基于反收购视角的万科股权之争案例分析

发布时间：2018-01-31 13:22

本文关键词： 反收购股权结构混业经营资产重组　出处：《河北大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自2012年以来我国经济进入明显的下行通道,不断降低的资产回报率与货币宽松政策共同造就了资金较多而优质资产较少的“资产荒”局面。“资产荒”问题使得金融机构风险偏好逐渐增强,不断通过配置高风险的资产来增加盈利。另一方面,金融混业经营不断增速,银行理财资金绕道进入股市,保险资金也在资本市场频频举牌,混业经营使得金融牌照价值大幅走高,一些保险企业甚至成为了控股公司投融资的利器。在这一系列因素的叠加下,催生了以融资难度降低、资金脱实向虚、优质企业吸引力增强为特征的第六次收购浪潮。在这次浪潮中,以弱吞强、杠杆收购为特征的恶意收购事件不断涌现。尤其是2015年7月开始的万科股权之争事件牵动着我国资本市场所有人的神经。面对大环境下恶意收购的不断增多、混业经营带来的金融风险不断增加等问题,以万科股权之争事件为切入点进行深入的案例分析,将对我国上市公司的公司治理及反收购战略设计提供借鉴,对金融业新形势下的协同监管也有积极意义。本文首先对中西方关于反收购理论的发展历程进行了回顾,通过综合整理国内外关于反收购的前沿理论成果,对案例分析提供理论支持。在具体案例分析的过程中,以时间进程和资金流动两条线索同时对案例进行梳理,在运用理论分析的同时注重结合我国资本市场独特的法律环境和制度环境,通过对收购与反收购双方的动机、策略进行分析与点评,设计出具有中国特色、符合中国国情的反收购方案。最后,由个案分析上升到对上市公司治理的启示以及宏观监管政策制定的建议层面,将个案中普遍适用的原理进行推广。在万科股权之争的案例中,恶意收购方宝能系利用保险资金、银行配资、股权质押、收益互换、融资融券等多种手段以杠杆收购的方式抢购万科股份成为了万科第一大股东。宝能系利用了众多金融工具,资金流动较为隐蔽,杠杆比例也较高,风险极大。万科管理层在事件中,利用资产重组、拉拢股东、增加员工持股等方式反击宝能系,手段很多,但效果有限,直至监管层的介入才基本平息股权纷争。这也反映出了我国上市公司普遍风险意识不强、忽略中小股东利益、公司治理存在缺陷等问题。在金融机构混业经营加速、资产荒与资金脱实向虚不断加剧的新形势下,我国上市公司在反收购战略设计上应该更加注重预防措施的建立,以预防为主,攻击为辅,同时在公司治理上将股权结构和股东利益问题解决好,将恶意收购扼杀在摇篮之中。金融监管部门也应加强对混业经营与金融创新的监管,在制度设计上为优秀的上市公司发展保驾护航。
[Abstract]:Since 2012, China's economy has entered an obvious downward channel. The declining rate of return on assets and monetary easing policy together created a "shortage of assets" with more capital and less high-quality assets. The problem of "asset shortage" makes financial institutions' risk appetite gradually increase. On the other hand, the financial mixed operation continues to grow, the bank financial management funds detour into the stock market, insurance funds are also frequently held in the capital market. Mixed operation makes the value of financial license greatly higher, and some insurance companies even become a sharp weapon for holding companies to invest and finance. Under the superposition of this series of factors, the difficulty of financing is reduced, and the funds are devoid of reality. A wave of 6th acquisitions characterized by an increase in the attractiveness of quality companies. In this wave, it is weak and strong. The hostile takeover events characterized by leveraged buyouts continue to emerge, especially the Vanke stock ownership dispute that began on July 2015, which affects the nerves of all people in the capital market of our country. In the face of the increasing hostile takeover under the general environment. More. The financial risk caused by mixed operation is increasing and so on. Taking Vanke's stock right dispute as the starting point, the in-depth case analysis will provide reference for the corporate governance and anti-takeover strategy design of listed companies in China. This paper first reviews the development of anti-takeover theory in China and the West, and summarizes the frontier theoretical achievements of anti-takeover at home and abroad. To provide theoretical support for case analysis. In the process of specific case analysis, the case is combed with two clues: time process and capital flow. In the use of theoretical analysis at the same time pay attention to the unique legal and institutional environment of China's capital market, through the acquisition and anti-takeover of both sides of the motivation, strategy analysis and comments, the design has Chinese characteristics. Finally, from case analysis to the enlightenment to the listed company governance and macro-regulatory policy recommendations. In the case of Vanke equity dispute, the malicious takeover of Fang Baoneng is the use of insurance funds, bank allocation, equity pledge, income swaps. Margin financing and other means of leveraged buy-out to buy Vanke shares became the largest shareholder of Vanke. Baoneng used many financial instruments, the capital flow is more hidden, leverage ratio is also high. Great risk. Vanke management in the incident, the use of asset restructuring, attract shareholders, increase employee ownership and other ways to counter Baoneng system, many means, but the effect is limited. Until the intervention of the regulatory level before the basic settlement of the stock dispute, which also reflects the general risk awareness of listed companies in China is not strong, ignoring the interests of small and medium shareholders. There are some defects in corporate governance. Under the new situation of accelerating the mixed operation of financial institutions, the shortage of assets and the shortage of funds are becoming more and more serious. China's listed companies in the anti-takeover strategy design should pay more attention to the establishment of preventive measures, mainly to prevent, attack as a supplementary, at the same time in corporate governance will be the equity structure and shareholders' interests to solve the problem. The financial supervision department should also strengthen the supervision of mixed operation and financial innovation, and guarantee the development of outstanding listed companies in the system design.
【学位授予单位】：河北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F299.233.4

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