金融分权的逻辑:行政发包制及其影响

发布时间：2018-01-14 05:25

本文关键词：金融分权的逻辑:行政发包制及其影响　出处：《上海经济研究》2017年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在微型金融领域,中央与地方金融分权体现了行政发包制的逻辑,在科层制内部引入了市场发包因素。中央政府以属地管理原则为基准,把监管权限和风险处置责任发包给省级政府,但省级政府在保留准入审批权的同时,把日常监督、市场退出监管权限以及风险处置责任继续发包,直至县级政府。而地方政府获取监管权限和承担风险处置责任的内在动力来源于发展本地金融产业的经济激励。这种金融分权模式存在着内部不稳定性,并对微型金融体系产生了消极性影响。因此,行政发包制的改革必须以监管事务的性质为基准配置中央和地方政府之间的监管权限和风险处置责任,实施以消费者保护为核心的非审慎监管,并建立中央与省级政府之间的协商沟通和合作监管机制。
[Abstract]:In the field of micro-finance, the decentralization of central and local finance embodies the logic of administrative contracting system, and introduces the market contracting factor within the branch system. The central government takes the principle of territorial management as the benchmark. The supervision authority and the risk disposal responsibility will be contracted out to the provincial government, but the provincial government will continue to contract the daily supervision, the market exit supervision authority and the risk disposal responsibility while reserving the right to enter into the examination and approval. Until the county level government, and the local government to obtain regulatory authority and assume responsibility for risk management, the inherent driving force comes from the development of local financial industry economic incentives. There is internal instability in this mode of financial decentralization. Therefore, the reform of administrative contract system must be based on the nature of regulatory affairs to allocate the regulatory authority and risk management responsibility between the central and local governments. Non-prudential supervision with consumer protection as the core is implemented, and the mechanism of consultation, communication and cooperation between central and provincial governments is established.
【作者单位】：上海工程技术大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般项目:微型金融领域中央与地方监管权的划分问题研究(批准编号:15BFX128)资助
【分类号】：F832.1
【正文快照】： 一、引言改革开放初期,中央与地方政府的金融分权问题就已经产生(1)。在1978-1992年间的第一次分权阶段,地方政府实际获得了信贷计划权、信托投资公司审批权,以及证券市场管理权,甚至直接任免国有银行地方分支行的人事(汤柳,2011)。金融监管权限上收起始于1993年全面清理信

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