基于复制动态的消费者众筹策略演化动态

发布时间：2018-02-24 14:40

本文关键词： 演化博弈众筹复制动态方程吸引域　出处：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年11期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：采用大群体反复博弈-复制动态演化博弈,在公平贡献和利他主义两种情景下,建立了有限理性的消费者群体通过模仿学习不断调整支持众筹和不支持众筹两策略多人博弈的演化系统.通过对不同参数变化对系统演化稳定均衡及吸引域的影响分析,研究了存在消费者后悔度条件下各因素对众筹演化成功的影响机制.研究发现,公平贡献机制下不考虑后悔度,则支持众筹策略占优,考虑众筹失败带给消费者后悔产生负效益时,当融资目标越小,产品质量越高,消费者偏好越大,团体效用越大,越有利于众筹演化成功,然而发行份额的增加会带给消费者搭便车的投机行为,从而抑制众筹成功.在利他主义策略下,消费者偏好、产品质量和团体效用越大,越有利于众筹演化成功,但是当融资目标不变而发行份额增加时,消费者搭便车的行为却没有增加,反而提高了众筹演化成功的概率.
[Abstract]:In the case of fair contribution and altruism, the large group repeated game replicating dynamic evolution game is adopted. An evolutionary system of multi-player game between crowdfunding and non-crowdfunding is established by imitating learning. The influence of different parameters on the evolution stability equilibrium and attraction region of the system is analyzed. This paper studies the influence mechanism of various factors on the success of crowdfunding evolution under the condition of consumer regret. It is found that if regret is not considered in fair contribution mechanism, crowdfunding strategy will prevail. Considering that the failure of crowdfunding brings negative benefits to consumers, when the financing target is smaller, the product quality is higher, the consumer preference is greater, and the group utility is greater, the more conducive to the success of crowdfunding evolution, However, the increase in distribution share will bring consumers free rider speculation and thus curb crowdfunding success. Under altruistic strategies, the greater consumer preferences, product quality and group utility, the more conducive to the evolution of crowdfunding success. However, when the financing target remains unchanged and the issue share increases, the free-rider behavior of consumers does not increase, but increases the probability of success of crowdfunding evolution.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;武汉理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71231007) 青年科学基金项目(71501149)~~
【分类号】：F224.32;F832

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