风险投资网络具有“传染”效应吗——基于上市公司超薪酬的研究

发布时间：2018-03-09 12:05

本文选题：关系网络　切入点：风险投资　出处：《南开管理评论》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：关系网络的"传染"效应指的是由网络的信息传导带来的网络内个体的行为趋同。对这一问题的检验是关系网络研究的重要领域,也为关系网络的信息功能提供了直接证据。因此本文以我国的风险投资网络为对象,以上市公司超薪酬问题为切入点,考察风险投资网络的"传染"效应问题。研究发现:第一,风险投资网络具有传染效应。即当与超薪酬公司具有共同的风险投资联结时,样本公司更有可能出现超薪酬现象;第二,"强联结"会加强网络的传染效应。风险投资所联接的样本公司与超薪酬公司的相似性越强,包括地域、成长性、风险等方面的相似,样本公司出现超薪酬的可能性也越大;第三,风险投资对上市公司的控制力也有可能加强网络的传染效应。当风投向投资项目派出高管时,样本公司更有可能出现超薪酬现象。在控制内生性等问题后,上述结论依然成立。本文的研究发现拓展了我国的关系网络研究,也从关系网络视角说明,风险投资作为积极投资者,有激励介入项目的公司治理。
[Abstract]:The "contagion" effect of relational networks refers to the behavior convergence of individuals in the network brought about by the information transmission of the network. The examination of this problem is an important field in the research of relational networks. It also provides direct evidence for the information function of the relational network. Therefore, this paper takes the venture capital network of our country as the object, and takes the overpayment problem of listed companies as the starting point. This paper investigates the "contagion" effect of venture capital network. The results show that: first, venture capital network has contagion effect, that is, the sample company is more likely to have the phenomenon of overcompensation when it has the same venture capital association with the super-compensation company; Second, "strong connection" will enhance the contagion effect of the network. The more similarity between the sample companies linked by venture capital and the overpaid companies, including the similarities in terms of location, growth, risk, etc. The more likely a sample company is to be overpaid, the third, the control of venture capital over a listed company may also strengthen the contagion effect of the network. The above conclusion is still true after controlling the endogenous problems. The findings of this paper expand the research of the relationship network in China, and explain from the perspective of the relationship network. Venture capital as an active investor, there are incentives to intervene in the project corporate governance.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院会计系;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学基金(15YJC790001);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(16JJD790034)资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F832.48

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