Y公司先收购后定增模式背后的利益输送研究

发布时间：2018-03-07 23:32

本文选题：资本运作　切入点：利益输送　出处：《广东工业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2015年以来,我国政府主动适应和引领新常态,不断创新宏观调控方式,并在深化经济体制改革的重点工作中,越来越重视资本市场环境的改善,在很大程度上提高了我国资本市场的活跃度,推进了资本运作的发展。从而创新出了各种各样的资本运作模式,先收购后定增模式是其中的典型。尽管,资本运作越来越多样化,但是,相关的监管措施并没有完全配套,有效的市场约束机制还未形成。因此,给了有关上市公司进行利益输送的可乘之机。本文旨在综合借鉴委托代理,信息不对称,博弈论等相关理论,对典型案例Y公司资本运作的过程和动因,效果进行深入剖析,并结合《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》,研究先收购后定增的资本运作模式背后是否存在绕行重大资产重组,借壳上市等逃避市场监管,给上市公司进行输送利益的行为。同时,挖掘上市公司的具体运作细节,探究利用此模式来进行利益输送的原因和实施条件。最后,为如何防止该模式的不合规运作,进一步规范资本市场的可能性提供参考建议。本文研究结果表明,首先,复杂的委托代理关系链造成了内部治理环境的部分失效,进一步导致了委托意愿分化和信息不对称的现象,并激化了大股东和中小股东的矛盾,借助各种资本运作模式,给利益输送提供了内部滋生的土壤。然后,中小股东群体和监管者群体的行为选择,对大股东群体进行利益输送行为选择会产生影响,中小股东和监管层对制衡大股东利益输送至关重要。降低大股东进行利益输送的概率的路径主要有:减少中小股东的举报成本,减少监管层的查处成本,提高大股东侵害中小股东利益的成本,提高大股东被查处后所付出的代价以及提高查处的成功率。最后,从Y公司资本运作利益输送案例分析的过程和结果,以及搜集的证据来看,Y公司在先收购后定增模式的资本运作中,存在对Y公司收购Z公司的收购比例进行优化考量后,搭配合适的运作时机,并通过定向增发的宣告效应以及后续分红派息,高转送来给大股东牟利的嫌疑。
[Abstract]:Since 2015, our government has been actively adapting to and leading the new normal, innovating the macro-control mode, and paying more and more attention to the improvement of the capital market environment in the key work of deepening the economic system reform. To a large extent, it has improved the activity of our capital market and promoted the development of capital operation. As a result, a variety of capital operation modes have been innovated, among which the mode of first acquisition and then fixed increase is a typical one. The capital operation is becoming more and more diversified, but the relevant regulatory measures are not fully matched, and an effective market restraint mechanism has not yet been formed. This paper aims to analyze the process, motivation and effect of capital operation in typical case Y company by using the theories of principal-agent, information asymmetry, game theory and so on for reference. And combining with the "measures for the Management of Major assets restructuring of listed companies", to study whether there are any evasion of market supervision behind the capital operation mode of first purchasing and then increasing, such as bypassing major asset restructuring, listing through backdoor listing, etc. At the same time, excavate the specific operating details of the listed company, explore the reasons and conditions of using this model to carry out the benefit transmission. Finally, in order to prevent the irregular operation of the model, The results of this paper show that, first of all, the complex principal-agent relationship chain results in partial failure of the internal governance environment. It further leads to the polarization of willingness to entrust and asymmetric information, and intensifies the contradictions between large and small shareholders, and provides an internal breeding ground for the transmission of benefits by means of various modes of capital operation. The behavior choice of minority shareholder group and regulator group will have an impact on the choice of interest transmission behavior of large shareholder group. The ways to reduce the probability of large shareholders' interest transmission are as follows: reducing the reporting cost of small and medium shareholders, reducing the investigation and punishment costs of supervision level. To increase the cost of large shareholders infringing on the interests of minority shareholders, to increase the costs paid by large shareholders after being investigated and to improve the success rate of investigation and punishment. Finally, the process and results of the case study on the transfer of capital operating benefits from Y Company are analyzed. As well as the evidence collected, we can see that in the capital operation of YY Company in the mode of first acquisition and then fixed increase, there is an optimized consideration of the acquisition ratio of Company Y to Company Z, which matches the appropriate operation opportunity. And through the announcement effect of directional additional issue and subsequent dividend payout, high transfer to the suspicion of making profits for large shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：广东工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F426.6

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