关注。而近年来,公司治理与并购绩效的关系,引起了学术界的关注。本文的研究对象是董事多重职位与企业并购绩效的关系。董事多重职位主要从两方面进行衡量,一是董事长与总经理两职合一;二是连锁董事,在两个及两个以上企业兼任董事即为连锁董事。在以往的研究中,一般将两职合一作为公司治理结构其中一个衡量变量进行研究。而连锁董事则更多的是从连锁董事形成的董事联结,与企业行为或企业绩效方面进行研究。本文从公司治理中董事在并购决策中担任的角色出发,研究两者和企业并购绩效的关系。本文通过选取2013-2015年沪深A股1096个并购事件为样本,对董事多重职位与并购绩效方面的关系进行了研究,构建了多元线性回归模型,进行了实证检验。得出以下结论:(1)董事长与总经理两职合一与企业并购绩效显著正相关关系。(2)连锁董事与公司并购绩效呈负相关关系。说明连锁董事的存在会减损企业并购绩效。(3)董事长与总经理两职合一与连锁董事对企业并购绩效的联合作用为负。(4)存在两职合一的企业,在并购中,公司治理水平较高的企业比公司治理水平较低的企业获得了更高的超额累积收益率。拥有连锁董事关系的并购企业,公司治理水平的提高对其产生的代理问题没有显著缓解作用。同时存在两职合一和连锁董事的企业,公司治理水平对企业并购绩效有正面影响,有显著。基于上述研究发现,本文提出如下建议:(1)企业在进行并购时,应继续保持谨慎态度,勿降低并购过程中的尽调要求。(2)完善公司治理机制,给予董事合适的激励,以此缓解代理冲突。(3)提高公司治理水平,提高公司运营效率。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the global economic depression and the urgent need to adjust the domestic economic structure, China's economy is in the critical period of industrial upgrading and transformation, and most industries are in the phase of optimizing the allocation of resources. More and more industries need to achieve large-scale integration through mergers and acquisitions. In 2014, the amount of M & A transactions in China was nearly 700 billion yuan. In 2015, the amount of M & A transactions exceeded 1 tillion yuan, and in 2016, the scale of M & A transactions reached a new high of 1.3 tillion yuan. New industries, such as the Internet, etc. Has begun to merge through mergers and acquisitions, such as Youku and Tudou, DiDi and Uber, and so on; Under the supply-side reform in recent years, the traditional industry has also brought some opportunities for merger and acquisition integration. China is in the new and golden stage of restructuring and industrial integration. M & A activities as a way to optimize the allocation of resources, whether on the macroeconomic level or individual level of the company. In recent years, the relationship between corporate governance and M & A performance is very important. The research object of this paper is the relationship between the multiple positions of directors and the performance of corporate mergers and acquisitions. The multiple positions of directors are mainly measured from two aspects: the first is the integration of the positions of chairman and general manager; Second, chain directors, in two or more enterprises concurrently as directors of the chain directors. In previous studies. Generally, the combination of two positions is considered as one of the measurement variables of corporate governance structure, while the chain director is more likely to form a board connection from the chain director. This paper starts from the role of directors in M & A decision in corporate governance. This paper studies the relationship between the two and corporate M & A performance. This paper selects 1096 A-share M & A events from 2013 to 2015 as samples. The relationship between multiple positions of directors and M & A performance is studied, and a multivariate linear regression model is constructed. An empirical test is carried out. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between the integration of chairman and general manager and corporate M & A performance. There is a negative correlation between chain directors and M & A performance, which indicates that the existence of chain directors will detract from M & A performance. The combined effect of chairman and general manager and chain director on M & A performance is negative. In M & A, the higher corporate governance level than the lower corporate governance level of enterprises to obtain a higher excess cumulative return. The improvement of corporate governance level has no significant role to alleviate the agency problem. At the same time, there are two positions and chain directors of the enterprises, corporate governance level has a positive impact on corporate M & A performance. Based on the findings of the above research, this paper proposes the following suggestions: 1) Enterprises should continue to be cautious in their M & A, not to reduce the requirement of full regulation in the process of M & A, and to improve the corporate governance mechanism. Give the appropriate incentive to the director, so as to alleviate the agency conflict. 3) improve the level of corporate governance, improve the efficiency of the company operation.
【学位授予单位】：广东外语外贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F271;F832.51

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