地方政府间环境规制竞争对FDI区位选择影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-08 21:26

本文选题：环境规制　切入点：地方政府竞争　出处：《中国矿业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在全球经济体密切联系、区域经济一体化发展不断加快的宏观大背景下,外商直接投资对我国的经济发展产生着深远的影响,成为我国经济发展的重要推动力。近年来在科学发展观的指导下,我国政府更加注重经济与环境协调发展,强调生态环境保护在社会经济发展中的重要地位,环境保护政策逐年严格化。然而严格的环境规制政策会增加企业的生产经营成本,在很大程度上影响着外资企业的区位选择。在中国财政分权与政治集权的制度框架下,以经济增长为核心的政绩考核机制促使地方政府间展开了激烈的引资竞争,其中,通过竞相降低环境标准以吸引外商资本流入是典型的手段之一。地方政府间环境规制恶性竞争的行为非常不利于我国生态文明建设和可持续经济发展。针对上述情况,本文首先阐述了环境规制对FDI区位选择的作用机制;然后分别运用博弈论和社会网络分析法从理论和实证两方面分析了地方政府间环境规制竞争机理;最后在以上理论框架的基础上,选用2000-2014年省际面板数据实证研究我国地方政府环境规制竞争对外商直接投资区位选择的影响。研究结果显示:(1)放松环境规制能够显著增加一个地区FDI的流入,各地方政府出于辖区利益最大化的目标,有动机降低环境规制水平以吸引FDI流入;(2)地方政府之间的环境政策博弈的确存在着“逐底竞争”的特征,环境规制成为地方政府间争夺经济增长的博弈工具;(3)外商直接投资具有地区集聚效应,外商直接投资企业倾向于选择基础设施和工业配套程度较好、外资企业集中的地区。然而,当一个区域内经济资源稀缺或有限时,地区间便会展开争夺FDI的竞争。在以上实证研究结论的基础上,本文结合中国的国情提出了相应的对策建议,以期优化我国外商投资结构,匡正我国地方政府间的竞争行为,建立区域合作发展、互利共赢的机制,实现我国国民经济持续健康稳定发展。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the close relationship between the global economy and the accelerating development of regional economic integration, foreign direct investment (FDI) has a profound impact on the economic development of our country. In recent years, under the guidance of the scientific concept of development, our government has paid more attention to the coordinated development of economy and environment, and emphasized the important position of ecological environment protection in the social and economic development. The environmental protection policy becomes more and more strict year by year. However, strict environmental regulation policy will increase the cost of production and operation of enterprises, and to a great extent affect the location choice of foreign-funded enterprises. Under the framework of fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China, The performance assessment mechanism, which takes economic growth as the core, has prompted fierce competition among local governments to attract investment, among which, It is one of the typical means to attract foreign capital inflow by competing to lower environmental standards. The vicious competition behavior of environmental regulation among local governments is very harmful to the construction of ecological civilization and sustainable economic development in China. This paper first expounds the mechanism of environmental regulation on FDI location choice, and then analyzes the mechanism of environmental regulation competition between local governments from two aspects of theory and demonstration, using game theory and social network analysis method, respectively. Finally, on the basis of the above theoretical framework, Using the provincial panel data from 2000 to 2014 to study the impact of local government environmental regulation competition on FDI location selection, the results show that the relaxation of environmental regulation can significantly increase the inflow of FDI in a region. In order to maximize the interests of local governments, local governments are motivated to reduce the level of environmental regulation in order to attract FDI into the local government.) the "bottom-by-bottom competition" does exist in the environmental policy game among local governments. Environmental regulation has become a game tool for local governments to compete for economic growth. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has the effect of regional agglomeration. Foreign direct investment enterprises tend to choose infrastructure and industry supporting degree better. However, when the economic resources in a region are scarce or limited, there will be competition between regions for FDI. According to the situation of China, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions in order to optimize the structure of foreign investment in China, correct the competitive behavior among local governments in China, and establish a mechanism of regional cooperation and development, mutual benefit and win-win. To achieve sustained, healthy and stable development of our national economy.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F832.6

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