双众筹平台垄断下的新用户优惠定价分析

发布时间：2018-02-20 23:23

本文关键词： 创新技术创新创新项目奖励型众筹优惠定价　出处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：众筹作为舶来品进入中国市场以来,发展快速且竞争激烈,电商平台也凭借其流量优势强势进入,但却没有出现我国商业中常用的新用户优惠定价策略。在众筹平台不对项目收费假设前提下,以项目发起人的利润最大化和平台方利益最大化为目标,构建了动态双寡头垄断模型。研究证明:在不考虑双平台共同客户情况下,优惠定价最终使两平台平分市场;在考虑共同用户影响下,当两平台初始市场份额差距不大时,平台和发起人均不存在优惠定价的动机,当两平台初始市场份额差距较大时,发起方存在优惠定价的动机。由于共同客户完全弹性,优惠定价会使两平台忠诚客户逐渐变少,最终两寡头会彻底失去产品定价能力。这种理性冲突使得众筹市场不存在新用户优惠定价现象。
[Abstract]:Since crowdfunding has entered the Chinese market as an imported product, it has developed rapidly and has been intensely competitive. The e-commerce platform has also come in strongly with its flow advantage. However, there is no new user preferential pricing strategy commonly used in Chinese business. Under the premise that the crowdfunding platform does not charge for the project, the goal is to maximize the profit of the project initiator and the benefit of the platform. The dynamic duopoly model is constructed. It is proved that the preferential pricing results in the split market of the two platforms without considering the common customers of the two platforms, and when the initial market share gap between the two platforms is not large, considering the influence of common users, When the initial market share difference between the two platforms is large, the initiator has the incentive of preferential pricing. Because of the complete flexibility of the common customers, the preferential pricing will make the loyal customers of the two platforms become less and less. In the end, the two oligarchs will lose their pricing power completely. This rational conflict does not allow new users to offer preferential pricing in crowdfunding markets.
【作者单位】：中国科学技术大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71472172) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目(14YJA630035)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.4

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