互联网众筹平台监管策略的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-03-07 21:16

本文选题：互联网众筹　切入点：逆向选择　出处：《当代财经》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在互联网众筹市场中,由于项目发起人和消费者之间存在事前信息不对称,导致消费者在选择投资项目的过程中面临较大的风险;而作为中介的众筹平台,对发起人监督机制下的惩罚效用可以有效地规避此类问题。运用演化博弈理论分析了互联网众筹中,具有有限理性的众筹平台和项目发起人策略选择的互动机制,得出如下结论:在不考虑平台和发起人受外界声誉激励时,众筹平台的监管惩罚力度越大,发起人策略演化趋于如实揭示策略的可能性越大;项目发起人欺骗的程度越大,众筹平台策略演化趋于监管策略的可能性越大。反之,消费者资金安全问题将由平台承担其损失。有效实施监管,运用不同程度的惩罚策略,可以有效规制众筹平台项目发起人隐藏产品信息欺骗消费者的行为,引导发起人如实揭示项目类型,减少信息不对称带来的逆向选择,提高消费者参与众筹的积极性。
[Abstract]:In the Internet crowdfunding market, due to the asymmetry of prior information between the project sponsors and consumers, consumers face greater risks in the process of choosing investment projects. The penalty utility under the supervision mechanism of promoters can effectively avoid this kind of problems. This paper analyzes the interactive mechanism between the limited rational crowdfunding platform and the choice of project promoters' strategies in the Internet crowdfunding by using evolutionary game theory. The conclusion is as follows: without considering that the platform and promoters are motivated by external reputation, the stronger the regulatory punishment of the platform is, the more likely it is that the promoters' strategy evolution tends to reveal the strategy truthfully, and the greater the degree of cheating by the project sponsors, The more likely the strategy of crowdfunding platform evolves to be a regulatory strategy, the more likely it is that the platform will bear its losses in terms of consumer financial security. It can effectively regulate the behavior of the promoters of crowdfunding platform to hide the product information to deceive consumers, guide the promoters to reveal the types of projects truthfully, reduce the adverse selection caused by asymmetric information, and improve the enthusiasm of consumers to participate in crowdfunding.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;武汉理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目“复杂不确定性多主体多目标合作博弈与协商谈判的合作机制与合作模式”(71231007);国家自然科学基金青年项目“复杂工程中不完全信息多议题争端谈判的博弈模型与合作机制研究”(71501149)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832

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