我国上市公司股票期权激励有效性的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-22 15:05

本文关键词： 股票期权激励人力资本公司绩效　出处：《山东建筑大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着现代企业经营管理模式中所有者和经营者的分离,在委托代理的理论基础之上,为了更好的解决所有者与管理者之间目标不一致的问题,进而使得企业所有者和管理者形成一个利益共同体,股票期权激励制度随之应运而生。股票期权激励理论产生于上个世纪50年代,最早在欧美地区得到了广泛的应用,并在西方发达国家上市公司的实施过程中取得了巨大的成功。我国对于股票期权激励的研究较晚,于上个世纪90年代才开始引入股票期权激励理论,在借鉴欧美等地区的成功与失败经验的基础之上,众多学者和企业家们纷纷探索适合中国企业管理的股票期权激励应用模式。随着2005年伊始的我国股权分置改革的不断推进,和中国证监会于2006年颁布的《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》,股票期权激励制度在我国广泛实施的法律环境保障已经初步形成,股票期权激励制度在我国上市公司中的广泛实施掀开了新的篇章。截至到目前,在不断改善股票期权激励制度的道路上,股票期权制度在我国得到了成功运行,并在一定程度上取得了不小的成功。但是,要想走向更大的成功,彻底将股票期权激励制度转化为我国企业在新一轮经济态势中得以腾飞的助推器,仍需对于在实施股票期权激励的过程中出现的问题做出进一步地研究改善。因此,本论文基于改善股票期权激励制度的迫切性需要,分为五个章节,首先阐述了股票期权激励的理论基础,并在此基础之上大量翻阅并总结了国内外学者对股票期权激励制度的研究进展。紧接着,从我国上市公司中实施股票期权激励制度的实际出发,分析我国上市公司股票期权激励制度的实施现状,主要表现为股票期权激励比例低、激励有效期短、激励计划的考核指标单一、实施企业尤以非国有企业为主,这为后续的检验股票期权激励的有效性做好了全面的准备。其次,以我国沪深A股实施股票期权激励的上市公司为研究样本,选取样本上市公司自2010年至2016年的数据,综合运用主成分分析和回归分析,对高管的持股比例、员工的知识层次和股权性质与公司绩效的关系分别进行了实证检验,得出,在我国现行的股票期权激励计划下,高程度的高管的持股比例和较高程度的员工知识水平可以更加有效地提升企业的公司绩效,同时在对实施股票期权激励计划的股权属性分析中可以得出,非国有企业的实施范围更加广泛,但是非国有企业并没有取得比国有企业更加优异的绩效。最终在此基础之上,为更好的完善股票期权激励制度和更有效的实施股票期权激励提出建设性意见,从而在一定程度上促进我国股票期权激励在应用中取得更大的成功。
[Abstract]:With the separation of owners and managers in modern enterprise management mode, on the basis of principal-agent theory, in order to better solve the problem of inconsistent objectives between owners and managers. As a result, the owners and managers of enterprises form a community of interests, and the stock option incentive system emerges as the times require. The theory of stock option incentive came into being in -50s. It has been widely used in Europe and America, and has achieved great success in the process of implementation of listed companies in western developed countries. In -10s, stock option incentive theory began to be introduced, on the basis of the successful and failed experience of Europe and the United States and other regions. Many scholars and entrepreneurs have explored the application mode of stock option incentive which is suitable for the management of Chinese enterprises. With the development of the split share structure reform in China at the beginning of 2005. And China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2006 promulgated the "listed companies equity incentive management measures (trial)", the stock option incentive system has been widely implemented in China, the legal environment has been initially formed. The extensive implementation of stock option incentive system in Chinese listed companies has opened a new chapter. Up to now, the stock option system has been successfully operated in our country on the way of continuously improving the stock option incentive system. To a certain extent, it has made great success. However, in order to achieve greater success, the stock option incentive system will be transformed into a booster for Chinese enterprises to take off in the new round of economic situation. We still need to further study and improve the problems in the process of implementing stock option incentive. Therefore, this paper is divided into five chapters based on the urgent need to improve the stock option incentive system. First of all, the theoretical basis of stock option incentive is described, and on this basis, a large number of review and summary of domestic and foreign scholars on the stock option incentive system research progress. Based on the practice of stock option incentive system in listed companies in China, this paper analyzes the actualization status of stock option incentive system of listed companies in China. It mainly shows that the proportion of stock option incentive is low and the incentive period is short. The evaluation index of incentive plan is single, and the implementation of enterprises is mainly non-state-owned enterprises, which makes a comprehensive preparation for the follow-up test of the effectiveness of stock option incentive. Secondly. Taking the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares to implement stock option incentive as the research sample, the data of the sample listed companies from 2010 to 2016 are selected, and the principal component analysis and regression analysis are used synthetically. The paper empirically tests the relationship between the proportion of senior managers' shareholding, employees' knowledge level and the nature of ownership and corporate performance, and draws a conclusion that under the current stock option incentive plan in China. A high level of executive ownership and a higher level of employee knowledge can improve corporate performance more effectively, and at the same time, it can be concluded in the stock ownership attribute analysis of the implementation of stock option incentive plan. The scope of implementation of non-state-owned enterprises is wider, but non-state-owned enterprises have not achieved better performance than state-owned enterprises. Finally, on this basis. In order to perfect the incentive system of stock option and implement the incentive of stock option more effectively, this paper puts forward some constructive suggestions, thus promoting the application of stock option incentive in our country to a certain extent.
【学位授予单位】：山东建筑大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.5

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